Holder v. State of NH et al.

2006 DNH 123
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedOctober 26, 2006
DocketCV-06-252-PB
StatusPublished

This text of 2006 DNH 123 (Holder v. State of NH et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holder v. State of NH et al., 2006 DNH 123 (D.N.H. 2006).

Opinion

Holder v. State of NH et al. CV-06-252-PB 10/26/06

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Ralph Holder

v. Case No. 06-cv-252-PB Opinion No. 2006 DNH 123 State of New Hampshire, et al.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Ralph Holder seeks money damages against the State of New

Hampshire, Patricia Frim, Esq. ("Frim"), Harriet Fishman

("Fishman"), and Arthur Hilson ("Hilson"). Holder asserts

numerous federal1 and state law claims arising from actions

allegedly taken by the individually named defendants in his

divorce and custody proceedings. In the Matter of Maria Holder

and Ralph Holder, 2002-M-0032, 2002-M-0372, 2002-M-0107.2 Each

of the defendants now moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

1 Holder asserts federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. He also claims that several of the defendants violated the Privacy Act of 1974. However, it is clear from the language of the statute that the Act only applies to federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1); 5 U.S.C. § 552(f). Thus, I dismiss Holder's "Privacy Act of 1974" claim.

2 Specifically, Frim served as the guardian ad litem in the proceedings, Fishman served as the Marital Master, and Hilson was appointed by Frim as a co-parenting counselor in the wake of the divorce. Pro. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, I grant their

motions and dismiss Holder's federal claims. I also decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law

claims.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

12(b)(6), I "accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations

of the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the

plaintiff's favor and determine whether the complaint, so read,

sets forth facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable

theory." Martin v. Applied Cellular Tech.. 284 F.3d 1, 6 (1st

Cir. 2002). An action should be dismissed "only if the

plaintiff's factual averments hold out no hope of recovery on any

theory adumbrated in its complaint." In re Colonial Mortgage

Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2003).

II. DISCUSSION

Because Holder's claims are so facially deficient, a

detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary. For purposes of

this discussion, it is sufficient simply to note that Holder's

- 2 - claims arise from facts surrounding certain divorce and custodial

proceedings to which Holder was a party.

First, with respect to Holder's § 1983 claim against the

State of New Hampshire, I note that it is well-established that

neither states nor state officials sued in their official

capacities are amenable to suit for damages pursuant to § 1983.

See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona. 520 U.S. 43, 69

(1997). Accordingly, I dismiss Holder's § 1983 claim against the

State of New Hampshire.

Second, Fishman functioned as an agent of the court and

performed activities "integrally related to the judicial process"

while acting as a Marital Master. Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1,

3 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335

(1983). Thus, she is entitled to absolute immunity and I

therefore dismiss Holder's § 1983 claim against her. See i d .

Next, Holder's §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against Frim are

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Torromeo v. Town of

Fremont, N.H., 438 F.3d 113, 116 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[t]he

doctrine [of res judicata] precludes litigation in a later case

of matters actually litigated, and matters that could have been

- 3 - litigated, in the earlier action"). Holder has already litigated

claims arising from the same set of facts--his divorce and

custody proceedings--against Frim in Judge DiClerico's court.

Holder v. Frim. 2006 WL 2190723, at *3 (D.N.H., 2006).

Accordingly, he is not free to pursue additional claims against

Frim in this action.

In any event, as Judge DiClerico explained, Frim is entitled

to absolute immunity when performing the functions of her office.

See i d .; see also Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 925 (4th Cir.

2005). Thus, even if Holder's claims were not barred by res

judicata, Frim would be entitled to immunity from this suit.

Accordingly, I dismiss Holder's §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against

Frim.

Finally, with respect to Hilson, Holder asserts only one

cause of action: a 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim, alleging that

Hilson engaged in a conspiracy to interfere with his

constitutional rights. He has failed, however, to make out a

prima facie case for this claim. To state a claim under 1985(3),

a plaintiff must allege the existence of (1) a conspiracy, (2) a

conspiratorial purpose to deprive a person or class or persons.

- 4- directly or indirectly, of the equal protection of the laws or of

equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an overt act

in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) either (a) an injury to

person or property, or (b) a deprivation of a constitutionally

protected right or privilege." See Aulson v. Blanchard. 83 F.3d

1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.

88, 102 (1971). In addition to these four elements, a plaintiff

must also show that "the conspiratorial conduct of which he

complains is propelled by ■'some racial, or perhaps otherwise

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'’" I d . (quoting

Griffin. 403 U.S. at 102).

In his complaint. Holder simply alleges that he is "of the

Roman Catholic religious denomination" and that Hilson is a

pastor at a Baptist church. Complaint 90, 91. For obvious

reasons, these allegations are not sufficient to support a claim

that Hilson acted with "invidiously discriminatory animus" aimed

at a class of Catholic Church members. Thus, Holder has failed

to satisfy an essential element of his § 1985(3) claim.

Holder's remaining claims arise under state law. I decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims as I have

- 5 - dismissed all claims over which I have original jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Perkins v. Londonderry Basketball

Club. 196 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir.

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Related

Griffin v. Breckenridge
403 U.S. 88 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Briscoe v. LaHue
460 U.S. 325 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona
520 U.S. 43 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Perkins v. Londonderry Basketball Club
196 F.3d 13 (First Circuit, 1999)
Martin v. Applied Cellular Technology, Inc.
284 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2002)
Banco Santander De Puerto Rico v. Lopez-Stubbe
324 F.3d 12 (First Circuit, 2003)
Torromeo v. Town of Fremont
438 F.3d 113 (First Circuit, 2006)
Dr. Gladys Cok v. Louis Cosentino
876 F.2d 1 (First Circuit, 1989)

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