Rel: March 6, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________
SC-2025-0455 _________________________
Holly Wren Wallace Schumpert
v.
Alton Hugh Wallace, as the personal representative of the Estate of Alton Hamric Wallace, deceased; and Patsy Lockett Wallace, individually and as trustee of the Patsy Gayle Lockett Wallace and Alton Hamric Wallace Revocable Trust
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court (CV-23-900543)
COOK, Justice. SC-2025-0455
In 2020, after Alton Hamric Wallace and Patsy Lockett Wallace
suffered serious complications from COVID-19, they asked their
daughter, Holly Wren Wallace Schumpert, to relocate from Memphis,
Tennessee, to Orange Beach, Alabama, to care for them. In exchange for
Holly's willingness to uproot her life and move to Orange Beach, Alton
and Patsy promised to convey to her an ownership interest in their
Orange Beach condominium.
Holly moved to Orange Beach and undertook efforts to assist in the
rehabilitation of her parents. On October 1, 2020, Alton and Patsy, in
their individual capacities, executed a deed purporting to convey to Holly
an interest in the Orange Beach condominium.
Several years later, Holly returned to Tennessee. Thereafter, Alton
and Patsy commenced this action in the Baldwin Circuit Court, seeking
to annul the October 2020 deed. They alleged, among other things, (1)
that the deed was ineffective because title to the condominium was held
by the Patsy Gayle Lockett Wallace and Alton Hamric Wallace Revocable
Trust and Alton and Patsy had signed the deed only in their individual
capacities rather than as trustees and (2) that the conveyance was
voidable and could be annulled under § 8-9-12, Ala. Code 1975, because
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a material part of the consideration for the deed was Holly's agreement
to provide them with care and support.
In response, Holly sought reformation of the deed to reflect that
Alton and Patsy had executed it in their capacities as trustees and
asserted counterclaims alleging fraud and breach of the warranties
contained in the deed. The trial court granted Alton and Patsy's request
to annul the conveyance and dismissed Holly's counterclaims. Holly now
appeals to our Court.
This appeal presents two related issues: first, whether Alton and
Patsy were entitled, under § 8-9-12, to annul the deed; and second,
whether, once the deed was annulled on that basis, the trial court
properly dismissed Holly's fraud and breach-of-warranty counterclaims
predicated on the same conveyance. As explained below, because we
conclude that the statute authorized annulment of the deed and that the
annulment extinguished the counterclaims flowing from the deed, we
affirm the trial court's judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
Alton and Patsy purchased a residential condominium at Perdido
Place in Orange Beach in 2004. Although they initially took title as
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individuals, they conveyed the condominium to the Patsy Gayle Lockett
Wallace and Alton Hamric Wallace Revocable Trust ("the Trust"), of
which they were the trustees, by a deed dated May 21, 2004. From that
date forward, title to the condominium remained vested in the Trust,
with Alton and Patsy serving as its trustees.
In July 2020, Alton and Patsy contracted COVID‑19. At that time,
their daughter, Holly, resided in Memphis, Tennessee, where she
practiced bankruptcy law. Their son, Alton Hugh Wallace ("Alton Jr."),
resided with them in the condominium but moved out after they became
ill because he feared exposure to the virus.
After learning about her parents' illness, Holly traveled to Orange
Beach. When she arrived, she found her father in declining health at the
condominium; her mother had already been admitted to a hospital. Holly
arranged for her father's admission to the same hospital and remained
in Orange Beach to provide care and assistance to both of her parents.
After an approximately 10-day hospitalization, both Alton and Patsy
were discharged home, where Holly continued to care for them during
their recovery.
4 SC-2025-0455
As August drew to a close, Holly informed her parents that she
would need to return to Memphis. In response, Alton and Patsy pleaded
with her to stay, expressing fear that they could not care for themselves
and that they would be left without reliable assistance if she departed.
They told Holly that they did not trust their other children to provide
adequate care and emphasized that she was the only person they believed
would look after them properly. Holly explained that relocating to Orange
Beach would require her to close her law practice and jeopardize her
financial security.
Faced with that concern, Alton and Patsy proposed transferring an
interest in the condominium to Holly in exchange for her relocation and
assistance. Holly accepted the proposal. She subsequently closed her law
practice, sold her home in Memphis, and moved to Orange Beach to care
for her parents. Alton and Patsy contacted a local attorney to prepare
documents to convey an interest in the condominium to Holly. On October
1, 2020, Alton and Patsy, acting in their individual capacities, executed
a "Warranty Deed with Right of Survivorship" purporting to convey the
condominium to Alton, Patsy, and Holly as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship. The deed made no reference to the Trust. The deed also
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included general warranties of title. Holly testified that, at the time, she
was unaware of the existence of the Trust or that the Trust held title to
the condominium.
