JaWILLIAM V. REDMANN, Judge Pro Tem.
Defendant employer appeals a workers’ compensation award of supplemental earnings benefits under La.R.S. 23:1221(3), for work injury producing inability to earn 90% of his former wages.
Plaintiff employee’s disability to work free of pain with arms overhead and head turned existed (because of congenital bone anomalies) from the time he started a new assignment of overhead work, and is not proved to [659]*659be the result of any injury at work. Nor did plaintiff provide any evidence that his inability to work with arms overhead prevented his earning, on some other job, 90% of his former wages.
We therefore reverse.
Plaintiff has a congenital skeletal condition, his medical witness testifies, such that working with his arms overhead, especially with his head turned, so restricts the thoracic outlet for his neurovascular bundle as to irritate the nerves, causing him such pain and muscle spasm that overhead work is contraindicated for him.2 His work assignment for defendant required substantial laoverhead work with turned head.3 Plaintiff himself advised his employer in writing, two days before he quit work because of a “sharp, sharp stabbing pain,” that five doctors agreed he “must pursue a new line of work.”
Plaintiff had had previous non-work incidents of more violent injury and similar pain,4 and previous work incidents of sharp, [660]*660Uknife-like, stabbing pain; but he claims disabling injury from an incident of October 23, 1991, when he felt a “sharp, sharp stabbing pain” in his back while twisting a fuel nozzle into an airliner’s under-wing fuel valve.
On October 21, two days before that particular stabbing pain incident, plaintiff had delivered to his employer a handwritten document titled “Topic, Patrick B. Holley filing for Workmen’s Compensation.” That document declared:
“no history of back pain prior to this job ... extreme pain for several months ... five [doctors] in agreement ... that my condition is work related and I must pursue a new line of work ... condition is getting worse, therefore I have no choice but to file for workmen’s compensation.”
And on October 23, after the allegedly disabling stabbing pain, plaintiff wrote and delivered to his employer a “To whom it may concern” note: “Due to the extreme pain associated with my condition, I will not be able to return to work until I have been rehabilitated.”
The trial judge reasoned that plaintiffs congenital condition was aggravated by the overhead work, constituting an accident with injury that prevents plaintiffs doing overhead work. The result, the judge concluded, was a non-total disability that entitles plaintiff to supplemental earnings benefits. We disagree.
To recover workers’ compensation supplemental earnings benefits, an employee must first show an injury by work-related accident, as defined by R.S. 23:1021(1):
an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.
It is clear that plaintiffs uncontroverted testimony, believed by the trial judge, of “sharp, stabbing pain in [his] back” while twisting a fuel nozzle overhead into an airliner’s under-wing fuel valve, satisfies plaintiffs burden of proving the “event.”
|5Less clear is whether muscle spasm not seen by a doctor until November 19, 27 days after the event of October 23, could satisfy the burden of proving the event as one “directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury” (of whatever severity).5
Quite clear, however, is that plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of proving, as required by R.S. 23:1221(3), that any injury of October 23 disables him from earning 90% of his former earnings.
The only doctors plaintiff saw on or after October 23 were Dr. Graham (who did not testify, though he saw plaintiff 10/23, 28, and 30; and 11/1, 6, 8, 11, and 18) and Dr. [661]*661Underwood (who did testify, but saw plaintiff only once post-event, on 11/19).
Dr. Graham’s medical records do not give any detail for those post-event visits beyond two or three word comments (perhaps describing x-rays taken). Those records afford no evidence even of injury, much less of a disability that would prevent plaintiffs working at a job paying 90% of his former earnings.
Dr. Underwood had seen plaintiff 29 times between January 2 and October 9, 1991, but did not see him after the October 23 event until November 19. Dr. Underwood’s testimony of that one post-event visit is footnoted.6 He, like Dr. Graham, is silent on any objective findings of injury save muscle spasm 27 days after thejeevent, which he does not connect to the event; and he is especially silent on any disability to earn 90% of former earnings.
The medical evidence set out in footnote 2 shows that plaintiffs disability to do overhead work without pain has long existed, even when he first changed assignments at his job, from parking and fueling small private aircraft, to overhead fueling of commercial aircraft. That evidence (while it reasonably shows a disability to do overhead work) further shows that plaintiffs inability to work overhead without pain was not the result of the pain from his overhead work, but the result of his congenital condition. The pain did not cause the condition: rather, the condition caused the pain, as Dr. Underwood’s uncontradicted testimony, quoted in fn. 2, shows.7 Thus we conclude that the event of October 23 did not disable plaintiff, and for that reason alone we would reverse.
