Hoid v. Denver Post

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 6, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0470
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0470 Hoid v Denver Post 03-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0470 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV577 Honorable J. Eric Elliff, Judge

Edward Hoid,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Denver Post and Mac Tully, CEO, President, Manager,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE* Fox and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 6, 2025

Edward Hoid, Pro Se

Ballard Spahr LLP, Ashley I. Kissinger, Denver, Colorado; Ballard Spahr LLP, Kennison Lay, Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Plaintiff, Edward Hoid, appeals the district court’s judgment

granting special motions to dismiss his complaints under

Colorado’s anti-SLAPP1 statute, § 13-20-1101(3), C.R.S. 2024, filed

in separate cases by defendants, CBS-4 News and Wendy McMahon

(collectively, CBS) in Denver District Court Case No. 23CV576 and

The Denver Post and Mac Tully (collectively, Denver Post) in Denver

District Court Case No. 23CV577. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 This case arises from news reports relating to an incident that

occurred in Longmont on November 5, 2020. A seventy-one-year-

old man was knocked off his bicycle and robbed of his possessions;

he died from his injuries several days later.

¶3 CBS posted an article online and aired twice a television

segment stating that the police had identified Hoid as a person of

interest in the assault and robbery and were looking for him.

¶4 Several days later, police arrested Hoid in connection with a

shopping center disturbance. CBS and Denver Post published news

1 “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuits against public

participation.” Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan, 2022 COA 145, ¶ 1 n.1.

1 articles reporting on Hoid’s arrest. The articles noted that Hoid

remained a person of interest in the bicyclist’s death, and CBS

stated specifically that Hoid had not been charged in that case.

¶5 After his arrest, Hoid was charged with and convicted of

several crimes unrelated to the bicyclist’s death. He is currently

incarcerated, serving a seven-year sentence for identity theft. He

has not been charged with any offense relating to the bicyclist’s

death.

¶6 Hoid filed the complaints at issue here against defendants,

asserting defamation, false light publicity, and child endangerment

claims. He alleged that defendants’ published statements about

him damaged his reputation and subjected him and his family to

public scrutiny and brutality.

¶7 Defendants filed special motions to dismiss Hoid’s complaints

under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, § 13-20-1101(3). The district

court granted both motions in one order, reasoning that the anti-

SLAPP statute applied to defendants’ reporting and that Hoid’s

claims were not viable.

2 ¶8 Hoid appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his

complaints against CBS and Denver Post.2

II. The Anti-SLAPP Statute

¶9 “Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute seeks to minimize the risk of

nonmeritorious lawsuits being used to silence another based on

their exercise of First Amendment rights.” Creekside Endodontics,

LLC v. Sullivan, 2022 COA 145, ¶ 21. “It thus aims to balance the

‘constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate

freely, and otherwise participate in government’ with the ‘rights of

persons to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.’” Id.

(citations omitted).

¶ 10 To that end, the anti-SLAPP statute allows a person, typically

the defendant, “to file a special motion to dismiss ‘[a] cause of

action against [the] person arising from any act of that person in

furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the

United States constitution or the state constitution in connection

with a public issue.’” L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123, ¶ 18 (quoting

2 Although Hoid filed two separate cases, his claims in the district

court and arguments on appeal as to CBS and Denver Post are substantially identical, so we address both cases in one opinion.

3 § 13-20-1101(3)(a)). When a party has filed such a motion, the

court “‘consider[s] the pleadings and supporting and opposing

affidavits’ to determine whether ‘the plaintiff has established that

there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the

claim.’” Id. (quoting § 13-20-1101(3)(a)-(b)).

A. Standard of Review and Legal Standards

¶ 11 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a special motion

to dismiss. Id. at ¶ 19.

¶ 12 Divisions of this court have outlined a two-step process for

considering a special motion to dismiss. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 21-22.

¶ 13 First, “the court determines whether the defendant has made a

threshold showing that the conduct underlying the plaintiff’s claim

falls within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute.” Id. at ¶ 21.

Specifically, the defendant must show “that the claim arises from

an act ‘in furtherance of the [defendant’s] right of petition or free

speech . . . in connection with a public issue.’” Id. (quoting § 13-20-

1101(3)(a)).

