Opinion issued November 5, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-18-00516-CV ——————————— HOLLY BROOKE SCHAUMLEFFEL, Appellant V. GS/TPRF III HOUSTON MED. CTR., LP, Appellee
On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1110670
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GS/TPRF III Houston Medical Center, LP rented an apartment to Holly
Brooke Schaumleffel. After Schaumleffel failed to pay her rent, GS/TPRF III gave
her notice to vacate and filed a forcible detainer action against her in justice court,
seeking possession of the premises and payment of past due rent. The justice court rendered judgment in favor of GS/TPRF III. After a de novo trial, the county civil
court at law rendered judgment in favor of GS/TPRF III, awarding it possession of
the property, past due rent, and attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Schaumleffel raises one issue. She contends that “the trial court
erred in ruling that her proffered retaliatory eviction defense” was not available to
her. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.331 (prohibiting retaliation by landlord for certain
acts taken by residential tenants); id. § 92.335 (providing that retaliation is defense
to eviction suit).
We affirm.
Background
Schaumleffel and GS/TPRF III entered into a one-year written apartment
lease contract in September 2017. Under the terms of the lease, Schaumleffel’s
monthly rent was $2009.
The lease required Schaumleffel to pay her rent “on or before the 1st day of
each month” with “no grace period.” The lease provided that “not paying rent on
the 1st of each month is a material breach of this Lease.” The lease further warned,
“If you don’t pay rent on time, you’ll be in default and subject to all remedies
under state law and this Lease.”
Schaumleffel failed to pay her rent for April 2018. On April 7, 2018,
GS/TPRF III delivered to Schaumleffel a notice to vacate for non-payment of rent,
2 requiring her to leave the premises in three days. The notice advised Schaumleffel
that her failure to move out would result in legal action against her.
Schaumleffel did not move out of the apartment. On April 17, 2018,
GS/TPRF III filed a Petition for Eviction against Schaumleffel in justice court
based on her “failure to pay rent.” For relief, GS/TPRF III requested possession of
the apartment and past due rent.
Following a trial, the justice court signed a judgment against Schaumleffel
on May 9, 2018. The court awarded GS/TPRF III possession of the apartment and
ordered Schaumleffel to pay $2,560 in past due rent. Schaumleffel appealed the
justice court’s judgment to the county civil court at law by filing a sworn statement
of inability to pay within five days after the judgment was signed. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 510.9(a).
Schaumleffel filed an answer in county court. Among her affirmative
defenses she claimed that the eviction suit was brought “in retaliation for her good-
faith exercise of a lawful right or remedy.”
On June 4, 2018, the county court conducted a bench trial. GS/TPRF III’s
representative, Rebecca Johnson, testified that Schaumleffel never paid April’s
rent. During Johnson’s testimony, the lease and the April 7 notice to vacate for
nonpayment of rent were admitted into evidence. GS/TPRF III’s attorney testified
regarding the amount of attorney’s fees GS/TPRF III had incurred.
3 Schaumleffel also testified. She acknowledged that she did not pay her rent
for April. She stated that she was unable to pay her April rent because she was “out
of work for a month.” Schaumleffel testified that she started working again in May
2018.
Schaumleffel also testified that she suffers from a medical condition, which
requires the temperature in her apartment to stay below 76 degrees. She stated that
in February 2018 her air conditioning stopped working. She requested GS/TPRF
III to fix it, and the repairs were made. Johnson also testified that repairs were
made to Schaumleffel’s air conditioning at her request in February 2018.
Schaumleffel’s attorney indicated to the trial court that Schaumleffel was
pursuing an affirmative defense against the eviction suit based on her request for
repairs, implying that the eviction action had been in retaliation for her requests to
repair the air conditioning. The trial court responded that the defense did not apply.
At the end of trial, the county court rendered judgment in favor of GS/TPRF
III, awarding it possession of the property, as well as $4,285.87 in past due rent
and $1,450 in attorney’s fees.
This appeal followed.
Retaliatory-Eviction Defense
In her sole issue, Schaumleffel contends that “the trial court erred in ruling
that her proffered retaliatory eviction defense” was not available to her. She asserts
4 that she offered evidence showing that the defense applied. Given Schaumleffel’s
arguments, we construe her issue as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to the
trial court’s implied findings supporting its conclusion that Schaumleffel was not
entitled to the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction. See Pham v. Harris Cty.
Rentals, L.L.C., 455 S.W.3d 702, 708-09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
pet.) (construing appellant’s issue that “the trial court erred by dismissing [his]
affirmative defense of release and waiver” to be sufficiency challenge to implied
finding that he had failed to prove that defense).
A. Standard of Review
A party challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue
for which she had the burden of proof at trial must establish, as a matter of law, all
essential facts in support of the issue. See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d
686, 690 (Tex. 1989). That is, the party “must show that there is no evidence to
support the factfinder’s finding and that the evidence conclusively establishes the
opposite of the finding.” Indian Oil Co., LLC v. Bishop Petroleum, Inc., 406
S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (citing Dow
Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001)).