Yet also requiring reversal is that plaintiff offered not only no medical evidence, but no other evidence to prove, and did not prove, that his inability to do overhead work prevented his finding a job paying 90% of his $7.50 per hour wages.
“The threshold prerequisite to the recovery of supplemental earnings benefits, as set forth in subparagraph (3)(a) [of R.S. 23:1221] is that the employee’s injury result in his ‘inability to earn wages equal to ninety percent or more of the wages he was earning at the time of the injury.’” Payne v. Country Pride Foods Ltd., 525 So.2d 106, 109 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988). The injured employee thus bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury resulted in his inability to earn that amount. The analysis is necessarily a facts and circumstances one in which the court is mindful of |7the jurisprudential tenet that worker’s compensa[662]*662tion law is to be liberally construed in favor of coverage.
Daigle v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 545 So.2d 1005, 1006-1007 (La.1989). See also Freeman v. Poulan/Weed Eater, 93-1530 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 733.
In comparison with the present case, where there is no medical evidence of near-total disability, and no testimony of any effort whatsoever to find employment, nor any expert opinion or employment agency advice that no employment was available for one who could not do overhead work, the Daigle case exemplifies the proof of inability to earn 90% of wages:
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JaWILLIAM V. REDMANN, Judge Pro Tem.
Defendant employer appeals a workers’ compensation award of supplemental earnings benefits under La.R.S. 23:1221(3), for work injury producing inability to earn 90% of his former wages.
Plaintiff employee’s disability to work free of pain with arms overhead and head turned existed (because of congenital bone anomalies) from the time he started a new assignment of overhead work, and is not proved to [659]*659be the result of any injury at work. Nor did plaintiff provide any evidence that his inability to work with arms overhead prevented his earning, on some other job, 90% of his former wages.
We therefore reverse.
Plaintiff has a congenital skeletal condition, his medical witness testifies, such that working with his arms overhead, especially with his head turned, so restricts the thoracic outlet for his neurovascular bundle as to irritate the nerves, causing him such pain and muscle spasm that overhead work is contraindicated for him.2 His work assignment for defendant required substantial laoverhead work with turned head.3 Plaintiff himself advised his employer in writing, two days before he quit work because of a “sharp, sharp stabbing pain,” that five doctors agreed he “must pursue a new line of work.”
Plaintiff had had previous non-work incidents of more violent injury and similar pain,4 and previous work incidents of sharp, [660]*660Uknife-like, stabbing pain; but he claims disabling injury from an incident of October 23, 1991, when he felt a “sharp, sharp stabbing pain” in his back while twisting a fuel nozzle into an airliner’s under-wing fuel valve.
On October 21, two days before that particular stabbing pain incident, plaintiff had delivered to his employer a handwritten document titled “Topic, Patrick B. Holley filing for Workmen’s Compensation.” That document declared:
“no history of back pain prior to this job ... extreme pain for several months ... five [doctors] in agreement ... that my condition is work related and I must pursue a new line of work ... condition is getting worse, therefore I have no choice but to file for workmen’s compensation.”
And on October 23, after the allegedly disabling stabbing pain, plaintiff wrote and delivered to his employer a “To whom it may concern” note: “Due to the extreme pain associated with my condition, I will not be able to return to work until I have been rehabilitated.”
The trial judge reasoned that plaintiffs congenital condition was aggravated by the overhead work, constituting an accident with injury that prevents plaintiffs doing overhead work. The result, the judge concluded, was a non-total disability that entitles plaintiff to supplemental earnings benefits. We disagree.
To recover workers’ compensation supplemental earnings benefits, an employee must first show an injury by work-related accident, as defined by R.S. 23:1021(1):
an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.
It is clear that plaintiffs uncontroverted testimony, believed by the trial judge, of “sharp, stabbing pain in [his] back” while twisting a fuel nozzle overhead into an airliner’s under-wing fuel valve, satisfies plaintiffs burden of proving the “event.”
|5Less clear is whether muscle spasm not seen by a doctor until November 19, 27 days after the event of October 23, could satisfy the burden of proving the event as one “directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury” (of whatever severity).5
Quite clear, however, is that plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of proving, as required by R.S. 23:1221(3), that any injury of October 23 disables him from earning 90% of his former earnings.
The only doctors plaintiff saw on or after October 23 were Dr. Graham (who did not testify, though he saw plaintiff 10/23, 28, and 30; and 11/1, 6, 8, 11, and 18) and Dr. [661]*661Underwood (who did testify, but saw plaintiff only once post-event, on 11/19).
