[Cite as Hoffman v. Gunawan, 2025-Ohio-5697.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF WAYNE )
BRIAN J. HOFFMAN C.A. No. 24AP0030
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE UPIKIN GUNAWAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO Appellee CASE No. 2022 CVC-A 000443
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 22, 2025
FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Brian Hoffman appeals the judgment of the Wayne County
Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Upikin Gunawan on
his claims against her. We affirm.
I.
{¶2} Gunawan’s minor child (“X”) was a member of the Wooster High School Speech
and Debate Team. Although X was an excellent student and active in extracurricular activities,
his behavior at home caused Gunawan concern. In an effort to address these concerns, Gunawan
reached out to X’s speech and debate coaches for help. Upon the recommendation of one of his
coaches, Gunawan approached Hoffman and inquired if he would be willing to assist her.
Hoffman, an attorney practicing immigration law, was also a member of the Wooster High School
Speech and Debate coaching staff, but did not directly coach X. Gunawan believed Hoffman could
be a positive influence on X. Hoffman agreed. 2
{¶3} After Hoffman’s interactions with X, Gunawan believed Hoffman’s involvement
was having a negative impact on X. Gunawan sent Hoffman an email requesting he give the family
space. After learning Hoffman had continued to interact with X, Gunawan sent Hoffman another
email expressly requesting Hoffman stop contacting X. Hoffman responded to Gunawan’s email
by stating that the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited him from discussing any
communications he may or may not have had with X and directing Gunawan to contact the Ohio
Supreme Court Office of Disciplinary Counsel if she had questions. In his response email,
Hoffman also asked Gunawan to stop contacting him.
{¶4} A few days later, Gunawan sent an email directed to two of X’s speech and debate
coaches. In Gunawan’s email, she expressed that Hoffman should have no contact with her minor
child and requested he not be permitted to attend X’s practices and tournaments. Later that same
evening, Gunawan sent another email, this time directed to one of X’s speech and debate coaches
with the subject line “[Important] Stop contact request[.]” In her email, Gunawan stated, in
relevant part, that Hoffman was still contacting X and specifically, that “It is inappropriate for an
adult (I’m guessing he is between 39-40 years old) to have any personal relationship with a 16-
year-old minor.” It is undisputed that the email was sent to at least five other school officials, a
court official, a member of law enforcement, and at least one other individual.
{¶5} Less than a week later, Hoffman filed a complaint against Gunawan asserting
claims of slander, false light, and tortious interference with a contract. Gunawan filed a timely
answer and counterclaim asserting claims against Hoffman for tortious interference with parental
rights and contributing to the unruliness of a child. The matter proceeded through the pretrial
process. 3
{¶6} After a year of litigation, Hoffman filed an amended complaint asserting claims of
defamation per se, defamation per quod, slander, false light, two counts of tortious interference
with a contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hoffman also sought a declaratory
judgment that Gunawan had violated Hoffman’s rights, compensatory damages, punitive damages,
costs, attorney’s fees, and any other relief that the court deemed appropriate.
{¶7} Gunawan filed a timely answer and amended counterclaim. In her amended
counterclaim, Gunawan asserted a claim against Hoffman for intentional interference with parental
rights. Hoffman filed a timely answer to Gunawan’s counterclaim.
{¶8} After a period of discovery, Gunawan filed a motion for summary judgment as to
Hoffman’s claims. Hoffman filed a combined opposition to Gunawan’s summary judgment
motion and cross-motion for summary judgment (hereinafter “Combined Motion”).
{¶9} Relevant to this appeal, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting Gunawan’s
motion for summary judgment as to all of Hoffman’s claims. The trial court concluded that, based
upon the totality of the circumstances, Gunawan’s emailed statement was an opinion and not
actionable as defamation. The trial court further concluded that although Hoffman referenced
rumors and innuendo, he did not point to any other statements made by Gunawan that he alleged
were defamatory. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Gunawan on all of Hoffman’s
claims.
{¶10} Hoffman filed this timely appeal, raising four assignments of error. For ease of
analysis, we combine Hoffman’s first two assignments of error. 4
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS, WHICH PRIMARILY ALLEGED DEFAMATION AND SLANDER[.]
