Holistic Fitness New Era LLC v. Local Flair, Inc.

47 Pa. D. & C.5th 321
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Monroe County
DecidedApril 21, 2014
DocketNo. 148 CV 2015
StatusPublished

This text of 47 Pa. D. & C.5th 321 (Holistic Fitness New Era LLC v. Local Flair, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Monroe County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holistic Fitness New Era LLC v. Local Flair, Inc., 47 Pa. D. & C.5th 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).

Opinion

ZULICK, J.,

This matter comes before the court on defendants’ preliminary objections to plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff Holistic Fitness New Era, L.L.C. (Holistic) filed its complaint sounding in breach of contract and fraud on January 8, 2015. Holistic alleges it entered into a contract for services with Local Flair, Inc. (Local Flair) on May 22, 2014, and that Local Flair did not perform its duties according to the contract or the later supplemental contract. Alternatively Holistic seeks to recover damages based on unjust enrichment and/or promissory estoppel. Holistic additionally alleges that Alexandra Schratt, the president of Local Flair, acted individually in regards to its claims for unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and fraud.

Defendants Local Flair and Alexandra Schratt filed preliminary objections on February 4,2015, asserting that [323]*323the complaint was legally insufficient, raising a demurrer as to Counts Two through Five (promissory estoppel against both defendants; unjust enrichment against both defendants; fraud against both defendants; and misrepresentation against both defendants), and moving to strike allegations for lack of specificity. All parties filed briefs, and oral arguments were held in this court on April 6, 2015.

The facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows. On May 22, 2014, “the parties entered into a written contract for services, including inter alia, logo design, packaging labels, website design, product brochure design, search engine optimization and social media implementation.” Complaint ¶ 7. Half of the payment, $6,937.50, was due at signing, which Holistic paid to Local Flair by check. Id. at ¶8. The contract also provided that one-fourth of the payment, $3,468.75, was due to Local Flair upon design approval, which Holistic paid on June 25, 2014. Id. at ¶ 10-11. On August 28, 2014, the parties entered into a supplemental contract which provided that $2,000 was due to Local Flair for the installation and configuration of an online “shopping cart” and website design. Id. at ¶ 12-13. Holistic paid $1,000 upon signing, pursuant to the supplemental contract. Complaint at ¶ 14-15.

Holistic paid $4,468.75 to Local Flair on September 19, 2014; this amount included the final one-fourth payment of the initial contract and the second half of the payment for the supplemental contract. Id. at ¶ 16. Holistic alleges that it paid $15,875.00 in total to Local Flair. Id. at ¶ 17. Local [324]*324Flair performed less than half of its duties, and the work that was completed was done in a “shoddy, unworkmanlike manner.” Id. at ¶ 25. Holistic additionally alleges that Local Flair and Ms. Schratt misrepresented that they “possessed the requisite e-commerce, search engine optimization, and social media experience to complete the project as described in the contract within the timeframe described in the contract.” Id. at ¶ 42. Holistic hired additional companies and individuals to complete the work. Id. at 19-21. Because Holistic historically generated in excess of $194,982.51 during the second half of each calendar year, Holistic requests damages, including expectation damages, in excess of $60,000.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Insufficiency of Pleading as to Ms. Schratt

First, the defendants assert the insufficiency of the complaint as to Ms. Schratt, arguing that Holistic contracted with and paid the corporation, Local Flair, Inc.1

There is a strong presumption in Pennsylvania against piercing the corporate veil.... When making the determination of whether to pierce the corporate veil, the court ‘must start from the general rule that the corporate entity should be recognized and upheld, • unless specific, unusual, circumstances call for an [325]*325exception.’... ‘Care should be taken on all occasions to avoid making the entire theory of corporate entity useless.’

Miners, Inc. v. Alpine Equipment Corp., 722 A.2d 691, 694 (Pa. Super. 1998).

Here, however, Holistic argues it is not attempting to pierce the corporate veil. Rather, Ms. Schratt is liable as an officer of the corporation for her individual actions under participation liability as recognized in Pennsylvania. “To impose liability on a corporate officer pursuant to the participation theory, a plaintiff must establish that the corporate officer engaged in misfeasance, i.e., ‘the improper performance of an act....’ However, a corporate officer cannot be held personally liable for nonfeasance, i.e., ‘the omission of an act which a person ought to do....’” Shay v. Flight C Helicopter Services, Inc., 822 A.2d 1, 17 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Fraud is the only misfeasance alleged in the complaint that could include Ms. Schratt under a participation theory of liability. The written agreement at issue here names Holistic and Local Flair as the parties, and Ms. Schratt consistently signed the documents as a representative of Local Flair. See Plaintiff’s Exhibits A-F. Holistic made its checks out to Local Flair, Inc. and not Ms. Schratt personally. Id. Thus, as will be discussed below, Ms. Schratt should not be included under the claims of unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel, because there is no indication in the complaint that she was enriched or was a party to any promise or agreement. However, as discussed [326]*326below, fraud is averred sufficiently in the complaint, and it amounts to a wrongful act on the part of Ms. Schratt as well as the corporation itself, exposing Ms. Schratt to possible liability under the participation theory. This preliminary objection will be sustained in part and denied in part.

2. Demurrer as to Count II Promissory Estoppel

The defendants next raise a demurrer to promissory estoppel as it relates to Ms. Schratt individually. The standard for demurrer is “whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible.” Santiago v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 613 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. 1992). “Where any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the demurrer.” Id.

Where there is no enforceable agreement between the parties because the agreement is not supported by consideration, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is invoked to avoid injustice by making enforceable a promise made by one party to the other when the promisee relies on the promise and therefore changes his position to his own detriment, restatement *403 (Second) Contracts § 90; see, e.g., Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006 (Pa. Super. 1997). In order to maintain an action in promissory estoppel, the aggrieved party must show that 1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; 2) the promisee actually took action or [327]

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Bluebook (online)
47 Pa. D. & C.5th 321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holistic-fitness-new-era-llc-v-local-flair-inc-pactcomplmonroe-2014.