Hogan v. Mohlenbrok

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMarch 5, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-03566
StatusUnknown

This text of Hogan v. Mohlenbrok (Hogan v. Mohlenbrok) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hogan v. Mohlenbrok, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 RU HOGAN, No. 2:24-cv-03566-JAM-SCR 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING DAVID MOHLENBROK’S MOTION FOR 12 CITY OF ROCKLIN, and DOES 1 ATTORNEY’S FEES THROUGH 100, 13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is David Mohlenbrok’s (“Mohlenbrok”) motion 16 for attorney’s fees. See Mot., ECF No. 15. Ru Hogan 17 (“Plaintiff”) has failed to file a timely opposition to 18 Mohlenbrok’s motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(c), the Court 19 construes Plaintiff’s failure to oppose as a non-opposition to 20 the motion. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS 21 Mohlenbrok’s motion. 22 Mohlenbrok brought a motion to strike three causes of action 23 under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. See Mot. to Strike, ECF 24 No. 5; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. In response to the motion, 25 and in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 15(a)(1)(B), Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 27 that dismissed Mohlenbrok as a defendant in this action. See FAC 28 at 2, ECF No. 9. 1 California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides that “a prevailing 2 defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to 3 recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” Cal. Code 4 Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1). Even though Plaintiff has voluntarily 5 dismissed Mohlenbrok, the Court retains the authority to decide 6 the present motion on the merits. See Law Offices of Andrew L. 7 Ellis v. Yang, 178 Cal.App.4th 869, 879 (2009) (“[T]he anti-SLAPP 8 statute . . . anticipates circumstances in which parties dismiss 9 their cases while motions to strike are pending. In such 10 circumstances, the trial court is given the limited jurisdiction 11 to rule on the merits of the motion in order to decide if it 12 should award attorney fees and costs to the defendants.”). Where 13 a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a defendant, a “presumption” 14 arises that the dismissed defendant is a prevailing party for 15 purposes of attorney’s fees. See Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal. 16 App. 4th 94, 107 (1998). This presumption can be rebutted by a 17 showing that plaintiff “realized its objectives in the 18 litigation,” such as through a settlement or other means. Id. 19 Here, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Mohlenbrok, which 20 creates the presumption that Mohlenbrok is the prevailing party 21 from his motion to strike. As Mohlenbrok explains, there is no 22 evidence that Plaintiff “realized [her] objectives in the 23 litigation.” See Mot. at 5-6; see id. There is no evidence that 24 Plaintiff settled or obtained another benefit from bringing her 25 prior motion that named Mohlenbrok as a defendant. As such, the 26 Court finds that Mohlenbrok is the prevailing party and entitled 27 to attorney’s fees and costs. 28 /// ERIE IE IE EE IEE EIEIO EES

1 Though Mohlenbrok jointly brought the motion to strike with 2 Defendant City of Rocklin, he argues that Plaintiff should pay 3 | all attorney’s fees associated with the motion. See Mot. at 7. 4 The Court agrees. Mohlenbrok and Defendant are represented by 5 the same counsel. “[A]llocation among jointly represented 6 | parties is not required when the liability of the parties is so 7 factually interrelated that it would have been impossible to 8 separate the activities . . . into compensable and noncompensable 9 time units.” Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver, 219 Cal. App. 4th 10 809, 830 (2013) (cleaned up). Because Mohlenbrok’s conduct is at 11 the center of this controversy, his and Defendant City of 12 Rocklin’s “is so factually interrelated that it would have been 13 impossible” to allocate attorney’s fees for just Mohlenbrok. See 14 | id.; see FAC FF 6-12. Mohlenbrok is therefore entitled to 15 recover all fees associated with the motion the strike. Finally, 16 | the Court finds Mohlenbrok’s requested fees reasonable. See Mot. 17 at 8. 18 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Mohlenbrok’s motion for 19 | attorney’s fees. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to pay Mohlenbrok 20 $15,268.50. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: March 4, 2025 23 opens JOHN A. MENDEZ 25 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28

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San Diego Citizenry Group v. County of San Diego CA4/1
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Bluebook (online)
Hogan v. Mohlenbrok, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hogan-v-mohlenbrok-caed-2025.