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS MERELY STATING OPINIONS[.]
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Hoffman argues the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to Gunawan and against Hoffman on his claims for defamation because (1)
Gunawan’s emailed “statement was not merely a statement of her opinion, but . . . necessarily
contained underlying factual claims[,]” and (2) “the trial court’s conclusion that [Hoffman]’s
evidence ‘reference[d] rumors and innuendo’ but did not have any ‘actual statements from
Defendant making such comments’ is a misreading of the record.” In his second assignment of
error, Hoffman claims that the trial court erred when it found Gunawan’s emailed statement was
an opinion. We disagree.
{¶12} Initially, we note that Hoffman has not raised a specific argument on appeal
addressing why it was error for the trial court to grant Gunawan summary judgment on Hoffman’s
claims for false light invasion of privacy, tortious interference with a contract, or intentional
infliction of emotional distress. When an appellant fails to develop an argument in support of his
assignment of error, this Court will not create one for him. See App.R. 16(A)(7); Cardone v.
Cardone, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (9th Dist. May 6, 1998). “If an argument exists that can support
[an] assignment of error, it is not this [C]ourt’s duty to root it out.” Cardone at *8.
{¶13} This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio
Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). “We apply the same standard as the trial court, viewing 5
the facts in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolving any doubt
in favor of the non-moving party.” Husa v. Knapp, 2020-Ohio-6986, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), citing Viock
v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 12 (6th Dist. 1983).
{¶14} Pursuant to Civ.R.56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when:
(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977). To succeed on a motion for summary
judgment, the movant must first be able to point to evidentiary materials demonstrating there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). If the movant satisfies this burden, the
nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
at 293, quoting Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶15} “To prevail in a defamation case, a plaintiff must demonstrate five elements:
(1) that a false statement of fact was made, (2) that the statement was defamatory, (3) that the statement was published, (4) that the plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of the publication, and (5) that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault in publishing the statement.”
Fisher v. Ahmed, 2020-Ohio-1196, ¶ 32 (9th Dist.), citing Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc.,
2012-Ohio-4193, ¶ 77. “There are two kinds of defamation; defamation per se occurs when
material is defamatory on its face; defamation per quod occurs when material is defamatory
through interpretation or innuendo.” Fisher at ¶ 33, citing Gosden v. Louis, 116 Ohio App.3d 195,
206 (9th Dist. 1996). “An allegedly slanderous or libelous statement is actionable as defamation
per se if it: 6
(1) alleges an indictable criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) imputes a loathsome or contagious disease that would exclude a person from society; (3) tends to injure a person in his trade or occupation; and, additionally, (4) written matter is libelous per se if it tends to subject a person to public hatred, ridicule, or contempt.
Fisher at ¶ 33, citing Dunnigan v. City of Lorain, 2002-Ohio-5548, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.); Gosden at
207. “Written defamation is known as libel; spoken defamation is known as slander.” Gosden at
206.
{¶16} In her motion for summary judgment, Gunawan argued in part that she was entitled
to summary judgment on Hoffman’s claims of defamation per se, defamation per quod, and slander
because (1) the statement, “[i]t is inappropriate for an adult (I’m guessing he is between 39-40
years old) to have any personal relationship with a 16-year-old minor[,]” at issue in Hoffman’s
complaint was not actionable because it was an opinion and not a statement of fact, and (2)
Hoffman’s assertion that Gunawan’s use of the term “inappropriate” implied “some sort of sexual
undertone or allegation of ‘grooming’” had no merit. In support of her motion, Gunawan relied
upon her own affidavit, copies of several emails she sent to Hoffman and/or individuals associated
with Wooster City School District or the speech and debate team, emails sent to her by Hoffman
and/or individuals associated with the Wooster City School District or the speech and debate team,
and a written correspondence from her legal counsel to the Wooster High School principal.
