UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANGELA HOFFMAN et al., : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 08-1924 (RMU) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 7, 15, 16 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND REQUEST FOR A SHOW CAUSE HEARING
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the motion of the defendant District of Columbia (“the
District”) to quash service and the plaintiffs’ related motion for sanctions and request for a show
cause hearing. For the reasons discussed below, the court denies both motions and denies the
plaintiffs’ request for a show cause hearing.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs commenced this action on November 6, 2008, alleging that agents of the
Metropolitan Police Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency conducted an unlawful
search of their residence. See generally Compl. The plaintiffs have asserted a variety of
statutory and common law causes of action based on this purportedly illegal search. See id.
¶¶ 37-82. On November 26, 2008, the plaintiffs submitted an Amended Complaint, adding the
District as a defendant to the action. See generally Am. Compl. On December 5, 2008, the plaintiffs attempted to effect service of their Amended
Complaint on the District by mailing copies of the summons, complaint and initial order to
Mayor Adrian Fenty, D.C. Attorney General Peter Nickles and Assistant Attorney General
Darlene Fields (designated agent for the Attorney General). See Pls.’ Opp’n, Ex. A at 1-3.
These individuals were specifically named as the intended recipients in the address boxes of the
mailings sent by the plaintiffs. Id. The packages were sent through the United States Postal
Service via first class certified mail, return receipt requested. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs paid
for “Restricted Delivery,” a service offered by the Postal Service which requires its couriers to
deliver designated packages only to the individuals specifically named as the intended recipients
or to persons expressly authorized to receive packages on behalf of the named recipient. Id.
On January 14, 2009, the District moved to quash service, alleging that the plaintiffs had
failed to properly serve the District. See generally Def.’s Mot. to Quash. The plaintiffs opposed
the District’s motion and filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that the District had committed
fraud on the court by attempting to quash service. See generally Pls.’ Mot. for Sanctions.
On February 24, 2009, as the District’s motion to quash service was pending, the
plaintiffs requested that the clerk’s office enter default against the District. Id. at 11. The clerk’s
office declined the plaintiffs’ request. Id. at 12. The plaintiffs now request that the court hold a
show cause hearing, “wherein the [clerk’s office] provide the legal basis for [its] decision,”
insinuating that the District somehow improperly influenced the clerk’s office not to enter
default. Id.
2 III. ANALYSIS
A. The District’s Motion to Quash Service
1. Legal Standard for Service on the District of Columbia
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) provides that:
A state, a municipal corporation, or any other state-created governmental organization that is subject to suit must be served by: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or (B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j)(2).
Under D.C. law, service of process upon the District is governed by Superior Court Rule
4(j)(1), which provides that
Service shall be made upon the District of Columbia by delivering . . . or mailing (pursuant to paragraph (c)(3)) a copy of the summons, complaint and initial order to the Mayor of the District of Columbia (or designee) and the Corporation Counsel [now the Attorney General] of the District of Columbia (or designee). The Mayor and the Corporation Counsel may each designate an employee for receipt of service of process by filing a written notice with the Clerk of the [Superior] Court.
D.C. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 4(j)(1). Paragraph (c)(3) of the rule provides that service “may be effected
by mailing a copy of the summons, complaint and initial order to the person to be served by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” Id. 4(c)(3). In construing the requirements
of Rule 4(j)(1), the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff does not effect proper service
on the District if the papers mailed to the Mayor and Attorney General are signed for by
employees not specifically designated to receive service of process. Eldridge v. District of
Columbia, 866 A.2d 786, 787 (D.C. 2004).
3 2. The Court Denies the District’s Motion to Quash Service
Relying principally on Eldridge, the District contends that although the plaintiffs mailed
the required papers to the proper officials in conformity with the Superior Court rules, the fact
that the papers were signed for by employees of the Mayor and the Attorney General rather than
the officials themselves renders the plaintiffs’ attempts at service ineffective. See generally
Def.’s Mot to Quash; Def.’s Reply. The plaintiffs respond that they have fully complied with the
service requirements prescribed by D.C. law. See generally Pls.’ Opp’n.
This precise issue was recently addressed by another court in this district in a case related
to the instant dispute. See Gresham v. District of Columbia, No. 09-0029 (Apr. 29, 2009) (Mem.
Order) (Robertson, J.). Like the plaintiffs here, the plaintiff in Gresham attempted to effect
service by mailing copies of the summons and complaint to Mayor Fenty and Assistant Attorney
General Fields via first class mail, return receipt requested, with restricted delivery. Id. at 2-3.
