Hoge v. Hoge

Oregon Supreme Court

Hoge v. Hoge

250 P. 839, 119 Or. 679, 1926 Ore. LEXIS 284

DecidedOctober 15, 1926

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This text of 250 P. 839 (Hoge v. Hoge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hoge v. Hoge, 250 P. 839, 119 Or. 679, 1926 Ore. LEXIS 284 (Or. 1926).

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Opinion

*681 BBOWN, J.

The record shows that the plaintiff and defendant were married in May, 1901, at Shenandoah, Iowa; that, at the time of their marriage, the plaintiff was an attorney by profession bnt worked at various occupations, and that defendant was a practicing dentist, but that she thereafter engaged from time to time in teaching school; that about two years after their marriage they removed to Medford, Oregon, where they purchased two lots and by their joint efforts constructed a house thereon. This was sold and they returned to Iowa for a short time, thence removed to Boise, Idaho, and later to Lane County, Oregon, where they bought a farm and some town property.

A careful reading of the testimony would indicate that the property, both real and personal, represents the joint earnings of the plaintiff and defendant. Such was the view of the lower court, and its holding thereon is abundantly sustained by the evidence. However, the wife having been granted the divorce, she is entitled, not only to her own one-half interest in the lands, but, in addition thereto, a one-third interest in her husband’s one-half which was decreed to him by the lower court, and there .should be incorporated' in the decree a provision granting to her such one-third interest. Section 511, Oregon Laws, provides:

“Whenever a marriage shall be declared void or dissolved, the party at whose prayer such decree shall be made shall in all cases be entitled to the undivided third part in his or her individual right in fee of the whole of the real estate owned by the other at the time of such decree.”

For an application of this statutory provision, see Wetmore v. Wetmore, 5 Or. 469; Rees v. Rees, 7 Or. *682 47; Houston v. Timmerman, 17 Or. 499, 506 (21 Pac. 1037, 11 Am. St. Rep. 848, 4 L. R. A. 716); Folkenberg v. Folkenberg, 58 Or. 267, 270 (114 Pac. 99); Silliman v. Silliman, 66 Or.4 402 (133 Pac. 769); Shaveland v. Shaveland, 112 Or. 173 (228 Pac. 1090).

The decree appealed from should be modified so as to accord’with the statutory provision above noted. It is so ordered. Modified.

McBride, O. J., and Bean and Belt, JJ., concur.

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*681 BBOWN, J.

The record shows that the plaintiff and defendant were married in May, 1901, at Shenandoah, Iowa; that, at the time of their marriage, the plaintiff was an attorney by profession bnt worked at various occupations, and that defendant was a practicing dentist, but that she thereafter engaged from time to time in teaching school; that about two years after their marriage they removed to Medford, Oregon, where they purchased two lots and by their joint efforts constructed a house thereon. This was sold and they returned to Iowa for a short time, thence removed to Boise, Idaho, and later to Lane County, Oregon, where they bought a farm and some town property.

A careful reading of the testimony would indicate that the property, both real and personal, represents the joint earnings of the plaintiff and defendant. Such was the view of the lower court, and its holding thereon is abundantly sustained by the evidence. However, the wife having been granted the divorce, she is entitled, not only to her own one-half interest in the lands, but, in addition thereto, a one-third interest in her husband’s one-half which was decreed to him by the lower court, and there .should be incorporated' in the decree a provision granting to her such one-third interest. Section 511, Oregon Laws, provides:

“Whenever a marriage shall be declared void or dissolved, the party at whose prayer such decree shall be made shall in all cases be entitled to the undivided third part in his or her individual right in fee of the whole of the real estate owned by the other at the time of such decree.”

For an application of this statutory provision, see Wetmore v. Wetmore, 5 Or. 469; Rees v. Rees, 7 Or. *682 47; Houston v. Timmerman, 17 Or. 499, 506 (21 Pac. 1037, 11 Am. St. Rep. 848, 4 L. R. A. 716); Folkenberg v. Folkenberg, 58 Or. 267, 270 (114 Pac. 99); Silliman v. Silliman, 66 Or.4 402 (133 Pac. 769); Shaveland v. Shaveland, 112 Or. 173 (228 Pac. 1090).

The decree appealed from should be modified so as to accord’with the statutory provision above noted. It is so ordered. Modified.

McBride, O. J., and Bean and Belt, JJ., concur.

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250 P. 839, 119 Or. 679, 1926 Ore. LEXIS 284, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hoge-v-hoge-or-1926.

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