Holly Robinson v. Mercury Insurance Company of Georgia

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 18, 2026
Docket1:25-cv-00081
StatusUnknown

This text of Holly Robinson v. Mercury Insurance Company of Georgia (Holly Robinson v. Mercury Insurance Company of Georgia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holly Robinson v. Mercury Insurance Company of Georgia, (N.D. Ga. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

HOLLY ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00081-JPB MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY OF GEORGIA, Defendant.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Mercury Insurance Company of Georgia’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 18]. This Court finds as follows: FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On February 5, 2024, Holly Robinson (“Plaintiff”) allegedly discovered visible water damage in her kitchen, her upstairs bathroom and her basement as a result of water dripping from the upstairs faucet. [Doc. 18-1, p. 6]. On the same day, Plaintiff contacted Defendant, her insurer, to report the loss. [Doc. 24, p. 5].

1 The facts of this case are derived from Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [Doc. 18-5], Plaintiff’s Response [Doc. 22-2] and Defendant’s Reply [Doc. 24]. The Court also conducted its own review of the record. She also retained Tidal Wave Response LLC (“Tidal Wave”) to perform mitigation services at the property.2 Id. “Tidal Wave removed the purportedly damaged insulation, baseboards, and drywall from the property and discarded them.” Id. Defendant’s claim adjuster visited Plaintiff’s property on February 6, 2024,

but was unable to inspect the claimed damages because Tidal Wave had already performed “extensive tear out, mitigation, and repair work at the property.”3 Id. at 6. According to Defendant, its adjuster did not observe any signs of moisture at

the purported source of the water damage and the moisture readings were negative.4 Id. at 8–9. Although Tidal Wave did provide Defendant with photographs of Plaintiff’s property to use in the investigation, Defendant’s adjuster asserted that the photographs did not show evidence of moisture damage. [Doc.

18-2, p. 4]; [Doc. 22-3, p. 2].

2 Additionally, she hired a public adjusting firm, Preferred Claim Solutions, to inspect the property and provide a damage estimate. [Doc. 18, p. 6].

3 The Court recognizes that Plaintiff disputed this fact but her citation to the record did not directly refute it. Instead of disputing that Defendant’s representative was unable to inspect the damage, Plaintiff claimed that the “tear out, mitigation, and repair work were preventative measures taken to prevent further damage to Plaintiff’s home.” [Doc. 24, p. 6].

4 Plaintiff refutes this evidence by attaching photographs to her response allegedly showing that moisture was observed. Problematically for Plaintiff, however, her evidence does not show that moisture was observed by Defendant’s adjuster and does not demonstrate when the photographs were taken. Plaintiff’s property was insured by Defendant pursuant to a homeowners insurance policy (the “Policy”). [Doc. 1-1, p. 22]. Under the Policy, an insured’s duty after a loss includes the following: 1. Give prompt notice to us or our agent;

. . .

4. Protect the property from further damage. If repairs to the property are required, you must:

a. Make reasonable and necessary repairs to protect the property; and

b. Keep an accurate record of repair expenses;

5. Cooperate with us in the investigation of a claim; [and]

7. As often as we reasonably require:

a. Show the damaged property. Id. at 38–39. Notably, the Policy states that Defendant has “no duty to provide coverage” if the failure to comply with the duties identified above is prejudicial. Id. at 38. It also provides that “[n]o action can be brought against us unless there has been full compliance with all of the terms under Section I of this policy.” Id. at 40. Defendant never paid Plaintiff’s insurance claim. As a result, on December 9, 2024, Plaintiff sued Defendant asserting the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract and (2) bad faith refusal to settle. [Doc. 1-1]. Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on November 13, 2025. [Doc. 18]. The

motion is now ripe for review. LEGAL STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a “court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A material fact is any fact that “is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d

642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). A genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Ultimately, “[t]he basic issue

before the court on a motion for summary judgment is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Allen, 121 F.3d at 646 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, “and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden the court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Id. After the movant satisfies this initial burden, the nonmovant bears the burden of showing specific facts indicating that summary judgment is improper because a material issue of fact does exist. Id. However, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251). If the record taken as a whole cannot lead “a rational trier of fact to find for the

non-moving party, there is ‘no genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)).

ANALYSIS Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on all claims. The Court will first address the breach of contract claim. I. Breach of Contract Claim Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to comply with the provision in the Policy that states that Plaintiff shall “show the damaged property” “as often as we reasonably require.” [Doc. 18-4, p.

7]. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff breached the Policy when she “removed the damaged items from the property and did not save or preserve them for [Defendant] to inspect.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that

summary judgment is improper because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether any purported failure to comply with the Policy was prejudicial to Defendant. Plaintiff also argues that she is excused from complying with the Policy because she was performing emergency mitigation.

As a general rule, “a forfeiture of insurance coverage may result when an insured fails to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage under the contract.” Progressive Mountain Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 790 S.E.2d 91, 94 (Ga. Ct. App.

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Related

Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
121 F.3d 642 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co.
391 U.S. 253 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Assurance Co. v. BBB Service Co.
576 S.E.2d 38 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2002)
Bayrock Mortgage Corp. v. Chicago Title Insurance
648 S.E.2d 433 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2007)
Diamonds & Denims, Inc. v. First of Georgia Insurance
417 S.E.2d 440 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1992)
Progressive Mountain Insurance Company v. Bishop
790 S.E.2d 91 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2016)

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Holly Robinson v. Mercury Insurance Company of Georgia, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holly-robinson-v-mercury-insurance-company-of-georgia-gand-2026.