Judge Robertson held that the plaintiff had properly effected service, despite the fact that the
plaintiffs’ papers were signed for by employees not specifically designated to accept service,
noting that the plaintiff had fully complied with the procedures for effecting service on the
District under D.C. law. Id. at 4-5. Furthermore, Judge Robertson distinguished the D.C. Court
of Appeals’ ruling in Eldridge, reasoning that
[Eldridge] is silent about whether the plaintiff in that case named the official designees in the address box of the return receipt form, as plaintiff’s counsel did here, and I am unwilling to assume that he did. The Eldridge court relied heavily on the reasoning that ‘the District of Columbia is subject to many lawsuits,’ and that ‘[t]he Mayor and the Corporation Counsel must be put on notice when a lawsuit is filed against the District,’ and that ‘the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel receive an enormous amount of mail.’ These are valid concerns, but they are fully met when the return receipt specifies delivery to the designee by name, when the plaintiff has arranged for restricted delivery, and when . . . there is no question that the defendant has actually received the papers served and has actual notice of the suit.
4 Id. (internal citations omitted) (italicized emphasis added).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANGELA HOFFMAN et al., : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 08-1924 (RMU) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 7, 15, 16 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S MOTION TO QUASH AND DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND REQUEST FOR A SHOW CAUSE HEARING
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the motion of the defendant District of Columbia (“the
District”) to quash service and the plaintiffs’ related motion for sanctions and request for a show
cause hearing. For the reasons discussed below, the court denies both motions and denies the
plaintiffs’ request for a show cause hearing.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs commenced this action on November 6, 2008, alleging that agents of the
Metropolitan Police Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency conducted an unlawful
search of their residence. See generally Compl. The plaintiffs have asserted a variety of
statutory and common law causes of action based on this purportedly illegal search. See id.
¶¶ 37-82. On November 26, 2008, the plaintiffs submitted an Amended Complaint, adding the
District as a defendant to the action. See generally Am. Compl. On December 5, 2008, the plaintiffs attempted to effect service of their Amended
Complaint on the District by mailing copies of the summons, complaint and initial order to
Mayor Adrian Fenty, D.C. Attorney General Peter Nickles and Assistant Attorney General
Darlene Fields (designated agent for the Attorney General). See Pls.’ Opp’n, Ex. A at 1-3.
These individuals were specifically named as the intended recipients in the address boxes of the
mailings sent by the plaintiffs. Id. The packages were sent through the United States Postal
Service via first class certified mail, return receipt requested. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs paid
for “Restricted Delivery,” a service offered by the Postal Service which requires its couriers to
deliver designated packages only to the individuals specifically named as the intended recipients
or to persons expressly authorized to receive packages on behalf of the named recipient. Id.
On January 14, 2009, the District moved to quash service, alleging that the plaintiffs had
failed to properly serve the District. See generally Def.’s Mot. to Quash. The plaintiffs opposed
the District’s motion and filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that the District had committed
fraud on the court by attempting to quash service. See generally Pls.’ Mot. for Sanctions.
On February 24, 2009, as the District’s motion to quash service was pending, the
plaintiffs requested that the clerk’s office enter default against the District. Id. at 11. The clerk’s
office declined the plaintiffs’ request. Id. at 12. The plaintiffs now request that the court hold a
show cause hearing, “wherein the [clerk’s office] provide the legal basis for [its] decision,”
insinuating that the District somehow improperly influenced the clerk’s office not to enter
default. Id.
2 III. ANALYSIS
A. The District’s Motion to Quash Service
1. Legal Standard for Service on the District of Columbia
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) provides that:
A state, a municipal corporation, or any other state-created governmental organization that is subject to suit must be served by: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or (B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j)(2).
Under D.C. law, service of process upon the District is governed by Superior Court Rule
4(j)(1), which provides that
Service shall be made upon the District of Columbia by delivering . . . or mailing (pursuant to paragraph (c)(3)) a copy of the summons, complaint and initial order to the Mayor of the District of Columbia (or designee) and the Corporation Counsel [now the Attorney General] of the District of Columbia (or designee). The Mayor and the Corporation Counsel may each designate an employee for receipt of service of process by filing a written notice with the Clerk of the [Superior] Court.
D.C. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 4(j)(1). Paragraph (c)(3) of the rule provides that service “may be effected
by mailing a copy of the summons, complaint and initial order to the person to be served by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” Id. 4(c)(3). In construing the requirements
of Rule 4(j)(1), the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff does not effect proper service
on the District if the papers mailed to the Mayor and Attorney General are signed for by
employees not specifically designated to receive service of process. Eldridge v. District of
Columbia, 866 A.2d 786, 787 (D.C. 2004).
