Hogg v. Armstrong

164 S.E. 496, 112 W. Va. 142, 1932 W. Va. LEXIS 110
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedApril 19, 1932
Docket6971
StatusPublished

This text of 164 S.E. 496 (Hogg v. Armstrong) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hogg v. Armstrong, 164 S.E. 496, 112 W. Va. 142, 1932 W. Va. LEXIS 110 (W. Va. 1932).

Opinion

Lively, Judge:

Point Pleasant Trust Company, organized in 1906, became insolvent about 1927, and this suit was instituted by its receiver against it and its several stockholders to collect from them “double liability”, that is, $100.00 for every share of stock held by them for the purpose of paying off and discharging the liabilities of the Point Pleasant Trust Company (hereinafter called the Trust Company), accruing while they were such stockholders. The stockholders denied liability; evidence was taken before a master commissioner who made a report; and the decree of November 7, 1930, held that the Trust Company was engaged in the business of banking from the time it began business until its receiver was appointed; and that the stockholders were liable for double the amount of the par value of the stock held by them, and pronounced judgment therefor against them.

Are the stockholders subject to “double” liability? That is the sole question, and calls for consideration of the constitution and statutes passed in pursuance thereto; and the evidence with respect to the character of business actually carried on by the Trust Company. Plaintiff contends, in substance, that the statutes impose upon stockholders of a trust company “double” liability whether or not the trust *144 company does a banking business; that by taking charter power to do a general banking business, it is immaterial whether it engaged in purely a trust business, so far as the “double” liability of its stockholders is concerned; and that the trial chancellor was warranted in decreeing that the Trust Company transacted the business of banking. Constitution, Article XI, sec. 2, reads: “The stockholders of all corporations and joint stock companies, except banks and banking institutions, created by laws of this State, shall be liable for the indebtedness of such corporations to the amount of their stock subscribed and unpaid, and no more.” It will be noted that stockholders in any corporation are liable only to the amount of their subscriptions, except banks and “banking institutions”. Under section 6 of that article, the legislature is empowered to provide, by a general banking law, for the creation and organization of banks of issue or circulation, and imposes “double” liability on the stockholders of any bank whether of issue, deposit or discount. Chapter 28, Acts 1891, provided for incorporation and regulation of title and trust companies giving them power, among others, to engage in a general banking business, and to exercise all such powers necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting promissory notes, negotiating drafts, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, receiving deposits, buying and selling exchange, bank notes, bullion or coin, and by loaning money on personal or other security. In order to exercise powers of a banking institution, the corporation was required to obtain a certificate of authorization from the secretary of state. When such certificate was issued, the corporation and its stockholders were made subject to all of the provisions of chapter 54 of the code'relating to banks, so far as the same are applicable. By section 1 of chapter 85, Acts 1901, the stockholders of title and trust companies, receiving certificate of power to engage in a general banking business, were made subject to all laws relating to banks of issue and circulation and of discount and deposit, so far as applicable; and by sec. 7 of that act, made subject to examination by the commissioner of banking. In 1903, by paragraph 2 of section 1, chapter 7, such *145 companies and tbeir stockholders were made liable to the banking laws, as to, such business of banking (general business of banking) engaged in by them under said paragraph 2, see. 1. The various acts and amendments are found in chapter 54-C, Code 1923, the chapter on trust and surety companies, and chapter 34, Acts 1925. By the latter act (see. 81a, par. 15), all trust companies, doing a banking business, shall be subject to that law so far as applicable to them, and to the extent that the commissioner of banking shall semi-annually examine their books, etc. By chapter 54, sec. 78a (5), trust companies engaged in a general banking business are made subject to the provisions of that chapter; and by sec. 79a (6) of that chapter, the words bank or banking company used in that act are to be construed to include any bank, banker, banking company or trust company; and by sec. 78a (3) of that chapter the stockholders of every bank are made subject to double liability in conformity to sec. 6, Article XI, Constitution. Reading all these acts together, the legislative intent is reasonably clear (and we so construe them) that whenever a title, surety or trust company engages in a general banking business (as it has power to do), then its stockholders shall be liable to all the laws on banking, which includes “double” liability for such debts as accrue while they are stockholders. Under the Trust Company’s charter, it had power to engage in a general banking business. If it exercised that power, then appellant stockholders are liable for debts accruing while they were such stockholders to an amount equal to the par value of the stock held by them (“double” liability.) If the Trust Company did not do the business of a banking institution, then the stockholders are not “doubly” liable. The cause is simple and turns upon the propositions just stated. Much authority is cited, in the extensive and able briefs filed on each side, from other jurisdictions interpreting their constitutional and statutory provisions. Our constitution and statutes are reasonably clear, and the construction of them disposes of this cause upon these propositions. It will be noted that under paragraph 4 of sec. 1 of chapter 54-C, Code 1923, a trust company, as such, has power “to receive *146 deposits of money and other personal property, and issue its obligations therefor”, and to “invest its funds in, and to purchase real and personal securities, and to loan money on real and personal securities.” By so doing, it does not become a bank or a banking institution. They are powers expressly given to a trust company. A trust company may be given powers incidental to a banking business, but the conferring of such powers for the purpose of facilitating its trust powers does not make it a bank or a banking institution.

We do not think a trust company is inherently a banking institution, because it has some incidental power exercised by banks or that the legislature intended to make the stockholders of a trust company subject to double liability unless it conducted a banking business. If the legislature intended to do so, plain words would have been used, expressing' that intent, and not left to implication. DeHaven v. Pratt, 223 Pa. St. 633, 72 Atl. 1068; Lankton v. Menefee, (Okla.) 145 Pac. 375; Williams v. Lewis Interest Co., 110 Ia. 535, 82 N. W. 332. The act of 1931, chap. 31, article 4, indicates that theretofore the stockholders of a trust company • were, not charged with double liability for debts by the former statutes; for, by that act, a trust company is defined as a banking institution, and “it was not intended that a trust company could be chartered except in connection ivith the lousiness of banking,

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DeHaven v. Pratt
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Bluebook (online)
164 S.E. 496, 112 W. Va. 142, 1932 W. Va. LEXIS 110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hogg-v-armstrong-wva-1932.