In a factual-sufficiency challenge, we review all the evidence and decide
whether the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. We set the finding aside only if
5 the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Id.
B. Analysis
Schaumleffel correctly points out that Property Code Section 92.331
prohibits a landlord from filing an eviction suit because of (and within six months
of) a tenant’s exercising a right or remedy against a landlord that is granted to the
tenant by a federal or state statute. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.331. Retaliation by a
landlord under Section 92.331 is a defense to an eviction suit. Id. § 92.335.
Schaumleffel asserts that she offered evidence to establish that GS/TPRF III
filed the eviction action to retaliate against her because she asserted her rights
under a federal statute: Section 3604(f)(3)(B) of the Fair Housing Act.
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Opinion issued November 5, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-18-00516-CV ——————————— HOLLY BROOKE SCHAUMLEFFEL, Appellant V. GS/TPRF III HOUSTON MED. CTR., LP, Appellee
On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1110670
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GS/TPRF III Houston Medical Center, LP rented an apartment to Holly
Brooke Schaumleffel. After Schaumleffel failed to pay her rent, GS/TPRF III gave
her notice to vacate and filed a forcible detainer action against her in justice court,
seeking possession of the premises and payment of past due rent. The justice court rendered judgment in favor of GS/TPRF III. After a de novo trial, the county civil
court at law rendered judgment in favor of GS/TPRF III, awarding it possession of
the property, past due rent, and attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Schaumleffel raises one issue. She contends that “the trial court
erred in ruling that her proffered retaliatory eviction defense” was not available to
her. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.331 (prohibiting retaliation by landlord for certain
acts taken by residential tenants); id. § 92.335 (providing that retaliation is defense
to eviction suit).
We affirm.
Background
Schaumleffel and GS/TPRF III entered into a one-year written apartment
lease contract in September 2017. Under the terms of the lease, Schaumleffel’s
monthly rent was $2009.
The lease required Schaumleffel to pay her rent “on or before the 1st day of
each month” with “no grace period.” The lease provided that “not paying rent on
the 1st of each month is a material breach of this Lease.” The lease further warned,
“If you don’t pay rent on time, you’ll be in default and subject to all remedies
under state law and this Lease.”
Schaumleffel failed to pay her rent for April 2018. On April 7, 2018,
GS/TPRF III delivered to Schaumleffel a notice to vacate for non-payment of rent,
2 requiring her to leave the premises in three days. The notice advised Schaumleffel
that her failure to move out would result in legal action against her.
Schaumleffel did not move out of the apartment. On April 17, 2018,
GS/TPRF III filed a Petition for Eviction against Schaumleffel in justice court
based on her “failure to pay rent.” For relief, GS/TPRF III requested possession of
the apartment and past due rent.
Following a trial, the justice court signed a judgment against Schaumleffel
on May 9, 2018. The court awarded GS/TPRF III possession of the apartment and
ordered Schaumleffel to pay $2,560 in past due rent. Schaumleffel appealed the
justice court’s judgment to the county civil court at law by filing a sworn statement
of inability to pay within five days after the judgment was signed. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 510.9(a).
Schaumleffel filed an answer in county court. Among her affirmative
defenses she claimed that the eviction suit was brought “in retaliation for her good-
faith exercise of a lawful right or remedy.”
On June 4, 2018, the county court conducted a bench trial. GS/TPRF III’s
representative, Rebecca Johnson, testified that Schaumleffel never paid April’s
rent. During Johnson’s testimony, the lease and the April 7 notice to vacate for
nonpayment of rent were admitted into evidence. GS/TPRF III’s attorney testified
regarding the amount of attorney’s fees GS/TPRF III had incurred.
3 Schaumleffel also testified. She acknowledged that she did not pay her rent
for April. She stated that she was unable to pay her April rent because she was “out
of work for a month.” Schaumleffel testified that she started working again in May
2018.
Schaumleffel also testified that she suffers from a medical condition, which
requires the temperature in her apartment to stay below 76 degrees. She stated that
in February 2018 her air conditioning stopped working. She requested GS/TPRF
III to fix it, and the repairs were made. Johnson also testified that repairs were
made to Schaumleffel’s air conditioning at her request in February 2018.
Schaumleffel’s attorney indicated to the trial court that Schaumleffel was
pursuing an affirmative defense against the eviction suit based on her request for
repairs, implying that the eviction action had been in retaliation for her requests to
repair the air conditioning. The trial court responded that the defense did not apply.
At the end of trial, the county court rendered judgment in favor of GS/TPRF
III, awarding it possession of the property, as well as $4,285.87 in past due rent
and $1,450 in attorney’s fees.
This appeal followed.
Retaliatory-Eviction Defense
In her sole issue, Schaumleffel contends that “the trial court erred in ruling
that her proffered retaliatory eviction defense” was not available to her. She asserts
4 that she offered evidence showing that the defense applied. Given Schaumleffel’s
arguments, we construe her issue as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to the
trial court’s implied findings supporting its conclusion that Schaumleffel was not
entitled to the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction. See Pham v. Harris Cty.
Rentals, L.L.C., 455 S.W.3d 702, 708-09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
pet.) (construing appellant’s issue that “the trial court erred by dismissing [his]
affirmative defense of release and waiver” to be sufficiency challenge to implied
finding that he had failed to prove that defense).
A. Standard of Review
A party challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue
for which she had the burden of proof at trial must establish, as a matter of law, all
essential facts in support of the issue. See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d
686, 690 (Tex. 1989). That is, the party “must show that there is no evidence to
support the factfinder’s finding and that the evidence conclusively establishes the
opposite of the finding.” Indian Oil Co., LLC v. Bishop Petroleum, Inc., 406
S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (citing Dow
Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001)).
In a factual-sufficiency challenge, we review all the evidence and decide
whether the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. We set the finding aside only if
5 the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Id.
B. Analysis
Schaumleffel correctly points out that Property Code Section 92.331
prohibits a landlord from filing an eviction suit because of (and within six months
of) a tenant’s exercising a right or remedy against a landlord that is granted to the
tenant by a federal or state statute. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.331. Retaliation by a
landlord under Section 92.331 is a defense to an eviction suit. Id. § 92.335.
Schaumleffel asserts that she offered evidence to establish that GS/TPRF III
filed the eviction action to retaliate against her because she asserted her rights
under a federal statute: Section 3604(f)(3)(B) of the Fair Housing Act. See TEX.
PROP. CODE § 92.331(a). Under Section 3604(f)(3)(B), a person with disabilities is
entitled to have her landlord make reasonable accommodations “when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use
and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Schaumleffel claims that she
offered evidence showing that she has a disability and that her request for her air
conditioning to be repaired and maintained under 76 degrees was a reasonable
accommodation for her disability. She points out that the evidence showed that she
made a request for her air conditioning to be repaired in February 2018, less than
6 six months before GS/TPRF III gave her the notice to vacate in April 2018. See
TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.331(b).
However, as GS/TPRF III points out, Property Code Section 92.331
prohibits a landlord from retaliating against a tenant by filing an eviction
proceeding “except for the grounds stated by Section 92.332.” Id.
Property Code Section 92.332 provides in relevant part:
(b) An eviction or lease termination based on the following circumstances, which are valid grounds for eviction or lease termination in any event, does not constitute retaliation:
(1) the tenant is delinquent in rent when the landlord gives notice to vacate or files an eviction action[.]
Id. § 92.332(b)(1).
Here, Johnson and Schaumleffel both testified that Schaumleffel never paid
her April 2018 rent. The lease shows that Schaumleffel’s rent was due April 1
“with no grace periods.” GS/TPRF III delivered the notice to vacate for non-
payment of rent to Schaumleffel on April 7, 2018.
On appeal, Schaumleffel acknowledges that she had not paid her April rent
when she received the notice to vacate on April 7. Nonetheless, Schaumleffel
claims that she was not “delinquent in rent” because she “had informed [GS/TPRF
III] that she would not be paying rent due to the air conditioner unit failing to
properly cool her apartment.” See id. § 92.335 (providing that “retaliation by the
7 landlord under Section 92.331 is a defense and a rent deduction lawfully made by
the tenant under this chapter is a defense for nonpayment of the rent”).
The record, however, does not support Schaumleffel’s claim that she
“informed [GS/TPRF III] that she would not be paying rent due to the air
conditioner unit failing to properly cool her apartment.” To the contrary, Johnson
testified that Schaumleffel had informed GS/TPRF III that “there was a problem
with her ability to pay rent” for April. (Emphasis added.)
Schaumleffel testified that she did not pay April’s rent because she was “out
of work for a month” in April and indicated that she could not afford to pay the
rent. No evidence showed that Schaumleffel told GS/TPRF III that she would not
pay April’s rent “due to the air conditioner unit failing to properly cool her
apartment” as she now claims on appeal. Thus, because she was delinquent in rent
when GS/TPRF III gave her notice to vacate, the evidence at trial established that
GS/TPRF III did not engage in retaliatory eviction of Schaumleffel. See id.
§ 92.332(b)(1).
After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that Schaumleffel did not
establish, as a matter of law, all essential facts in support of her affirmative defense
of retaliatory eviction. Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690. Nor has she shown that the trial
court’s implied findings supporting the trial court’s rejection of her retaliatory-
eviction defense are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence
8 to be manifestly unjust. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. We hold that the
evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s implied
findings regarding the defense of retaliatory eviction.
We overrule Schaumleffel’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Landau.