Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co.

91 F. 655, 34 C.C.A. 39, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2062
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJanuary 5, 1899
DocketNo. 33
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 91 F. 655 (Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 91 F. 655, 34 C.C.A. 39, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2062 (2d Cir. 1899).

Opinion

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts). La the opinion expressed in the excerpt above quoted, we entirely concur; and it will not be necessary to review in detail the several propositions covered in the master’s report, nor to discuss the exceptions thereto seriatim.

Complainant, with a persistency wholly unwarranted by anything in the record, contends repeatedly in his brief that the defendant has been a willful and wanton infringer, that it has obstinately and perversely refused to file an account of profits when it was within its power to do so, and that, therefore, complainant’s evidence, such as it is, is entitled to the most kindly consideration of the court. The bill of complaint contained the usual allegations as to infringement. It further averred that “said defendants have been warned and requested to desist and refrain from said infringement, and said unlawful and wrongful acts, but that said warning and request and notice Jiave been wholly disregarded by them, and that said defendants still continue the infringements * * * as aforesaid.” The suit was begun in September, 1888, 25 days before the expiration of the patent. The answer of the defendant company denies infringement, and further “denies that it has been warned and requested to desist and refrain from any pretended infringement of said letters patent.” To sustain the affirmative of these issues, complainant called one Patrick Hughes, who was complainant’s foreman from 1870 to 1890, and who manufactured all the slings that complainant sold. He testified that he saw rope slings in use on the steamers of defendant’s company, “about the same as Mr. Hohorst’s slings.” He described them sufficiently-. to establish their infringing character. He further testified [657]*657that his visits to the defendant’s docks were in complainant’s interest, to discover whether they were infringing on his patent or not; that the last time he was there w-as prior to 1886; that from 1880 to 1886 he saw them using infringing slings over a dozen times; that he reported to Mr. Holiorst, but that he did not say a word to anyone on the dock about using the infringing slings. Ho evidence what-e\ er of any warning or request to desist from infringement prior to the beginning of the suit was offered. It appears that the _ infringing slings were four in number,—a number sufficient to equip a single gang of cargo handlers,-—and as one w-ore out it would be replaced with a new one. They were made by one Loshi, an employe of defendant, out of old rope. They were used indiscriminately with other cargo-hoisting appliances, and sometimes freight would be going in and out of as many as eight gangways simultaneously. It is thus apparent that, so far from complainant having made out a case of willful infringement by defendant company, the converse is the fact. Fully aware as early as 1880, which is about a year after the infringing nets were made, (hat the'defendant was using them, and kept advised from time to time by his foreman that infringement was continuing, complainant carefully refrained from saying or doing anything to warn defendant that it was infringing until almost the very day when the patent expired. The reason for this policy of inaction is quite apparent. A careful examination of the record will leave no doubt in any unprejudiced mind that, had complainant notified defendants at any time from 1880 to 1886 that the slings Loshi had made were infringements of his patent, the use of such slings would have ceased forthwith. They were convenient, and in some respects and under some conditions superior to other appliances; hence the set of four were, always kept renewed. But manifestly they were not so superior as complainant contends, for their number was never increased. If they did not offer sufficient advantages to warrant increasing their number, it is difficult to believe that those advantages would have been sufficient to induce continued use after defendant was advised that they were infringements of a patent'. The complainant has deliberately chosen not to warn an unconscious infringer, whom he has watched infringing year after year, no doubt hoping thereby to increase the amount of profits ultimately recoverable. This is sharp practice, and, if there ever w-as a case where complainant should be required to establish these profits by reliable and tangible proof, this is pre-eminently such. We further concur with the master in the conclusion that defendant was not in default for failing to file an account of profits from the use of the infringing articles. It is quite apparent that any pretended “account of profits” based on data in the possession cf. or obtainable by, defendant, must have been the wildest guesswork.

The complainant further assumes that the patent sued upon is of the broadest scope. Thus, in the brief it is stated, “Any combina tion of side ropes with a net and with corner eyelets,” or “any combination of self-adjusting straps with side ropes, corner eyelets, and a net for the purpose of loading or unloading packages,” would be within the •patent. The record lends no support to any such contention. There [658]*658is no testimony whatever as to the state of the art, nothing at all bearing upon the construction and scope of the patent, except the patent itself, and the presumption of validity arising from its issue. The specification sets forth that the invention relates to a “sling made of rope netting, provided at its corners with eyelets through which pass protecting side ropes, which are fastened to the netting at its ends and sides, in combination with supporting straps or handles, the ends of which are provided with eyelets or grommets sliding on the protecting side ropes in such a manner that when the sling is loaded with a quantity of small packages, and suspended from its supporting straps, the protecting side ropes adjust themselves so as to prevent the packages from dropping out. * * * In the drawing, the letter A designates a netting made of nets of thick cords in an oblong or rectangular form. To each of the four corners of this rope netting is secured an eyelet or grommet, a, and through these grommets pass the protecting side ropes, b, which are fastened at their ends to the ends in the netting near the said grommets, and in the middle to the sides of the netting, as shown in Fig. 2 of the drawing,” etc. By reference to the “side ropes, b,” “substantially as described,” the peculiarities of the side ropes pointed out in the specifications are imported into the claims. Certain it is that, according to the specification, the fastening of the side ropes at the ends, and again at the •middle of the sides, of the net, is an essential feature of the patented combination. Why this was so, we can only conjecture, since complainant has given v. no information as to the state of the art, but that it is so the specification abundantly shows; and we must assume that the patentee inserted this qualification because he was satisfied that it was necessary so to do. It follows that a net sling drawn together, as is a purse or reticule, by side ropes rove through rings or grommets surrounding the net, and which side ropes are not fastened either at the sides or the ends of the net, but play freely through the grommets, would not be within the claims of the patent.

The calculation by which complainant undertakes to show the amount of profit's accruing to defendant from the use of the infringing articles is a complicated one, involving numerous factors. Of course, if any single factor is not sustained by competent proof, the conclusion sought to be maintained is not established.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
91 F. 655, 34 C.C.A. 39, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2062, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hohorst-v-hamburg-american-packet-co-ca2-1899.