Holland v. Puritan Dairy, Inc.

120 So. 2d 1, 1960 Fla. LEXIS 2431
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedApril 29, 1960
StatusPublished

This text of 120 So. 2d 1 (Holland v. Puritan Dairy, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holland v. Puritan Dairy, Inc., 120 So. 2d 1, 1960 Fla. LEXIS 2431 (Fla. 1960).

Opinion

DREW, Justice.

The order of the full commission sought to be reviewed in these proceedings reversed an order of the deputy commissioner 1 on the ground that the deputy [2]*2commissioner’s findings of fact were not supported by competent substantial evidence which accorded with logic and reason, and that the order did not accord with [3]*3the essential requirements of law within the meaning of United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., Fla.1955, 55 So. 2d 741.2

[4]*4Those portions of the order of the deputy commissioner in which he arrives at the conclusions overruled by the full commission read as follows:

“9. That the claimant has been unable to work since the accident of November 10, 1955, although I find that he had acquired an earning capacity before the accident, in spite of his severely injured back.

“10. That the claimant’s accident of November 10, 1955 aggravated the pre-exist-ing back condition which he had, worsening this previous condition to such an extent that he could no longer work at all. The claimant is, therefore, permanently and totally disabled by reason of his industrial accident of November 10, 1955, and is entitled to receive compensation for such disability from the Manufacturer’s Casualty Company, the carrier at the time of the accident, at the rate of $33.00 per week.”

The evidence was uncontroverted that the petitioner could work and did work for this employer prior to the injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. Therefore, that portion of the case, a necessary precedent in support of a workman’s compensation3 claim, need not be considered further here.

We now come to the crux of this review. The real issue is whether the deputy commissioner’s order meets all the required tests of validity in holding that there was an aggravation of the pre-existing back condition of the petitioner worsening this previous condition to such an extent that petitioner could no longer work.

Testimony and company employment records revealed to the deputy commissioner — and it is so reflected in his order —that petitioner worked up to November 10, 1955, the date he suffered his occupationally incurred injury, and could work no longer. The testimony of Dr. Keedy, properly considered by the deputy commissioner in his order along with other medical and lay testimony,4 and which was apparently ignored by the full commission in their attempt to revaluate the testimony is so vital to this review it must be quoted:

“ * * * The part which I feel that that accident caused is a tugging and pulling on this scar tissue now which has further aggravated a pre-existing condition, a condition pre-existing this other, which was actually a superimposed sprain of his back, has caused a persistent radiculitis, that is, irritation of the nerve roots, going down into the left leg.
“Q. Since that time, I note in your reports we don’t find any report of muscle spasm in there. Would that show an improvement?
“A. Oh, from time to time, you know, on bed rest and so forth, he rests a lot, that would go away.
“Then he gets up and moved around and pulls on this scar tissue, and one thing and another, and it comes back again. So his [5]*5muscle spasm, I believe, is an intermittent thing. Some days in my office he shows it and other times he did not.
“Q. From your examinations, you felt that this man, based on your examinations of him, is not able to work, am I correct about that?
“A. Yes, sir.”

Thus we have before us an order of the deputy commissioner in which he considers and weighs all the evidence, including the opinions of those physicians relied on by the petitioner and those called by the employer. The full commission in its attempt to make independent findings based upon its review of the record — which was an adequate record in every respect — fell into error 5 by its treatment of Dr. Keedy’s statements regarding the petitioner’s disclosure of his previous lay history. This specialist was able to determine medically the injury caused an aggravation of a preexisting condition leading to inability to work.

The very nature of the evidence in this case, involving as it does, the truthfulness and credibility of the employee’s testimony ■ — not only before the deputy but as a basis for the findings of Dr. Keedy, was peculiarly within the province of the deputy to evaluate. He had the parties before him, could see and hear them, and, in the light of his experience in such matters, come much nearer a proper evaluation of the evidence than the full commission on a cold written record. Moreover, as we read the order of the full commission, and the language in which it is couched, particularly the use of the adjective “alleged” when referring to the accident which forms the basis for the claim, and which was never disputed by anybody, the view is justified that the error of the full commission in evaluating the evidence itself may have been unconsciously influenced by doubts that there actually was an accident.

For these reasons the writ is granted and the order of the full commission is quashed and set aside with directions to affirm the order of the deputy commissioner.

THOMAS, C. J., and TERRELL, HOBSON and THORNAL, JJ., concur.

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Andrews v. CBS DIVISION, ETC.
118 So. 2d 206 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1960)
Ball v. Mann
75 So. 2d 758 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1954)
US Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.
55 So. 2d 741 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1951)
Foxworth v. Florida Industrial Commission
86 So. 2d 147 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1955)
Gray v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co.
64 So. 2d 650 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1953)
Arkin Construction Company v. Simpkins
99 So. 2d 557 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1957)
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114 So. 2d 425 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
120 So. 2d 1, 1960 Fla. LEXIS 2431, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holland-v-puritan-dairy-inc-fla-1960.