Dr. Graham’s medical records do not give any detail for those post-event visits beyond two or three word comments (perhaps describing x-rays taken). Those records afford no evidence even of injury, much less of a disability that would prevent plaintiffs working at a job paying 90% of his former earnings.
Dr. Underwood had seen plaintiff 29 times between January 2 and October 9, 1991, but did not see him after the October 23 event until November 19. Dr. Underwood’s testimony of that one post-event visit is footnoted.6 He, like Dr. Graham, is silent on any objective findings of injury save muscle spasm 27 days after thejeevent, which he does not connect to the event; and he is especially silent on any disability to earn 90% of former earnings.
The medical evidence set out in footnote 2 shows that plaintiffs disability to do overhead work without pain has long existed, even when he first changed assignments at his job, from parking and fueling small private aircraft, to overhead fueling of commercial aircraft. That evidence (while it reasonably shows a disability to do overhead work) further shows that plaintiffs inability to work overhead without pain was not the result of the pain from his overhead work, but the result of his congenital condition. The pain did not cause the condition: rather, the condition caused the pain, as Dr. Underwood’s uncontradicted testimony, quoted in fn. 2, shows.7 Thus we conclude that the event of October 23 did not disable plaintiff, and for that reason alone we would reverse.
Yet also requiring reversal is that plaintiff offered not only no medical evidence, but no other evidence to prove, and did not prove, that his inability to do overhead work prevented his finding a job paying 90% of his $7.50 per hour wages.
“The threshold prerequisite to the recovery of supplemental earnings benefits, as set forth in subparagraph (3)(a) [of R.S. 23:1221] is that the employee’s injury result in his ‘inability to earn wages equal to ninety percent or more of the wages he was earning at the time of the injury.’” Payne v. Country Pride Foods Ltd., 525 So.2d 106, 109 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988). The injured employee thus bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury resulted in his inability to earn that amount. The analysis is necessarily a facts and circumstances one in which the court is mindful of |7the jurisprudential tenet that worker’s compensa[662]*662tion law is to be liberally construed in favor of coverage.
Daigle v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 545 So.2d 1005, 1006-1007 (La.1989). See also Freeman v. Poulan/Weed Eater, 93-1530 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 733.
In comparison with the present case, where there is no medical evidence of near-total disability, and no testimony of any effort whatsoever to find employment, nor any expert opinion or employment agency advice that no employment was available for one who could not do overhead work, the Daigle case exemplifies the proof of inability to earn 90% of wages:
Mr. Daigle successfully bore his burden of proving his disability and resultant inability to earn at least 90% of his pre-injury wages. Testimony from the treating physician as well as from the doctor who examined Daigle at Sherwin-Williams’ request indicated that he suffered a ten to fifteen percent anatomical disability and should not lift, push, or pull anything more than fifty pounds. As manager of the Sherwin-Williams paint store, he was expected to do a considerable amount of lifting and carrying, often of loads in excess of his fifty pound limitation. It follows that it is likely that he would encounter the same requirements and accompanying problems in another such job. In addition, the record revealed that he had made several attempts at gainful employment. Although plaintiffs work history was in hardware and in paint stores, he attempted to find work outside of his past field.
Daigle, 545 So.2d at 1008.
In the present case, there is no medical evidence other than that, because of his congenital condition, plaintiff cannot do overhead work, especially while his head is turned, without experiencing pain. No medical evidence suggests he has any disability to perform any other physical or mental effort. No medical or other evidence suggests that he could not do the work he was doing before he switched to commercial airliner refueling.
And, as far as the record shows, plaintiff made no effort to find work. He did not even ask his employer to return him to his previous assignment of parking and fueling light aircraft, which did not require overhead work.
Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving that he could not earn 90% of his wages, notwithstanding his congenital inability to do overhead work without pain.
In sum, pretermitting whether there were objective findings “at the time” of the October 23 incident, and whether any then injury was uneompensable deterioration or degeneration, we conclude |8that plaintiffs only disability to work overhead results not from working overhead but from his congenital condition detailed by Dr. Underwood; and that plaintiff did not, in any case, prove that his disability to work overhead renders him unable to earn 90% of his former earnings. The hearing officer’s view that plaintiffs congenital condition was aggravated by injury of October 23, 1991 or other work injury, and that that aggravation disabled plaintiff to do overhead work and thereby prevented his earning 90% of former earnings, is clearly wrong.
Reversed; judgment for defendant at plaintiffs cost.