Holmes Burglar Alarm Tel. Co. v. Domestic Telegraph & Telephone Co.

42 F. 220, 1890 U.S. App. LEXIS 2142
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey
DecidedApril 12, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 42 F. 220 (Holmes Burglar Alarm Tel. Co. v. Domestic Telegraph & Telephone Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holmes Burglar Alarm Tel. Co. v. Domestic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 42 F. 220, 1890 U.S. App. LEXIS 2142 (circtdnj 1890).

Opinion

Wales, J.

This suit was brought to restrain the defendants from infringement of reissued letters patent No. 4,297, for improvements in electro-magnetic burglar alarms, granted March 14, 1871, to William B. Guernsey. One of the complainants is the owner of the patent, and the other is alleged to be a licensee under it.

The bill sets out the title of tbe Holmes Burglar Alarm Telegraph Company, and the granting of an exclusive license, for certain purposes, to the Municipal District Telegraph Company; but objection is made in the a'nswer of the defendants that in fact no license was ever granted to the Municipal District Company, and, in consequence of the absence of joint interest and privity between the parties complainant, the bill should be dismissed on account of this misjoinder. Waiving a consid-erati&nof the question whether this objection should not have been taken by a plea in abatement, it is sufficient for tbe present purpose to say tliat the testimony of the witness, Holmes, and the written agreements in relation to the ownership and use of this patent, which are set out in the complainants’ exhibits, afford satisfactory proof that a license was given to the Municipal District Company, as is alleged in the bill. The granting of a license may be proved by the acts and dealings of the parties who own, and permit others to use, the patent, without the necessity of resorting to written instruments; and it clearly appears from the proofs that prior and up to the time of bringing this suit the Municipal District Company had been treated and acknowledged as its licensee by the owner of the patent. This inference of fact is drawn from the transactions which were had between the Holmes Burglar Alarm Company and its immediate licensee, the Protective Company, which latter company transferred its license to tbe Municipal District Company. Admitting, as is claimed by the defendants’ counsel, that the license to the Protective Company was personal only, and not transferable, and that it bad not, prior to its assignment to the Municipal District Company, any right to assign its license, yet it is certain that the Holmes Burglar Alarm Company acquiesced in and ratified the assignment, and thereafter recognized the Municipal District Company as its licensee. There is no restrictive provision in any of the agreements which prevented the owner of the patent from conferring authority on the Protective Company to assign its license, and such authority may be proved without the aid of written articles. This conclusion dispenses with the necessity of dis[222]*222cussing the regularity of the mode adopted by the defendants in presenting the objection of misjoinder, which, under the technical rule of pleading, and equity rule 89, should have been taken advantage of by a plea in abatement.

Another preliminary objection which is insisted on by the defendants’ counsel is that claim 2 of the original Guernsey patent, which is made claim 4 of the reissue, is not covered by the oath of the inventor, and is therefore a nullity, and forms no part of the real patent. There is no evidence on this point, and there is equal ground for the presumption that the oath was taken as that it was not. But is the taking of the oath absolutely necessaiy? In Whittemore v. Cutter, 1 Gall. 433, Judge Story said: “The taking of the oath was but a prerequisite to the granting of the patent, and in no degree essential to its validity.” In Crompton v. Belknap Mills, 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 536, the defendants, as in the present case, relied upon a certified copy of the file wrapper and contents to show that the oath had not been taken, but the court said:

“ We are not satisfied the oath was not taken. The letters patent recite that it was. * * *' But suppose the oath was not taken. Would the patent be void on that account? It was held otherwise by Judge Story" in Whittemore v. Cutter, supra. The taking of the oath, though it be done prior to the granting of the patent, is not a condition precedent, failing which the patent must fail. It is the evidence required to be furnished to the patent-office, that the applicant verily believes he is the original and first inventor of the art, etc. If he take this oath, and it turns out that he was not the fir3t inventor or discoverer, his patent must fail, and is void. So, if he do not take it, and still he is the first inventor or discoverer, the patent will be supported. ”

It has also been held that this is not a matter to be inquired into collaterally in an infringement suit. Hoe v. Kahler, 20 Blatchf. 430, 12 Fed. Rep. 111; De Florez v. Raynolds, 14 Blatchf. 505. And in Railway Register Manuf’g Co. v. North Hudson R. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 793, the court recognized the right of an applicant’s attorney to insert in a pending application amended and enlarged claims, without having, them verified by the oath and signature of the patentee, provided only they relate to matter substantially shown and described in the specification. As to the oath, it was decided in Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, that recitals in letters patent that the required oath was taken before the same "was granted are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive evidence that it was so taken.

Original letters patent No. 108,257 were issued to Guernsey, October 11, 1870, and the reissue for the same invention, No. 4,297, were granted to him on March 14, 1871. The nature and objects of the invention are, in part, thus specified by the patentee in the reissue:

“ The principal object of my invention is to provide an electrical apparatus which will give an alarm or an indication either in the event of the conducting circuit being broken, or in the event of a new or shorter circuit being formed. To this end 1 employ a continuous circuit, or a circuit capable of being made continuous at will, arranged with a resistance or resistances so that the current which is allowed to pass will not possess sufficient electromotive force to effect the alarm, but having such arrangements at windows [223]*223and doors, and other places to be guarded, as will, on any tampering therewith, short-circuit the current past or around the said resistance or resistances to an extent sufficient to actuate the alarm. My invention thus combines the advantages, and avoids the disadvantages, of the two varieties of electro-mag-netic alarms which are distinguished as the ‘closed circuit’ system and the ‘ open circuit ’ system. I will 'proceed to describe a way of carrying out my invention by the we of two separate electro-magnets, each of which may constitute a resistance to prevent the sounding of an alarm until the circuit is either made around or past such resistance, or broken. More than one magnet or resistance is not essential in carrying out the invention. as will be understood from the following explanation: Fig. 1 shows in perspective two electro-magnets, with separate conductors connected with a common battery, each conductor passing through an alarm, and through suitable connecting devices, which may be located in the frames of windows, or at any desired points, in such a manner that the opening of a door or window, or the performance of any act which it is desired to detect, will connect one conductor with tho other, and avoid both electro-magnets. For this purpose the magnet of one conductor is located near the positive pole, and that of the other near the negative pole, of tho battery. Fig. 2 illustrates a modification, in which one magnet may be

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Bluebook (online)
42 F. 220, 1890 U.S. App. LEXIS 2142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holmes-burglar-alarm-tel-co-v-domestic-telegraph-telephone-co-circtdnj-1890.