Holland v. Knoll

202 B.R. 646, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17685, 1996 WL 685686
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedNovember 27, 1996
DocketCivil Action 94-40100-NMG
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 202 B.R. 646 (Holland v. Knoll) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holland v. Knoll, 202 B.R. 646, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17685, 1996 WL 685686 (D. Mass. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

Pending before this Court is an appeal by Star M. Holland (“Wife”) from the ruling of the United States Bankruptcy Court entered on June 8, 1994. That Court ruled that an award to Wife’s ex-husband of an $8,000 interest in Wife’s pension plan pursuant to a property settlement and made part of a divorce decree, is not a dischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523. This Court has jurisdiction to hear Wife’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158. Upon consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, this Court concludes that the findings of the Bankruptcy Court were not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were sound and well reasoned and its decision will, therefore, be affirmed.

Background

On March 5, 1992, Wife and her husband, David Knoll, Defendant-Appellee (“Husband”) were granted a judgment for divorce nisi in the Worcester Probate Court. Incorporated into the divorce judgment was a separation agreement which provided, inter alia that 1) within 90 days of the judgment, Husband was to receive $8,000 as a property settlement, and 2) Husband waived all right to Wife’s pension from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Wife failed to pay Husband the $8,000 within the time prescribed and shortly thereafter the Probate Court entered an order (“the August, 1992 Order”) modifying the divorce decree to provide for Husband to receive $8,000 from Wife’s pension fund when and as it became payable. On or about October 5, 1993, Wife filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Wife listed Husband under Schedule F (“Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims”) of her petition and no objection was ever filed by or on behalf of Husband.

The State Board of Retirement has refused to pay Wife’s pension funds to her because the August, 1992 Order prohibits her from receiving such funds until Husband has been paid his $8,000. The monies in the pension fund are currently held solely in Wife’s name.

On January 21, 1994, Wife filed an adversary proceeding against Husband to determine the dischargeability of her $8,000 “debt” to Husband, specifically, the amount of her pension fund awarded to him in the divorce decree. The Bankruptcy Court denied Wife’s motion for summary judgment and instead, entered judgment in favor of Husband, determining that he had a present property interest in the $8,000 transferred by force of the August, 1992 Order. Judge Queenan concluded that Husband’s $8,000 *647 property interest was, therefore, not a “debt” subject to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523.

Standard of Review

It is well settled that this Court may not disturb the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact unless they are “clearly erroneous,” but reviews that Court’s conclusions of law de novo. Fed.R.Bankr. 8013; In re DN Associates, 3 F.3d 512, 515 (1st Cir.1993). The determination of the dischargeability of the $8,000 interest in Wife’s pension fund is ultimately one of law and the Bankruptcy Court’s decision on that issue is, therefore, subject to de novo review.

Analysis

Wife/Appellant maintains that reversal of the Bankruptcy Court is required because 1) the debt that she owes to Husband resulted from a property settlement in a divorce action and 2) the money held in the pension fund in her own name is property of her bankruptcy estate and, for both reasons, any claim to it by Husband is dischargeable. The Bankruptcy Court did not dispute Wife’s arguments specifically, but rather concluded that Husband’s $8,000 interest in her pension was not a “debt” at all.

A. Husband’s Interest in Wife’s Pension is not a “Debt”

As a threshold matter, there can be no doubt or disagreement that the divorce decree award of $8,000 to Husband in this case was a property settlement and not payment of alimony, maintenance or support. Furthermore, consistent with Wife’s contention, a “debt” incurred as a result of a property settlement is dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Abrams v. Burg, 367 Mass. 617, 327 N.E.2d 745 (1975); Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir.1976); In re Janowski, 175 B.R. 155 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1994); In re Butler, 186 B.R. 371 (Bankr.D.Vt.1995). Those cases and the proposition for which they stand are, however, inapposite to the case at bar.

The salient issue before this Court, as pointed out by Judge Queenan in the Bankruptcy Court hearing, is: whether or not the right of a Chapter 7 debtor’s ex-husband to a portion of her pension plan benefits, awarded pursuant to a divorce decree, constitute a “debt” owed by the debtor and dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523. Neither the First Circuit nor a district court within the First Circuit has ruled on that question. Other Circuits have, however, addressed the question of the dischargeability of an assignment of pension funds via a divorce decree in the context of Chapter 7.

The Ninth Circuit has dealt with the question and concluded that such an assignment of pension funds is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. In In re Teichman, 774 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.1985), a dissolution decree ordered the debtor to pay his former wife a percentage of his retirement benefits as a division of property. The debtor failed to pay her $14,000 of the benefits he received prepetition and further refused to pay her any benefits received postpetition. He argued that his obligations to his ex-wife were discharged, but the Ninth Circuit held that, although the $14,000 prepetition debt was discharged, his wife’s right to a percentage of his monthly pension benefits postpetition was not a “debt” subject to discharge.

The Court in Teichman explained that under the dissolution decree, the wife had an ownership interest in a portion of the retirement fund. Because the postpetition payments were not debts under the Bankruptcy Code, they were not subject to discharge. A Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit applied the Teichman reasoning in finding that the right of a debtor’s ex-wife to a portion of his postpetition pension plan benefits was not a debt owed by him and therefore, was not subject to discharge. Gendreau v. Gendreau, 191 B.R. 798 (9th Cir. BAP 1996).

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Bluebook (online)
202 B.R. 646, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17685, 1996 WL 685686, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holland-v-knoll-mad-1996.