{¶17} In response to Gunawan’s motion for summary judgment, Hoffman agreed “there
are no issues of fact about which reasonable minds may differ,” but asserted Gunawan’s written
statement was a false statement of fact because it implied an allegation that the relationship
between Hoffman and X was both personal and inappropriate instead of professional and
appropriate. Although Hoffman’s response does not expressly state that Gunawan was implying
Hoffman was pursuing her son for a sexual relationship and/or had a sexual relationship with her
son, his amended complaint alleges that “when made against the backdrop of many recent high- 7
profile cases of illegal student-teacher sexual conduct (some of which occurred in Wooster),”
Gunawan’s statement was “defamatory per quod due to facts external” to Gunawan’s email.
Hoffman supported his response to the motion for summary judgment by pointing to the affidavits
of a Wooster High School Speech and Debate team coach and the parent of a student member of
the team.
{¶18} Whether an allegedly defamatory statement is actionable as defamation is a
question of law. Leadscope, 2012-Ohio-4193, at ¶ 78, quoting Yeager v. Local Union 20,
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am., 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372 (1983),
abrogated on other grounds by Welling v. Weinfeld, 2007-Ohio-2451. A court must consider the
allegedly defamatory statement in the totality of the circumstances, including “reading an alleged
defamatory statement in the context of the entire publication to determine whether a reasonable
reader would deem the statement defamatory.” Fisher, 2020-Ohio-1196, at ¶ 50 (9th Dist.), citing
Leadscope at ¶ 79.
{¶19} “The right to sue for damage to one’s reputation pursuant to state law is not
absolute. Instead, the right is encumbered by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.” Soke v. Plain Dealer, 69 Ohio St.3d 395, 395 (1994). Additionally, “[t]he Ohio
Supreme Court has held that ‘[t]he Ohio Constitution provides a separate and independent
guarantee of protection for opinion ancillary to freedom of the press.’” Sturdevant v. Likley, 2013-
Ohio-987, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting Vail v. The Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 281
(1995). “In granting the opinion privilege to a defendant in a defamation action, the Ohio Supreme
Court has interpreted this constitutional provision as providing a stronger protection for opinions
than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Emphasis in original.) Concrete
Creations & Landscape Design LLC v. Wilkinson, 2021-Ohio-2508, ¶ 31 (7th Dist.), citing 8
Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 116-117, 132 (2001) and Vail v. The Plain Dealer
Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 281 (1995). This protection extends to both media defendants
and private citizens. Sturdevant, at ¶ 9, citing Wampler at 112.
{¶20} When determining “whether a statement is actionable as a statement of fact, or not
actionable as a statement of opinion, courts apply the four-part Scott/Vail test to consider: (1) ‘the
specific language used,’ (2) ‘whether the statement is verifiable,’ (3) ‘the general context of the
statement,’ and (4) ‘the broader context in which the statement appeared.’” Fisher, 2020-Ohio-
1196, at ¶ 51 (9th Dist.), quoting Vail at 282, citing Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 250
(1986). “The weight given to any one factor under this inquiry will vary depending on the
circumstances of each case.” Wampler at 126 , citing Vail at 282.
{¶21} In reviewing the specific language used, a court should consider both the common
meaning of the words used and what the specific language would mean to an ordinary reader.
Sturdevant at ¶ 11, citing Scott at 250; Vail at 279. A court “must determine whether a reasonable
reader would view the words used to be language that normally conveys information of a factual
nature or hype and opinion; whether the language has a readily ascertainable meaning or is
ambiguous.” Vail at 282. “[S]tatements that are ‘loosely definable’ or ‘variously interpretable’
cannot in most contexts support an action for defamation.’” Wampler at 126, citing Ollman v.
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984). “[T]he mere fact that an opinion rests on facts does
not transform opinion into fact.” Byrne v. Univ. Hosps., 2011-Ohio-4110, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing
Wampler at 129.
{¶22} “The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that ‘when the meaning of an allegedly
defamatory statement is in question, courts apply an objective ‘ordinary reader’ test to determine
whether an allegedly libelous statement is a false statement of fact.” (Emphasis in original.) 9
Gaydosh v. Procop, 2006-Ohio-6557, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), quoting Wampler, 93 Ohio St.3d at 122.
“Furthermore, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized the ‘innocent construction rule,’ which
states that ‘if allegedly defamatory words are susceptible to two meanings, one defamatory and
one innocent, the defamatory meaning should be rejected, and the innocent meaning adopted.’”