After the execution of the deed, Holly lived in Orange Beach and
assisted her parents. By early 2022, Alton and Patsy had regained
independence. In July 2022, after learning that Alton Jr. -- with whom
she had a strained relationship -- planned to move back into the
condominium, Holly returned to Tennessee. When she left Orange Beach,
she took with her a packet of her parents' documents, including their
wills and the October 2020 deed.
A few months later, Alton asked Holly to return the wills. Holly
returned the entire packet of documents, including the deed. After
reviewing the documents and consulting counsel, Alton and Patsy sought
to rescind the October 2020 deed. Alton testified that he did not recall
executing the deed and was unaware of its existence until the documents
were returned. Alton and Patsy asked Holly to execute a corrective
instrument, but she declined.
On May 12, 2023, Alton and Patsy commenced this action seeking
to annul the October 2020 deed. Alton and Patsy argued that, because
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the condominium was owned by the Trust at the time the deed was
executed, the October 2020 deed signed by them in their individual --
rather than representative -- capacities was ineffective to convey any
interest in the Trust's property. They further argued that the deed should
be annulled pursuant to § 8-9-12 which permits a grantor to annul a deed
when "a material part of the consideration is the agreement of the
grantee to support the grantor during life."
On November 13, 2023, Holly filed a four-count counterclaim
alleging (1) that she was entitled to reformation of the deed; 2) that Alton
and Patsy had defrauded her by representing that they would convey to
her a one-third interest in their condominium; (3) that she was entitled
to a judgment declaring that the deed was effective to convey to her a
one-third interest in the condominium even though it was not signed by
Alton and Patsy in their capacities as trustees of the Trust; and (4) that
Alton and Patsy had breached the warranties in the deed.
On May 17, 2024, Alton and Patsy filed a motion for partial
summary judgment. On October 31, 2024, the trial court entered an order
granting that motion. Specifically, the trial court ruled (1) that the
October 2020 deed was ineffective to convey title, (2) that the deed was
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not subject to reformation, (3) that Holly's fraud counterclaim was barred
by the Statute of Frauds, and (4) that Alton and Patsy were entitled to
have the deed annulled pursuant to § 8-9-12. The trial court's partial
summary judgment resolved all but one of the parties' claims.
On April 11, 2025, Alton Jr., as the personal representative of
Alton's estate, and Patsy, individually and as the remaining trustee of
the Trust, filed a motion seeking to dismiss the last remaining claim
against Holly and to obtain a final order disposing of all the claims.1 On
May 6, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting the motion. On
May 9, 2025, the trial court entered a final order declaring that the
October 1, 2020, warranty deed was void and that Holly owned no
interest in the condominium. Holly appealed.
Discussion
1The record indicates that Alton died on October 25, 2024, and that
Alton Jr. was appointed as the personal representative of Alton's estate. A motion to substitute Alton Jr., as the personal representative of Alton's estate, for Alton was filed, and the trial court granted that motion. From that point forward in the trial court, the plaintiffs were identified as Alton Jr., as the personal representative of Alton's estate, and Patsy, individually and as trustee of the Trust. The same parties appeared as appellees in this Court. 8 SC-2025-0455
On appeal, Holly advances three primary arguments. First, she
asserts that the October 2020 deed should be reformed to reflect that
Alton and Patsy executed the deed in their representative capacities as
trustees, rather than in their individual capacities. Second, she contends
that Alton and Patsy are not entitled to annulment under
§ 8-9-12 because, she says, that statute applies only when an individual
-- and not a trust -- is the grantor. Finally, Holly argues that the trial
court erred in dismissing her counterclaims for fraud and breach of
warranty.
As a threshold matter, we need not decide whether the October
2020 deed was effective when executed or whether it is subject to
reformation. Even assuming, without deciding, that the deed was valid
and that reformation would otherwise be appropriate, the trial court
correctly concluded that § 8-9-12 authorized Alton and Patsy to annul the
deed.
I. Section 8-9-12 Permits Annulment of the Deed
Section 8-9-12 provides:
"Any conveyance of realty wherein a material part of the consideration is the agreement of the grantee to support the grantor during life is void at the option of the grantor, except as to bona fide purchasers for value, lienees, and mortgagees 9 SC-2025-0455
without notice, if, during the life of the grantor, he takes proceedings to annul such conveyance."
By its terms, § 8-9-12 provides the grantor with a unilateral right
to annul a conveyance when a material part of the consideration consists
of the grantee's promise to support the grantor during his or her lifetime.
Critically, the statute does not condition annulment on proof that the
grantee failed to perform or breached that obligation. See Martin v.
Martin, 998 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 2008). Rather, the right to annulment
arises solely from the nature of the consideration underlying the
conveyance. See Ex parte Alexander, 806 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Ala. 2001)
("[I]n proceedings to annul a deed under § 8-9-12, Ala. Code 1975, it is
immaterial whether the promise to support was actually fulfilled by the
grantee.").