3 2. The Court Denies the District’s Motion to Quash Service
Relying principally on Eldridge, the District contends that although the plaintiffs mailed
the required papers to the proper officials in conformity with the Superior Court rules, the fact
that the papers were signed for by employees of the Mayor and the Attorney General rather than
the officials themselves renders the plaintiffs’ attempts at service ineffective. See generally
Def.’s Mot to Quash; Def.’s Reply. The plaintiffs respond that they have fully complied with the
service requirements prescribed by D.C. law. See generally Pls.’ Opp’n.
This precise issue was recently addressed by another court in this district in a case related
to the instant dispute. See Gresham v. District of Columbia, No. 09-0029 (Apr. 29, 2009) (Mem.
Order) (Robertson, J.). Like the plaintiffs here, the plaintiff in Gresham attempted to effect
service by mailing copies of the summons and complaint to Mayor Fenty and Assistant Attorney
General Fields via first class mail, return receipt requested, with restricted delivery. Id. at 2-3.
Judge Robertson held that the plaintiff had properly effected service, despite the fact that the
plaintiffs’ papers were signed for by employees not specifically designated to accept service,
noting that the plaintiff had fully complied with the procedures for effecting service on the
District under D.C. law. Id. at 4-5. Furthermore, Judge Robertson distinguished the D.C. Court
of Appeals’ ruling in Eldridge, reasoning that
[Eldridge] is silent about whether the plaintiff in that case named the official designees in the address box of the return receipt form, as plaintiff’s counsel did here, and I am unwilling to assume that he did. The Eldridge court relied heavily on the reasoning that ‘the District of Columbia is subject to many lawsuits,’ and that ‘[t]he Mayor and the Corporation Counsel must be put on notice when a lawsuit is filed against the District,’ and that ‘the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel receive an enormous amount of mail.’ These are valid concerns, but they are fully met when the return receipt specifies delivery to the designee by name, when the plaintiff has arranged for restricted delivery, and when . . . there is no question that the defendant has actually received the papers served and has actual notice of the suit.
4 Id. (internal citations omitted) (italicized emphasis added).
The court finds Judge Robertson’s reasoning persuasive and adopts it in the instant
dispute. The plaintiffs followed the proper procedures for effecting service on the District by
mailing the required papers to the Mayor, the Attorney General and the Attorney General’s
designated agent via certified mail, return receipt requested, with restricted delivery, expressly
naming these officials as intended recipients in the address boxes accompanying the mailings.1
See Pls.’ Opp’n, Ex. 1. Furthermore, there is no allegation that the District did not actually
receive the papers or have actual notice of the suit. See generally Def.’s Mot. to Quash; Def.’s
Reply. Accordingly, the court denies the District’s motion to quash service.
B. The Court Denies the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions and Request for a Show Cause Hearing
The plaintiffs contend that the District should be sanctioned because it has been
tampering with mail service by having unauthorized employees open mail addressed to the
Mayor and the Attorney General in an effort to thwart service of process. See generally Pls.’
Mot. for Sanctions. The District responds that sanctions are inappropriate because the plaintiffs’
allegations are unsupported and the plaintiffs have not pointed out a single factual or legal
misrepresentation in its motion to quash. See generally Def.’s Opp’n.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the court may impose sanctions on attorneys
or unrepresented parties if “a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . [is] presented for any
improper purpose[;] . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
[un]warranted by existing law[;] . . . the allegations and other factual contentions have [no]
1 The caption of the Amended Complaint contains the following language: “District of Columbia/SERVE – Darlene Fields, Esq. Agent for Service of Process Assistant Attorney General for District of Columbia.” See Am. Compl. at 1.
5 evidentiary support [or] the denials of factual contentions are [un]warranted on the evidence[.]”
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
The plaintiffs have put forward no evidence supporting their assertion that the District
deliberately tampered with mail service to prevent service of process from being effected on the
District. See generally Pls.’ Mot. for Sanctions. And although the court denies the District’s
motion to quash service, the arguments and assertions made in the District’s motion are not
completely unwarranted or unsupported by existing law. See Gresham v. District of Columbia,
No. 09-0029 (Apr. 29, 2009) (Mem. Order) (observing that the District had asserted a reasonable
legal position in alleging improper service). Accordingly, the court denies the plaintiffs’ motion
for sanctions.
Likewise, the plaintiffs have put forward no evidence to support their allegation that the
District improperly influenced the clerk’s office of the district court to withhold default. See
generally Pls.’ Mot. for Sanctions. Nor have the plaintiffs articulated how the clerk’s office
exceeded its discretion in declining the plaintiffs’ request for entry of default while the District’s
motion to quash service was pending. See id. Accordingly, the court denies the plaintiffs’
request for a show cause hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the District’s motion to quash service and
denies the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion
is separately and contemporaneously issued this 29th day of June, 2009.
RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge