Holloway v. Hauver

322 A.2d 890, 22 Md. App. 303, 1974 Md. App. LEXIS 351
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
DecidedAugust 7, 1974
Docket394, September Term, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 322 A.2d 890 (Holloway v. Hauver) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Special Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holloway v. Hauver, 322 A.2d 890, 22 Md. App. 303, 1974 Md. App. LEXIS 351 (Md. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

Orth, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On 30 May 1973 TERESA L. HOLLOWAY, appellant, instituted a tort action in the Circuit Court for Washington County against RICHARD V. HAUVER, M.D. and HAGERSTOWN SURGICAL CLINIC, Drs. CRAIG and MARSH, P.A., appellees. The declaration demanded judgment against appellees in the sum of $250,000 for injuries suffered by appellant caused by the negligence of appellees. It alleged:

“For that on or about October 23, 1971, the Plaintiff was a patient of the Defendants, licensed medical doctors in the State of Maryland, and the Plaintiff also was a patient admitted to the Wáshington County Hospital, in Hagerstown, Maryland, and while in the operating room of said hospital, under the care of the Defendants, the Plaintiff sustained first, second and third degree burns on her body when the merthiolate and alcohol, with which the Plaintiff has been prepared, was ignited by the negligent use of a hot cautery, which resulted in a flash blaze, said blaze and injuries being caused by the negligence and carelessness of the Defendants and by the failure of the Defendants to exercise the standard care to which the Plaintiff was entitled under the circumstances, and as a proximate result of the injuries aforesaid, the Plaintiff sustained serious, *305 painful, disabling and permanent injuries to body and mind, that she has in the past and will in the future incur necessary medical, hospital expenses and related expenses, the exact amount of which is not wholly ascertainable at this time. As a further and proximate result of the Defendants negligence aforesaid, she has in the past and will in the future suffer with pain and mental anguish, has in the past and will in the future be unable to engage in her every day activities and functions as before the accident and was in the past and will in the future be compelled to lose time from her employment and the income therefrom, the full extent of which is not wholly determinable at this time.”

Appellant prayed a trial by jury. Appellees filed a general issue plea on 19 June 1973. On 14 August, upon suggestion for removal, Md. Rule 542, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Allegany County. On 15 November trial was had before a jury. At the close of the evidence offered by appellant, appellees moved for a directed verdict in their favor. The motion was granted. Appellant noted an appeal.

When the record came before us we noted that no judgment had been entered. We dismissed the appeal and remanded the case for the entry of a judgment in accord with the verdict directed. We said: “The case was fully briefed and argued before us on the merits. If, upon the entry of a judgment below, a timely appeal is noted, we shall be favorably disposed, upon request of appellant and appellees, to accept the briefs previously filed, and consider the arguments as previously made, so that the appeal may be determined forthwith with the least possible additional expense.” Holloway v. Hauver, No. 927, September Term, 1973, unreported, filed 20 June 1974. On 24 June judgment was entered in favor of appellees and against appellant. Appellant noted an appeal. Upon petition of the parties we issued an order that the appeal be submitted on the briefs previously filed and the arguments previously made.

*306 The Grant of a Directed Verdict

There is only one question presented. As framed by appellant and concurred in by appellees, it is whether the trial judge properly granted appellees’ motion for a directed verdict.

The Evidence

We give a compendium of the evidence offered by appellant. There were admitted by agreement a copy of a summary of a report of The Washington County Hospital Association signed by Hauver with respect to appellant under her then name of Teresa Lynn Ridenour, and a summary of a similar report signed by R. S. Oakley, M.D. The former, dated 5 November 1971 and dictated 3 November 1971, begins: “This 27 year old female was admitted to the hospital on 10/31/71 for hymenotomy, complaining of redness and itching around the vulva and has been treated recently for vulvitis with some effect and was found to have almost completely intact hymen.” Under the heading “COURSE”, there is set out:

“On the day of admission, the patient had hymenotomy. This operation was complicated by burns to the buttocks resulting from a flash blaze started by the hot cautery as it was used to cut the hymen, the blaze being caused by ignition of the merthiolate containing alcohol with which the patient had been prepped. The blaze was immediately extinguished, and after the operation, Furacin dressings were applied to the burns, which consisted of two areas of burns, one on each buttock and each measuring about 5 inches square. The patient’s hospitalization was for one week, and she was discharged 10/29/71 receiving daily dressings of Furacin to the burns. She is to be followed in the office.”

The “FINAL DIAGNOSIS” was “INTACT HYMEN”. “COMPLICATIONS” were stated to be “First and second *307 degree burns of buttocks.” The report of Dr. Oakley, also dated 5 January 1972, contains the following:

“The patient was a 23 year old white female who underwent hymenotomy under general anesthesia on 10/21/71 and during the procedure encurred a slash burn which was caused by the cautery arch igniting the Merthiolate prep. As a consequence, the patient sustained a severe second degree burn of the posterior buttock area. Postoperatively the wounds were treated temporarily in the hospital and subsequent to this were managed as an outpatient. However, her wounds failed to heal and she continued to complain of persistent drainage and pain in the buttock area. She was subsequently then admitted to Washington County Hospital for further care to the burned areas.” 1

It discloses that she was again admitted to the hospital on 6 November 1971 and gradually improved under treatment. On 22 November, however, she underwent a skin graft operation because a significant percentage of the burned area “continued to manifest itself as third degree.” She was discharged on the eighth postoperative day. The “Final Diagnosis” was “Second and third degree burns on the buttocks.”

Appellant testified regarding the circumstances leading to the hymenotomy. With respect to the operation itself, she remembered only that she was given the anesthesia and woke up in the recovery room. “I remember Dr. Hauver walking up and telling me that I was going to have to be admitted, that there had been an accident. At this point, he didn’t explain exactly what.” Later Hauver talked to her in the presence of her parents. He said “Just that I had been burned. That there had been an accident, and that I had been burned.” She was in the hospital from Saturday until Friday. The transcript reads:

*308 “Q. During that time, did Dr. Hauver ever explain to you what happened that caused your burns?
A. Not in detail.
Q.

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Bluebook (online)
322 A.2d 890, 22 Md. App. 303, 1974 Md. App. LEXIS 351, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holloway-v-hauver-mdctspecapp-1974.