Holder v. State

571 S.W.2d 885, 1978 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1234
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 20, 1978
DocketNo. 58811
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 571 S.W.2d 885 (Holder v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holder v. State, 571 S.W.2d 885, 1978 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1234 (Tex. 1978).

Opinion

OPINION

PHILLIPS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a revocation of probation. Appellant was originally convicted for burglary of a building and was assessed a punishment of four years’ imprisonment and a $800.00 fine, probated. On February 6, 1978, the State filed a motion to revoke probation. On March 7, 1978, the State filed an amended motion to revoke probation alleging that the appellant violated State law in that the appellant appeared “in a public place, to-wit: US Highway 180 approximately four (4) miles west of Mineral Wells, Texas under the influence of a substance, to-wit: clear acrylic plastic aerosol spray paint, to the degree that the said David Michael Holder might endanger himself and others.” On the 17th of March, 1978, an order revoking appellant’s probation was entered based on the trial court’s finding that the State’s allegation in its amended motion to revoke probation was true.

Appellant’s single ground of error alleges that the evidence adduced by the State in support of its motion to revoke probation was insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain the trial court’s finding that the appellant was indeed under the “influence of a substance, to-wit: clear acrylic plastic aerosol spray paint, . . ..”

The amended motion to revoke probation upon which appellant and the State proceeded in the instant cause alleged that the appellant violated that condition of his probation which required that he not violate the “laws of this state . ..” The amended motion to revoke probation alleged the offense of public intoxication. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 42.08.1 The arresting police officer testified at the hearing that he had experience with over a thousand individuals who were intoxicated by alcohol or drugs. He further testified that he observed a vehicle on Highway 180 weaving and crossing the center stripe and driving erratically. He proceeded to signal the vehicle to stop. The driver’s response was slow, sharp, and jerky. The appellant was unsteady as he exited the vehicle and approached the police officer. He appeared unkempt, glassy-eyed, and had a strong chemical smell about him like glue or thinner. Appellant’s speech was slurred and he appeared “like he was in a fog” or “distant.” The police officer observed a roll of baggies, a can of spray acrylic lacquer, and a single baggie with the lacquer substance within it on the transmission hump beside the driver’s position. He also observed more baggies and another can of similar substance in the rear of the vehicle. Finally, he testified that he was of the opinion, based on his experience and observations, that the appellant was intoxicated and to such a degree that he was a danger to himself and others. This testimony clearly establishes the violation of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 42.08. See Scamardo v. [887]*887State, Tex.Cr.App., 517 S.W.2d 293. Appellant cites Malone v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 169, 117 S.W.2d 779; Daulton v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 335, 235 S.W.2d 165; and Schubach v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 276, 340 S.W.2d 42, for the proposition that descriptive aver-ments in the allegation of an offense must be proven as charged.

Were we to conclude that the State was obliged to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that appellant was indeed intoxicated under the precise substance alleged, i. e., clear acrylic plastic aerosol paint, we consider the evidence in this record to be sufficient in establishing that descriptive allegation. As noted previously, the arresting officer noticed a strong chemical smell about the appellant like glue or thinner and observed a roll of baggies, a can of spray acrylic lacquer, and a single baggie with the lacquer substance within it on the transmission hump beside the driver’s position. The arresting officer made similar observations in the rear seat area.2 Thus, the State’s proof that the appellant “smelled like airplane glue or paint thinner” and the close proximity of the can of acrylic lacquer and the baggie with the acrylic substance within it to the driver’s position in the automobile driven by appellant is sufficient to establish that the acrylic lacquer paint was the cause of appellant’s public intoxication.

Appellant’s single ground of error is overruled. There bfeing no abuse of discretion in revoking appellant’s probation, the judgment is affirmed.

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Related

Gonzalez v. State
664 S.W.2d 797 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1984)
Davenport v. State
574 S.W.2d 73 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
571 S.W.2d 885, 1978 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1234, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holder-v-state-texcrimapp-1978.