Holborn v. Coombs

245 N.W. 673, 209 Wis. 556, 1932 Wisc. LEXIS 285
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 6, 1932
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 245 N.W. 673 (Holborn v. Coombs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holborn v. Coombs, 245 N.W. 673, 209 Wis. 556, 1932 Wisc. LEXIS 285 (Wis. 1932).

Opinion

Fairchild, J.

If the material incidents of a collision between two cars are so veiled by reason of death of witnesses or their loss of memory that no evidence of any convincing influence can be found pointing to fault in the defendant, the plaintiff, in the nature of things, cannot produce the necessary evidence to form a reasonable basis for a verdict in her favor. Unless under the evidence produced at the trial the respondent has shown that this collision occurred on the east side of the middle of the highway, all her contentions are without support and the basis for the jury’s finding [559]*559of- negligence on the part of the appellant does not exist. So our inquiry is directed to the question as to whether or not there is evidence showing, or tending to show, that the appellant’s car crossed over the dividing line and entered the path of the car driven by Edge. Two of the occupants of-Edge’s car were killed and the driver of the appellant’s car was so injured as to have no recollection of the events leading up to the crash or o,f the crash itself.

• The appellant, who was in the Chrysler car, and Edge, who was driving the Essex, the two cars concerned, are the only human witnesses to whom we may look for an account of what occurred at that time. Edge was called as a witness by the plaintiff. He testified to being on his side of the road and among other things was asked:

“Q. And how long after you first observed the Coombs car was it before the accident happened? A. Well, it was so quick I couldn’t judge it by time.
“Q. Did you do anything when you saw the Coombs car approaching? A. No sir, just let up on the gas, that is all I did.
“Q. Do you know whether or not you put your foot on the brakes?' A. I don’t remember.
“Q. Do you know whether or not you guided your car to one side or the other? A. I would say I did not.”

Careful consideration must be given to all the testimony and particularly to the testimony given by Edge; for his account concerning the .matter is the only source in which can be found an opinion or theory sustaining respondent’s case. All marks and signs indicating the collapse or breaking of the cars were indisputably on the other as distinguished from Edge’s side of the road. Still a jury question exists as to the negligence of appellant if Edge°s testimony is not overthrown by the controlling physical facts. We are not for the present on this branch of the case considering the impeaching testimony concerning Edge’s conviction of more [560]*560or less serious offenses, or the fact that he might have been somewhat affected by his indulgence in intoxicating liquor during a short period of time before the unhappy event, but are giving his testimony the fullest scope and greatest possible bearing it can be entitled to. Plis claim is that while driving toward Madison and when in or about to make a curve, he drove in a normal way on the right side of the road, that he didn’t guide his car to either one side or the other, and the collision occurred. Could the matter rest here, there would be a sufficient showing to take the case to the jury; but it is impossible to overlook the unmistakable evidence of the way in which the two cars came together, and when the full effect of this is considered it becomes evident that Edge’s explanation of the meeting of the two cars is not the true one. The points of impact on each car are clearly established, and they show, when read in the light of the laws of physics, that the collision occurred on the west side of the road, while appellant’s car was in its proper lane, and while Edge’s car was traveling over that lane, though at an angle, immediately across defendant’s path.

The jury found there was no excessive speed. .There is testimony that Edge had been traveling at about thirty and appellant from thirty to thirty-five miles per hour. It is undisputed that, an instant before the collision, appellant passed without difficulty an oncoming car driven by Mr. Sid-well. This fact is not of itself enough to disprove or destroy as evidence the statement of Edge that appellant was on the east or wrong side of the road when the collision happened. But it is a fact which may be said to be corroborative of controlling physical facts now to be detailed.

There is unanimity among auto, mechanics called as experts as to the parts of the cars which came into contact. An examination of the wrecks showed the Essex (Edge’s car in which plaintiff’s decedent was riding) received the [561]*561impact “right on top of the right front frame just m back of the frame horn,” which is “an anchorage for the front end of the front spring.” The frame horn is riveted onto the frame. The blow was to the right of the radiator. The Chrysler (appellant’s car) showed the point of impact to be on the right front frame. The right front wheel was pushed back into the frame which supports the rear of the motor. Mr. Eichman, who was called as an expert witness, testified that it was a forty-five degree damage; that pushing that front in forty-five degrees would bring the front end of the frame around as he found it; the damage to the Essex was on the right side and there was no damage to the Chrysler on the left. This absence of mars or damage on the left side of the Chrysler is important in a study of the way in which the two cars came to their position of rest and in determining whether or not the collision occurred as Edge suggests it might have. After the collision the Chrysler was standing crosswise on the west half of the road. Some witnesses placed it with its back wheels a little east of the black line in the center; a variation of a few inches here is of no great consequence; but when sheriff Firm arrived a few minutes after the crash and before the Chrysler had been moved, he made measurements, a map, and took particular note of the location of the cars, and he testified that the Chrysler “was across the highway. The front of the car 'was very close to the west edge of the concrete. The rear of the car, the spare tire on the car, was directly above the black line — the spare tire on the rear of the car.”

It is established and undisputed that the Essex after the impact moved off the concrete and tipped or settled over on its right side. The Essex was raised, the occupants taken out, and the car was permitted to stand with its left side against a pole. The sheriff also noticed marks, as he testified, “about fiye or six feet west of the black line; there were [562]*562two scratches in the cement and those were the most prominent ones.” He also noticed water and oil under the Chrysler.

With these facts established it is not enough to say the collision might have taken place on the east side of the road or that anything may happen in a collision. If the condition of the two cars and their location immediately after the accident show the accident happened on the west side of the highway and disprove human testimony supporting a different opinion or theory, then that testimony must be rejected, and the court in its decision must be guided by the undisputed laws of nature. This is in the interest of truth and justice. Musbach v. Wis. Chair Co. 108 Wis. 57, 84 N. W. 36. We are convinced that in the nature of things two cars could not collide under circumstances detailed by the witness Edge and produce the results which are conceded to have existed after this collision.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
245 N.W. 673, 209 Wis. 556, 1932 Wisc. LEXIS 285, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holborn-v-coombs-wis-1932.