Holly argues that § 8-9-12 is inapplicable because, if the deed is
reformed, the Trust -- not Alton and Patsy individually -- would be the
grantor. According to her, § 8-9-12 contemplates only a natural person,
not a trust, as the grantor with the right to annul. We do not read the
statute so narrowly.
Section 8-9-12 is remedial in nature and reflects a legislative
response to a well-recognized problem: elderly or vulnerable property 10 SC-2025-0455
owners conveying real property in reliance on promises of support, only
to face neglect, mistreatment, or uncertainty thereafter. See Bush v.
Greer, 235 Ala. 56, 58, 177 So. 341, 342 (1937) (noting that "[t]he books
abound with cases where the aged, weak, or afflicted had improvidently
executed conveyances upon the promise of support" and explaining that
"[t]he lawmakers considered this a growing evil, and [the predecessor to
§ 8-9-12] was passed as declaratory of a public policy, and well within the
police power of the state").
The text of the statute confirms this public policy -- that § 8-9-12
protects the individuals whose support was bargained for, not merely the
nominal "grantor" identified in the deed. Section 8-9-12 applies to "[a]ny
conveyance of realty" when "a material part of the consideration is the
agreement of the grantee to support the grantor during life." The
Legislature's use of the word "any" signals an intentionally broad scope,
encompassing all qualifying conveyances. See United States v. Gonzales,
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) ("Read naturally, the word 'any' has an expansive
meaning, that is, 'one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.' "
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976))).
11 SC-2025-0455
There is no dispute that a "material part of the consideration" for
the conveyance of an interest in the condominium was Holly's
"agreement" to support the "grantors" (here, Alton and Patsy).2 Nor is
there any dispute that Alton and Patsy executed the deed. They signed
the deed in their individual capacities, and the deed itself identifies them
as the "grantors." Thus, on its face, the transaction falls squarely within
the plain language of § 8-9-12.
Holly wishes to avoid that result by arguing that the Trust -- rather
than Alton and Patsy -- was the true grantor and that § 8-9-12
consequently does not apply. That argument fails for several reasons.
First, as noted above, Alton and Patsy executed the deed in their
2During her deposition, Holly expressly acknowledged that the conveyance was made in consideration of her agreement to care for Alton and Patsy. She testified that, in exchange for assuming those caregiving responsibilities and leaving her career in Memphis, Alton and Patsy agreed to convey an interest in the condominium to provide her with financial security. As Holly explained:
"All I know is that our agreement and intent was that by taking care of them and giving up my ability to retire, as had been planned, that this was a safeguard that I would have the ability to retire if I survive them. And we specifically said that I -- my fear was I don't want to be working and being a Walmart greeter. And our intention was to make sure that I had a backup retirement ability because I was giving it up." 12 SC-2025-0455
individual capacities and were expressly designated as the "grantors" in
that instrument. It is Holly who seeks to change the operative facts by
reforming the deed to reflect the Trust as the grantor.
Second, the consideration for the deed was not Holly's promise to
support of the Trust as an entity, but her promise to provide personal
care for Alton and Patsy.
Third, even if the deed was reformed to reflect the Trust as the
grantor, the substance of the transaction would remain unchanged. Alton
and Patsy were the sole settlors and trustees of the Trust, retained
complete control over the condominium, and stood to receive the entirety
of the promised support from Holly. See Morgan Plan Co. v. Bruce, 266
Ala. 494, 497, 97 So. 2d 805, 807 (1957) (explaining that beneficial owner
" ' has the privilege at his election to transfer his inchoate beneficial
interest in the land to the proceeds of the sale of it' " (citation omitted));
see also Lee v. Lee, 260 Ala. 93, 95, 69 So. 2d 258, 259 (1953) (holding
that beneficial owner is entitled to bring "suit in the capacity of a joint
owner or tenant in common" for sale of land for division of proceeds);
Burditt & Radzius v. Brown (In re Barone), 184 B.R. 747, 749 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (holding that beneficial owner has the power "to receive the
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proceeds from the sale of the property made pursuant to [his or her]
power of direction").
In sum, this Court need not decide whether reformation of the deed
would be proper. When the substance of the transaction demonstrates
that specific individuals were the true beneficiaries of the support
promise, that those specific individuals controlled the decision to convey
the property, that the care of those individuals formed a material part of
the consideration, and that those individuals were expressly identified in
the conveyance instrument as "grantors," then those individuals may
invoke the annulment remedy afforded to "grantors" under § 8-9-12.
Here, Alton and Patsy were the settlors of the Trust, served as the Trust's
sole trustees, purported to convey an interest in the condominium in
exchange for Holly's promise to care for them personally, and were
identified as "grantors" in the deed. They fall squarely within the class of
persons the statute was enacted to protect. Thus, even if the deed is
reformed, the Trust would function as a conduit, not as the true
beneficiary of Holly's promise of care and support.