Gaydosh at ¶ 12, quoting Yeager, 6 Ohio St.3d at 372.
{¶23} In considering whether a statement is verifiable, “[w]e seek to determine whether
the allegedly defamatory statements are objectively capable of proof or disproof . . . .” Wampler
at 129. If a statement “lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe
that the statement has specific factual content” and will instead understand the statement to be
“value-laden and represents a point of view that is obviously subjective.” Vail at 283, quoting
Scott, 25 Ohio St.3d at 251-252. There exists an “obvious potential for quashing or muting First
Amendment activity” when courts “attempt to assess the truth of a statement that admits of no
method of verification.” Wampler at 129, quoting Ollman at 981-982.
{¶24} In viewing the context of the statement, we “look at the combined statements made
by [Gunawan] and that nature of the exchange in order ‘to assess the “larger objective and
subjective context of the statement.”’” Niotti-Soltesz v. Piotrowski, 2017-Ohio-711, ¶ 23 (11th
Dist.), quoting Gilson v. Am. Inst. of Alternative Medicine, 2016-Ohio-1324, ¶ 63 (10th Dist.),
quoting Scott at 252. “We examine more than simply the alleged defamatory statements in
isolation, because the language surrounding the averred defamatory remarks may place the
reasonable reader on notice that what is being read is the opinion of the writer.” Wampler at 130.
This factor “may be weighed in favor of a finding of protected opinion if the context demonstrates
the writer ‘is not making an attempt to be impartial’ and ‘no secret is made of [her] bias.’”
Wilkinson, 2021-Ohio-2508, at ¶ 37 (7th Dist.), quoting Scott at 253 (“noting a reader of the words 10
in context would ‘hard pressed’ to accept the statements as impartial reporting.”). “For example,
if apparently defamatory statements are contained in a letter clearly meant to be a persuasive
statement of the declarant’s opinion, then they are not actionable.” Rothschild v. Humility of Mary
Health Partners, 2005-Ohio-5481, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.), citing Jorg v. Cincinnati Black United Front,
2003-Ohio-3668, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.) (“statements in letter were not defamatory since letter was
advocacy, not objective news”).
{¶25} “[W]e also examine “the broader social context into which the statement fits
[because s]ome types of writing or speech by custom or convention signal to readers or listeners
that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.” (Emphasis in original) Wampler
at 131, quoting Ollman at 983. “This fourth factor focuses, then, not merely on the internal context
within which a particular written statement appears, but on the unmistakable influence that certain
‘well established genres of writing will have on the average reader.’” (Emphasis in original.)
Wampler at 131, quoting Ollman at 984.
{¶26} Although Hoffman alluded in his complaint to several oral defamatory statements
he believes Gunawan made about him, he only identified one specific statement Gunawan made
that he claims was defamatory. The amended complaint shows that the only specific statement
Hoffman identified as allegedly defamatory was Gunawan’s statement that “It is inappropriate for
an adult (I’m guessing he is between 39-40 years old) to have any personal relationship with a 16-
year-old minor,” which Gunawan included in an email with the subject line “[Important] Stop
contact request” addressed to one of X’s speech and debate coaches. It is undisputed that several
additional individuals were copied on the email. That email stated in full:
Dear Mrs. [C],
As of tonight, Friday, October 21, 2022, 8:40 PM, Brian Hoffman is still contacting [X] and scheduling meetings. [X] said the meeting is at school but refused to 11
provide any more details. Please take action and tell him to cease contacting [X]. It is inappropriate for an adult (I’m guessing he is between 39-40 years old) to have any personal relationship with a 16-year-old minor.
I will have to pull [X] out of the WHS Speech and Debate team if he disrespects my stop-contact request of October 18, 2022, copied below this email.