¶ 14 If the plaintiff’s claim falls within the anti-SLAPP statute’s

scope, the court then “turns to the second step, in which it reviews

the pleadings and affidavits and determines whether the plaintiff

4 has established a ‘reasonable likelihood [of] prevail[ing] on the

claim.’” Id. at ¶ 22 (quoting § 13-20-1101(3)(a)-(b)). This step is a

summary judgment-like procedure in which the court reviews “the

pleadings and the evidence to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has

stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual

showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.’” Id. at ¶ 23

(citation omitted). In doing so, “‘[t]he court does not weigh evidence

or resolve conflicting factual claims’ but simply ‘accepts the

plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing

only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of

law.’” Id. (citation omitted). But see Coomer v. Salem Media of Colo.,

Inc., 2025 COA 2, ¶ 117 (Tow, J., specially concurring) (courts

should “engage in a preliminary, nonbinding weighing of the

conflicting evidence,” rather than accept the plaintiff’s evidence as

true); Jogan Health, LLC v. Scripps Media, Inc., 2025 COA 4, ¶ 63

(Berger, J., specially concurring) (same).

B. Analysis

1. First Step: Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies to Defendants’ Acts

¶ 15 We agree with the district court’s determination that

defendants satisfied the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis by

5 establishing that Hoid’s claims arise from acts “in furtherance of

[their] right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a

public issue.” § 13-20-1101(3)(a).

¶ 16 The anti-SLAPP statute provides that an “‘[a]ct in furtherance

of a person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a

public issue’ includes” four enumerated actions, one of which is

“[a]ny written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to

the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public

interest.” § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(III).

¶ 17 Because they regularly face defamation litigation, newspapers

and publishers are “prime beneficiaries” of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Paterno v. Superior Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 254 (Ct. App. 2008)

(citation omitted).3 “Reporting the news is speech subject to the

protections of the First Amendment and subject to a motion

3 Because Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute closely resembles

California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California case law offers guidance for considering standards under the statute. See L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123, ¶ 20 (“[B]ecause Colorado’s anti-SLAPP law is relatively new and untested, and given that it tracks California’s statute almost exactly, it is appropriate to draw from the more well- established body of authority interpreting the California law.” (quoting Stevens v. Mulay, Civ. A. No. 19-cv-01675-REB-KLM, 2021 WL 1153059, at *2 n.7 (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2021) (unpublished order))); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (West 2025).

6 brought under [the anti-SLAPP statute] if the report concerns a

public issue or an issue of public interest.” Lieberman v. KCOP

Television, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536, 541 (Ct. App. 2003).

¶ 18 The commission of a crime and the proceedings that follow are

“without question events of legitimate concern to the public.”

Bowers v. Loveland Publ’g Co., 773 P.2d 595, 596 (Colo. App. 1988).

So news items that address police reports and criminal activity

serve important public interests and merit protection. See id.;

Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541.

¶ 19 Also, the public interest is served by identifying individuals

suspected of having committed a criminal offense. See Briscoe v.

Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 39 (Cal. 1971), overruled in part

by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).

Doing so may notify others that the person is suspected of having

committed a crime and may “persuade eye witnesses and character

witnesses to testify.” Id. So “while the suspect . . . obviously does

not consent to public exposure, his right to privacy must give way

to the overriding social interest.” Id.

¶ 20 Defendants’ publications in question here reported on issues

of public concern. Each publication covered local crime reports and

7 related police investigations. The publications stated that the police

had identified Hoid as a “person of interest” in the bicyclist’s

assault. In one article, CBS stated that investigators indicated Hoid

should be considered dangerous and provided a number to contact

for anyone having information. And in another article, CBS noted

that, while Hoid was wanted as a person of interest, he had not

been charged in the bicyclist’s death.

¶ 21 Because these publications covered issues of public concern —

namely, current, local criminal activity and Hoid’s identity as a

person of interest to the police — the publications fall squarely

within the anti-SLAPP statute’s scope. See § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(III);

2. Second Step: Hoid Did Not Demonstrate a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Against Defendants

8 a. Hoid’s Defamation Claims Fail

¶ 22 Hoid asserted defamation claims against both CBS and Denver

Post,4 alleging that they had falsely accused him of murdering the

bicyclist. But he could not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of

prevailing on these claims because the statute of limitations had

expired before he filed his complaints.

¶ 23 In Colorado, defamation claims must be brought within one

year after the cause of action accrues. Burke v. Greene, 963 P.2d

1119, 1121 (Colo. App. 1998); see also § 13-80-103(1)(a), C.R.S.

2024. Such claims accrue “on the date both the injury and its

cause are known or should have been known by the exercise of

reasonable diligence.” Burke, 963 P.2d at 1121. When a statement

is published and then continuously circulated, the date on which

the statement was first published is the date of accrual for statute

4 While Hoid filed a response to CBS’s motion, arguing that he had

a likelihood of prevailing on his claims against it, he did not file a similar response to Denver Post’s motion. Nevertheless, to assure full review of Hoid’s claims, we construe his “Notice of Related Cases and Notice of Declarations,” filed after Denver Post’s special motion to dismiss, as responses to that motion. See Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5 (“Pleadings by pro se litigants must be broadly construed to ensure that they are not denied review of important issues because of their inability to articulate their argument like a lawyer.”).

9 of limitations purposes. See Corporon v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 708

P.2d 1385, 1390 (Colo. App. 1985); see also Bloom v. Goodyear Tire

& Rubber Co., No. 05-cv-01317-LTB-MJW, 2006 WL 2331135, at

*6-7 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2006) (unpublished order) (statements

posted on the internet are subject to the single publication rule

and, “like the publication of a book, the initial posting of material

on a web site constitutes a discrete act of publication”).

¶ 24 CBS published its first online article and television broadcast

regarding Hoid on November 21, 2020. On November 27, 2020,

CBS published a follow-up report online. And Denver Post

published its article on November 28, 2020. Although the

publications remained continuously available, these initial

publication dates constitute the accrual dates for any potential

defamation claims. See Corporon, 708 P.2d at 1390. So the statute

of limitations for defamation claims relating to the publications

expired on November 21, 2021, November 27, 2021, and November

28, 2021, respectively. See Burke, 963 P.2d at 1121. Hoid filed

both his complaints on September 15, 2023, nearly two years too

late.

10 ¶ 25 Hoid argued before the district court that, even though he filed

his complaints late, the statute of limitations should have been

equitably tolled. He asserted that equitable tolling was necessary

because defendants fraudulently concealed additional publications

and “extraordinary circumstances” — namely, his placement in

restrictive custody and COVID-19 closures — prevented him from

learning of the publications and timely filing his complaints.

¶ 26 A court may consider equitably tolling the applicable statute of

limitations if the record shows that the plaintiff “did not timely file

their claims because of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ or because

[the] defendants’ wrongful conduct prevented them from doing so.”

Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1053 (Colo. 2004) (quoting Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d 1094, 1096-97 (Colo.

1996)). “The reasoning underlying these . . . cases is that it is

unfair to penalize the plaintiff for circumstances outside [their]

control, so long as the plaintiff makes good faith efforts to pursue

the claims when possible.” Brodeur v. Am. Home Assurance Co.,

169 P.3d 139, 149 (Colo. 2007).

¶ 27 Fraudulent concealment has been recognized as a basis for

tolling statutes of limitation. First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins,

11 N.A. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 744 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Colo. 1987). The

plaintiff must prove the following elements of fraudulent

concealment:

(1) the concealment of a material existing fact that in equity and good conscience should be disclosed; (2) knowledge on the part of the party against whom the claim is asserted that such a fact is being concealed; (3) ignorance of that fact on the part of the one from whom the fact is concealed; (4) the intention that the concealment be acted upon; and (5) action on the concealment resulting in damages.

Id.

¶ 28 Hoid broadly alleged that defendants and their attorneys lied

and concealed publications, but to the extent we can discern the

portions of the record on which he relies, those portions do not

support his argument. Nor did he show any other wrongdoing by

defendants that would mandate equitable tolling. Thus, Hoid did

not meet his burden of establishing the elements of fraudulent

concealment by defendants.

¶ 29 And Hoid did not raise on appeal his “extraordinary

circumstances” argument related to his incarceration and COVID-

19 restrictions. So we deem it abandoned. Armed Forces Bank,

N.A. v. Hicks, 2014 COA 74, ¶ 38 (arguments raised in the trial

12 court and not pursued on appeal are deemed abandoned) (citing

People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 293 (Colo. App. 2004)).