Accordingly, even if the October 2020 deed is reformed to reflect a
conveyance by the Trust, § 8-9-12 remains applicable because Alton and
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Patsy were the "grantors" of the relevant "conveyance of realty." For
these reasons, the trial court properly "voided" -- i.e., annulled -- the
October 2020 deed pursuant to § 8-9-12.
II. The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Holly's Counterclaims
After declaring the October 2020 deed void, the trial court
dismissed Holly's counterclaims for breach of warranty and fraud. On
appeal, Holly contends that she should be permitted to pursue those
counterclaims even if the deed was properly annulled pursuant to § 8-9-
12.
With respect to her breach-of-warranty counterclaim, Holly argues
that § 8-9-12 authorizes annulment of a "conveyance" under certain
circumstances but does not address -- much less extinguish -- warranties
or promises made contemporaneously with that conveyance. On that
basis, she urges this Court to construe § 8-9-12 narrowly and to hold that
the trial court erred in dismissing her breach-of-warranty counterclaim.
That argument, however, is foreclosed by long-standing precedent.
This Court has repeatedly held that § 8-9-12 "is to be read into the deed"
and that a grantee accepts such a conveyance " ' with the limitations of
the statute written into it, and with full knowledge of the rights of the
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grantor, and the consequent defeasible character of the instrument.' "
Clyburn v. Toney, 245 Ala. 341, 343, 17 So. 2d 235, 236 (1944) (citation
omitted); see also Bush, 235 Ala. at 58, 177 So. at 341 ("At the time these
defendants accepted the deed of complainant, [the predecessor to § 8-9-
12] was in force, and the legal principle that every contract is made with
reference to existing law and every law affecting the contract is read into
and becomes a part of the contract when made, is directly applicable.").
Because § 8-9-12 was incorporated into the deed, any warranties
arising from or dependent on the conveyance are necessarily subject to
the statute's annulment mechanism. Accordingly, once the deed was
declared void under § 8-9-12, there was no surviving conveyance -- and
thus no surviving warranty -- upon which Holly's breach-of-warranty
counterclaim could be maintained.3
Holly's fraud counterclaim fares no better. Because § 8-9-12 was
incorporated into the deed, Holly was charged with notice that the
3We emphasize that our decision should not be read to establish a
general rule that a breach-of-warranty claim can never be viable following the annulment or rescission of a deed. We hold only that when, as here, the alleged warranties arise solely from and are dependent on a conveyance that is voided pursuant to § 8-9-12, no independent warranty obligation survives the deed's annulment.
16 SC-2025-0455
conveyance was subject to annulment at the option of Patsy and Alton.
See Clyburn, 245 Ala. at 343, 17 So. 2d at 236. Thus, any alleged reliance
on representations inconsistent with that statutory right was
unreasonable as a matter of law. Further, when a deed is voided pursuant
to § 8-9-12, a grantee cannot recast his or her claim for relief premised on
the failed conveyance as a tort claim to recover benefits that the statute
expressly permits the grantor to defeat. To hold otherwise would
undermine the statute's purpose by allowing a grantee to obtain
indirectly -- through damages for fraud -- the very consideration that the
Legislature has declared defeasible.4 See id. Accordingly, because the
4We note, however, that grantees are not left without any recourse.
Our caselaw recognizes that, when a conveyance is annulled pursuant to § 8-9-12, the trial court retains discretion to award reimbursement to the grantee for "reasonable expenditures and services performed in caring for the grantor and for the value of such reasonable permanent improvements to the property which the grantee has made which in equity and good conscience might appear to be just." Hipp v. McMurry, 263 Ala. 11, 15, 81 So. 2d 531, 534 (1955); see also Petty v. Chamberlain, 253 Ala. 453, 455, 45 So. 2d 161, 162 (1950) (recognizing that, "on proper pleading and proof, it [is] the duty of the equity court 'to do full justice between the parties in regard to all matters growing out of the transaction brought before the court' " (citation omitted)). Importantly, our precedent makes clear that such equitable relief is available only "on proper pleading and proof." Id. Here, Holly neither sought equitable remedy of reimbursement in the trial court nor raised such a request on appeal. 17 SC-2025-0455
trial court properly voided the deed under § 8-9-12, it did not err in
dismissing Holly's fraud counterclaim.
Conclusion
We recognize the concerns Holly raises in her brief regarding the
devotion she showed to her parents and the personal sacrifices she made
on their behalf. Nevertheless, in enacting § 8-9-12, the Legislature made
a clear public-policy choice to protect elderly and vulnerable property
owners. Our role is to enforce that legislative choice. Based on the
foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
Shaw, Wise, McCool, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the
result.