Hollie Crosbie v. Amedisys Holding, LLC

2013 DNH 112

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: August 21, 2013
• Docket: 12-cv-138-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Hollie Crosbie

v. Case No. 12-cv-138-PB Opinion No. 2013 DNH 112 Amedisys Holding, LLC

O R D E R

Hollie Crosbie was fired after her employer, Amedisys

Holdings, LLC, learned that she had accepted payments from an

independent living facility for referring patients to the

facility. It is undisputed that Crosbie violated company policy

when she accepted the fees. It also appears likely that Crosbie

acted contrary to the public policies that underlie federal and

state anti-kickback laws. Nevertheless, Crosbie has sued her

employer for wrongful discharge. Amedisys has filed a motion

for summary judgment.

To prove her wrongful discharge claim under New Hampshire

law, Crosbie must establish "(1) [that] the termination of

employment was motivated by bad faith, retaliation, or malice;

and (2) that she was terminated for performing an act that

public policy would encourage or for refusing to do something

that public policy would condemn." Lacasse v. Spaulding Youth Ctr., 154 N.H. 246, 248 (2006) (quoting Karch v. BayBank FSB,

147 N.H. 525, 536 (2002)).

Crosbie claims that she was discharged for accepting

referral fees that her supervisor encouraged her to accept. She

then argues that the termination was contrary to public policy

because it serves the interest of the public for healthcare

employees to accept referral fees from third parties when an

employee's supervisor encourages her to accept such fees. I

disagree. The federal and state anti-kickback laws are animated

by the strong public interest in discouraging referral fees

under circumstances such as those presented here. Even if an

employer encourages its employee to accept such fees, no public

interest is served by permitting the employee to accept them.

Thus, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Crosbie was

discharged for taking an action that public policy would

support.

I am also unpersuaded by Crosbie's contention that the

record would support a finding that her employer was motivated

by bad faith, malice, or retaliation. Crosbie does not assert

that she was tricked by her employer into accepting the referral

fees for the purpose of generating a pretext to fire her.

Instead, at most, the evidence suggests that a supervisor who was not involved in her discharge was insufficiently attentive

to a company policy prohibiting the acceptance of referral fees

when she failed to intervene to condemn a suggestion offered by

one of Crosbie's co-workers. Such evidence does not amount to

bad faith, malice, or retaliation.

This is not a close case. Crosbie has failed to produce

sufficient evidence to support either element of her wrongful

discharge claim. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc.

No. 14) is granted.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

August 21, 2 013

cc: Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Esq. Benjamin T. King, Esq.