Holmes v. Chen

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 KIARA HOLMES, Case No. 24-cv-00115-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. RECUSE

10 STEVE CHEN, et al., Re: ECF No. 84 Defendants. 11

13 Plaintiff Kiara Holmes has filed a motion for this Court to recuse. ECF No. 84. The Court 14 will deny the motion. See Civ. L.R. 3–14. 15 Motions to disqualify or recuse a judge fall under two statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. 16 § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 144 provides for recusal where a party files a timely and 17 sufficient affidavit averring that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias 18 or prejudice either against the party or in favor of an adverse party, and setting forth the facts and 19 reasons for such belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 144. 20 A judge finding a § 144 motion timely and the affidavits legally sufficient must proceed no 21 further and another judge must be assigned to hear the matter. See id.; United States v. Sibla, 624 22 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Where the affidavit is not legally sufficient, however, the judge at 23 whom the motion is directed may determine the matter. See id. at 868 (holding judge challenged 24 under § 144 properly heard and denied motion where affidavit not legally sufficient). 25 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 144, the standard for recusal is “whether a reasonable person with 26 knowledge of all the facts would conclude the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 27 questioned.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). “Judges are presumed 1 to be honest and to serve with integrity.” McCray v. Ryan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 663, 665 (D. Ariz. 2 2019) (citation omitted). 3 Here, Plaintiff’s affidavit is not legally sufficient. Plaintiff avers that a male judge is 4 unable to decide matters concerning gender discrimination. ECF No. 84 at 4. That the 5 undersigned is male does not disqualify him from deciding a case alleging discrimination against a 6 woman on the basis of gender. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist, No. 1,294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 7 } 2002) (“Judges routinely decide hostile environment sexual harassment cases involving plaintiffs 8 of the opposite sex.”); cf. United States v. Cook, No. 3:18-CR-19-PLR-DCP, 2019 WL 2932660, 9 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 8, 2019) (“the Defendant’s preference for a male judge is not a reason for a 10 judge to recuse herself.”). 11 Plaintiff also asks the Court to recuse because she believes the Court’s rulings “seem bias.” 12 ECF No. 84 at 4. Plaintiff does not identify any evidence that supports this assertion. “A court’s g 13 adverse rulings are not an adequate basis for recusal.” Carr v. Allied Waste Sys. of Alameda Cnty., 14 No. C 10-00715 WHA, 2010 WL 2557768, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2010) (citing Liteky v. 15 United States, 510 U.S. 540, 549 (1994)). a 16 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for disqualification is DENIED.

18 Dated: June 17, 2024 .

19 JON S. TIGA 20 nited States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28