¶ 30 Finally, other than claiming that “were [he] able to, [he] would

have” filed a lawsuit, Hoid failed to demonstrate any good faith

efforts he made to file his complaints within the statute of

limitations. See Brodeur, 169 P.3d at 149 (the plaintiff must make

good faith efforts to file the suit on time).

¶ 31 Because Hoid failed to file his defamation claims within the

one-year statute of limitations period and did not demonstrate

circumstances warranting equitable tolling, he did not establish a

reasonable likelihood of prevailing on his defamation claims against

defendants. See L.S.S., ¶ 22.

b. Hoid’s False Light Publicity and Child Endangerment Claims Fail

¶ 32 Hoid asserted false light publicity claims against defendants

based on the same publications on which his defamation claims

were based. Colorado law does not recognize or permit a plaintiff to

sue for the tort of false light invasion of privacy: a cause of action

arising from publicity unreasonably placing another person in a

false light before the public. Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d

13 893, 904 (Colo. 2002) (“We believe false light is too amorphous a

tort for Colorado, and it risks inflicting an unacceptable chill on

those in the media seeking to avoid liability.”).

¶ 33 Hoid also asserted child endangerment claims, alleging that

defendants’ reporting put his children in danger by fueling public

outrage and disclosing his address. Child endangerment is not a

recognized tort with a private right of action in Colorado.

Unreasonably placing a child in a situation that poses a threat of

injury to the child’s life or health constitutes child abuse, a criminal

offense that Hoid, as a private citizen, does not have standing to

enforce. See § 18-6-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; Kailey v. Chambers, 261

P.3d 792, 798 (Colo. App. 2011) (private citizens lack standing to

enforce criminal statutes).

¶ 34 We conclude that Hoid did not show a reasonable likelihood of

prevailing on these claims. And because Hoid would not have been

able to prevail on any of his claims, the district court did not err in

granting defendants’ special motions to dismiss.

III. Hoid’s Judicial Misconduct and Perjury Claims Fail

¶ 35 Hoid contends that the district court engaged in judicial

misconduct by repeating defendants’ allegedly defamatory

14 statements in its order and demonstrating bias in defendants’ favor.

Because matters of judicial discipline are beyond this court’s

purview, we decline to review this claim. See In re Kamada, 2020

CO 83, ¶ 13 (the Colorado Constitution entrusts such matters to

the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline and, ultimately, to

the supreme court); see also Merrick v. Burns, Wall, Smith & Mueller,

P.C., 43 P.3d 712, 714 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[J]udges are immune

from civil liability for their judicial acts,” and “[t]his absolute

immunity applies to actions in a legal proceeding no matter how

erroneous, how injurious the consequences, or how malicious the

motive.”).

¶ 36 Hoid also contends that defendants and their legal

representatives committed perjury by concealing additional

reporting about him. But to the extent we can discern the portions

of the record on which Hoid relies, those portions do not support

his argument. We therefore decline to consider it. See McCall v.

Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Colo. App. 2004) (statements in the

briefs that are not substantiated in the record cannot be

considered).

15 IV. Attorney Fees

¶ 37 Section 13-20-1101(4)(a) provides that “a prevailing defendant

on a special motion to dismiss is entitled to recover the defendant’s

attorney fees and costs.” Because we conclude that Hoid did not

have, as a matter of law, a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on his

claims, CBS and Denver Post are the prevailing parties and are

entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, including those incurred

on appeal. See Creekside Endodontics, ¶ 54; Coomer v. Donald J.

Trump for President, Inc., 2024 COA 35, ¶ 220 (anti-SLAPP statute

permits recovery of appellate attorney fees for prevailing defendant).

¶ 38 We grant both CBS’s and Denver Post’s requests and remand

the case to the district court to calculate and award defendants’

attorney fees and costs. See C.A.R. 39.1; Rosenblum v. Budd, 2023

COA 72, ¶ 64.

V. Disposition

¶ 39 We affirm the district court’s judgment granting CBS’s and

Denver Post’s special motions to dismiss in Case Nos. 23CV576 and

23CV577, and we remand to the district court to determine and

award CBS and Denver Post attorney fees and costs, including

those incurred in this appeal.

16 JUDGE FOX and JUDGE LUM concur.