Hoffmaster v. City of San Diego

55 Cal. App. 4th 1098, 55 Cal. App. 2d 1098, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4593, 97 Daily Journal DAR 7586, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 479
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 17, 1997
DocketD025961
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 55 Cal. App. 4th 1098 (Hoffmaster v. City of San Diego) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hoffmaster v. City of San Diego, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1098, 55 Cal. App. 2d 1098, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4593, 97 Daily Journal DAR 7586, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

*1103 Opinion

WORK, Acting P. J.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the housing element in the City of San Diego’s (City) general plan substantially complies with Government Code 1 section 65583, subdivision (c)(1). This provision requires City to identify adequate sites it will make available as part of a plan designed to facilitate and encourage development of homeless emergency shelters and transitional housing. We conclude City’s amended housing element, which contains blanket developmental and separation restrictions on the siting of residential care facilities anywhere within City, does not substantially comply with the legislative mandate to identify sites which its action program will make available to satisfy City’s quantified objectives for the homeless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment with directions the trial court stay for 60 days its order that City approve all conditional use permit (CUP) applications for emergency shelters and transitional housing until it has complied with section 65583, subdivision (c)(1), to permit City to comply with the legislative mandate as interpreted by this court.

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 18, 1994, Kevin Hoffmaster and Joan Sun (petitioners) petitioned for writ of mandate and asked for injunctive and declaratory relief asserting the housing element in City’s general plan had not been timely revised and failed to include sufficient planning for the homeless population. The trial court found City had failed to adopt the statutorily mandated housing element by July 1, 1991, as required by section 65588, subdivision (b)(3) and ordered compliance within 120 days. On March 21, 1995, City adopted a housing element update. 2 Petitioners, as class representatives for homeless persons within City, promptly filed their first amended petition for peremptory writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief, challenging the adequacy of the revised housing element for, among other reasons, failing to comply with section 65583, subdivision (c)(1) by neither properly designating adequate real property sites which City would make available for homeless emergency shelters and transitional housing, nor providing a five-year action plan to implement the goals and policies of the housing element by various means, including facilitating the development of emergency shelters and transitional housing on designated sites. In defense, City asserted its element contained an adequate site inventory of land, stated its goal to increase the construction of housing, and suggested means of minimizing governmental restraints to housing development.

*1104 On October 10, the trial court concluded the element neither adequately identified sufficient emergency shelter and transitional housing sites nor included an action program to make those sites available. The court declared: “The housing element does not adequately identify emergency shelter and transitional housing sites that will be made available, as required by Government Code section 65583 (c)(1), in light of the fact that the element, at page 67, table 20, identifies an unmet need. Respondents are ordered to identify adequate sites for emergency shelters and transitional housing and propose an action program to make these sites available.” On January 30, 1996, City amended the housing element by including maps purportedly showing all vacant and infill/redevelopment land within its boundaries and generally declaring they are potential sites for emergency shelters and transitional housing. It also included maps locating existing emergency shelters and transitional housing and the homeless population by geographical subarea; a discussion of its residential care facility ordinance; a summary of its “Good Neighbor Policy”; and a description of its 1995-1996 inclement weather program.

On March 8, 1996, the trial court ordered City to provide evidence “substantiating that its proposed action plan will result in adequate sites for emergency shelters [and] transitional housing to meet the needs of the homeless within 5 years.” Specifically, the court ordered City to present evidence as to how generally designating all unbuilt lots as potential sites and stating its intent to increase the stock of housing through public/private partnering, will, within 5 years, meet the needs of the 3,424 homeless persons City had identified as having been unmet. 3

Noting the Legislature recognized in section 65583, subdivision (b)(2) a community may not be financially able to insure shelter for its entire identified homeless population, City argued it is not statutorily required to present a plan designed to meet the entire recognized homeless housing need within five years. City acknowledged it had no evidence its program would meet the entire needs of all the homeless within five years, but that its housing element was a sincere effort to provide for the homeless. At the final hearing before the writ issued, petitioners’ counsel argued section 65583, subdivision (c)(1) requires City to identify adequate sites which would be available based on the total recognized need, even though its action plan *1105 need only address fulfilling a reasonable and acceptable quantified objective consistent with its own ability to obtain funding. He stated: “This is not an issue of cost where we’re asking the City to spend millions of dollars. It’s an issue of the City complying with the law by allowing through development, zoning and regulation standards adequate sites that will be made available. These needs, these beds, can be filled if we allow private providers to fill the need simply because they won’t have to go through this conditional use permit process that effectively precludes this need from being filled, the City saying we don’t have the money to fill it, but we’re not going to let anybody else fill it because we have this C.U.P. process, and the reason they have that process, it’s a political issue .... We’re not asking the City to spend $120 million, we’re asking them to allow these sites to be made available, as the law requires, through appropriate zoning and development standards ....’’ The court then responded: “Well, I think that’s precisely my interpretation of the entire situation. I don’t expect the City to come up with $120 million plus the cost of services. That’s not my place to do that. Or to cause that to be entered into my evaluation of whether or not the adequacy of the Plan has been established. But certainly, by, I think, the City’s own admission, either expressed or implicitly, the need that the Task Force has identified and the City’s acknowledging that need and its concession that it can’t meet that need, which I believe this whole scenario reflects, means that it has not met the basic mandates of the Government Code.” 4

On April 18, the trial court issued a final judgment and peremptory writ of mandate finding City had not complied with section 65583, subdivision (c)(1) and ordered it to approve all CUP applications for emergency shelters and transitional housing until it complied with the statute.

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55 Cal. App. 4th 1098, 55 Cal. App. 2d 1098, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4593, 97 Daily Journal DAR 7586, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hoffmaster-v-city-of-san-diego-calctapp-1997.