Holbrook Towing and Recovery, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet

Kentucky Supreme Court·Decided July 17, 2009·No. 2007 SC 000174·Unknown

Opinion

RENDERED : JUNE 25, 2009

TO BE PUBLISHED

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DIRECTV, INC . AND ECHOSTAR SATELLITE, LLC

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V CASE NO . 2006-CA-001983-MR FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 05-CI-01623

MARK TREESH, IN HIS OFFICIAL APPELLEES CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND FRANKFORT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ABRAMSON REVERSING

Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 160.613 authorizes local district boards of education to levy "a utility gross receipts license tax for schools" on the gross receipts derived from furnishing utility services within the district . In 2005, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 272, which in part expanded the gross receipts tax base to include "gross receipts derived from the furnishing of direct satellite broadcast and wireless cable service." KRS 160 .614(3) . Soon after this new provision went into effect, Appellants DirecTV, Inc . and Echostar

Satellite, L.L.C ., the multi-channel television industry's two largest suppliers of direct broadcast satellite (DBS) services (the DBS providers), brought suit in Franklin Circuit Court seeking a declaration that as applied to them the gross receipts tax was preempted by the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, a provision of which bars local taxation of DBS programming services . They also sought an injunction barring the Department of Revenue (the Department) from enforcing the tax against them . By order entered August 22, 2006, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the DBS providers and awarded the relief they sought. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. The majority ruled that because the gross receipts tax was levied to fund schools it was in effect a state tax and thus was not preempted by federal law . We accepted the DBS providers' motion for discretionary review to consider the preemptive scope of the applicable provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and now reverse.

RELEVANT FACTS

The General Assembly has expanded the tax base for the utility gross receipts license tax on two occasions. In 1990, the General Assembly amended the tax to include a levy "on the gross receipts derived from the furnishing of cable service in addition to the gross receipts derived from the furnishing of the utility services defined in KRS 160 .6131 ." KRS 160 .614(1) . 1 Then, as noted, in 2005 the General Assembly authorized a levy on the "gross receipts derived

"Cable service" is defined in KRS 136 .602(1) as "the provision of video, audio, or other programming service to purchasers ."

from the furnishing of direct satellite broadcast and wireless cable service in addition to the gross receipts derived from the furnishing of utility services defined in KRS 160 .61.31 and cable service." KRS 160 .614(3) . 2 The individual school districts decide at what rate to tax the cable and satellite providers, provided that rate does not exceed 3% of gross receipts, and may opt not to tax them at all. KRS 160 .613, 60.614(4) . The local school districts must, however, treat the two types of provider the same way. KRS 160 .614(4)-(5) . Cable and satellite providers are thus obliged to determine their tax liability on a district- by-district basis, and are required to remit the total to the Department every month. KRS 160 .615.

While the Kentucky General Assembly was responding to the evolution of multi-channel video programming with these changes to the school tax provisions, Congress was addressing the same programming evolution in other ways . With the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Tele- communications Act), Congress extensively amended the original 1934 Telecommunications Act, stating that its intent was "[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies ." Pub . L . 104-104 (preamble) . Clearly aware of satellite broadcasters' emerging role as competitors of cable providers in the multi-channel video programming market,

2 "Satellite broadcast" is defined as a point-to-point distribution service, wherein "programming or voice [is] transmitted or broadcast by satellite, microwave, or any other equipment directly to the purchaser." KRS 136.602(19) .

Congress enacted Section 602(a) of the 1996 Act which provides: "Preemption . A provider of direct-to-home satellite service shall be exempt from the collection or remittance, or both, of any tax or fee imposed by any local taxing jurisdiction on direct-to-home satellite service." Pub . L . No . 104-104, Title VI, § 602(a) (reprinted at 47 U .S .C. § 152, historical and statutory notes) . The DBS providers maintain that the gross receipts license tax is a local tax imposed in violation of Section 602(a), a tax to which they should not be subjected .

In ruling to the contrary, the Court of Appeals' majority relied on Section 602(c) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, a savings clause which provides that "[t]his section shall not be construed to prevent taxation of a provider of direct-to-home satellite service by a State or to prevent a local taxing jurisdiction from receiving revenue derived from a tax or fee imposed and collected by a State." According to the Court of Appeals' majority, the gross receipts license tax is in effect a state tax and thus is saved from preemption by this latter provision. Although school taxes in Kentucky are indeed deemed state taxes for a variety of state purposes, we agree with the DBS providers that for the purposes of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the gross receipts tax, as presently administered, must be deemed the sort of local imposition which Section 602(a) was intended to preempt.

ANALYSIS

As the parties and the courts below all correctly note, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (Article VI Clause 2), a state law that interferes with or is contrary to federal law is "without effect."

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc . , 505 U .S. 504, 516 (1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) . This federal preemption of state law is generally understood as occurring in any one of three overlapping ways. Congress may expressly declare its intention to displace state law or it may imply that intention by so thoroughly occupying a legislative field as to leave no room for the States to develop their own rules . Id. The intent to preempt is also understood when the state law actually conflicts with federal law. Id. Where, as in this case, Congress has expressly declared its intention to preempt an area of state law, a reviewing court's task is reduced to determining the scope of that intended preemption . As the United States Supreme Court has explained,

the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case. . . . As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on a fair understanding of congressional purpose. . . . Congress' intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the language of the pre-

emption statute and the statutory framework surrounding it . . . . Also relevant, however, is the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole, . . . as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.

Medtronic, Inc . v. Lohr, 518 U .S. 470, 485-86 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) . Thus, "congressional purpose" is paramount and a reviewing court must consider not only the language of the statute but also the statute's legislative history, an important indicator of Congress's intent . Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 463 U.S . 85 (1983) .

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Holbrook Towing and Recovery, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, (Ky. 2009).

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