Thank you for your good cooperation,
Respectfully,
[Gunawan]
{¶27} Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that Gunawan’s
statement in this email cannot support a defamation claim as a matter of law. First, the specific
language used by Gunawan is value-laden hyperbole representing a subjective viewpoint. Second,
although the words “inappropriate” and “personal” are definable, whether a specific relationship
can be defined as “inappropriate” and/or “personal” will vary reader to reader and is not objectively
verifiable. Finally, considering allegedly defamatory statement in the entire context of Gunawan’s
email, we conclude that an ordinary reader would understand Gunawan was expressing her opinion
that a continued relationship between an adult and a child—where the child’s parent has expressly
asked the adult to stop contacting the child—is inappropriate. Immediately preceding the allegedly
defamatory statement, Gunawan states that her son informed her that Hoffman scheduled a
meeting with him on school grounds despite Gunawan’s request that he cease contacting X. She
then pleads with the recipients of the email to “take action” and tell Hoffman to cease contacting
her son. Notably, Hoffman does not dispute that Gunawan requested he stop contacting her minor
child nor does he dispute that he continued to do so despite this request.
{¶28} Gunawan sent this email after she learned Hoffman had disregarded her request—
a request she made because she believed Hoffman’s involvement with X was a bad influence on
his behavior. In this context, Gunawan’s statement that a personal relationship between an adult 12
and minor child is inappropriate is plainly hyperbole presented to persuade the recipients to help
her convince Hoffman to cease contacting X. In viewing Gunawan’s email as a whole, no
reasonable reader would understand that Gunawan was implying that Hoffman was engaging in a
sexual relationship with her minor child.
{¶29} On appeal, Hoffman contends that his reference to the affidavit of a member of the
Wooster High School Speech and Debate Team coaching staff in response to Gunawan’s motion
for summary judgment was sufficient to show Gunawan was insinuating Hoffman “could be
grooming her son.” However, when the meaning of an allegedly defamatory statement is in
question, the question is whether “an objective ‘ordinary reader’” would consider the allegedly
libelous statement to be a false statement of fact, and not whether any specific individual inferred
meaning from allegedly defamatory statement. See Gaydosh, 2006-Ohio-6557, at ¶ 12 (9th Dist.),
quoting Wampler, 93 Ohio St.3d at 122. Regardless, our review of the coach’s affidavit shows
that the coach does not identify any specific statements made by Gunawan, let alone the statement
Hoffman alleges was defamatory, as the basis for her own inference that Gunawan was implying
Hoffman “could be grooming her son.” Instead, the coach’s affidavit merely alludes to the content
of rumors she claims Gunawan “was spreading rumors through other parents . . . .” The affidavit
does not assert any personal knowledge of any actual statement made by Gunawan nor any basis
for the affiant’s belief that Gunawan was responsible for the unspecified rumors.
{¶30} We conclude that the allegedly defamatory statement in Gunawan’s email cannot
support a defamation claim as a matter of law. Therefore, we further conclude that Gunawan met
her burden to demonstrate there were no genuine issue as to any material fact and that she was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Hoffman’s claims for defamation per se, defamation per
quod, and slander. See Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 292. 13
{¶31} Hoffman’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A BAD FAITH FINDING UNDER RULE 56(G)[.]
{¶32} In his third assignment of error, Hoffman contends the trial court erred when it
failed to find Gunawan’s affidavit in support of her motion for summary judgment was filed in
bad faith pursuant to Civ.R. 56(G). We disagree.
{¶33} In his Combined Motion, Hoffman asked the trial court to “find that [Gunawan]’s
affidavit in support of her summary judgment motion is in bad faith pursuant to Rule 56 (G).”
However, a review of the motion shows that Hoffman did not develop an argument related to this
request nor did he move the court for any specific sanction related to such a finding. Instead,
Hoffman asserted under the subheading “COUNT FIVE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH CONTRACT – WOOSTER CITY SCHOOLS” that Gunawan’s statement in her
affidavit that she was unaware of whether Hoffman had a contract with Wooster City Schools was
“false” based on a statement she made in an earlier email she sent to two other speech and debate
team coaches wherein she stated “As a speech and debate coach, he is a Wooster City School
(WCS) employee who is bound to follow the WCS rules.”
{¶34} The trial court did not expressly rule on Hoffman’s request for a finding of bad faith
related to Gunawan’s affidavit in its judgment entry. However, “‘[i]n circumstances where the
trial court fails to expressly rule on a motion prior to entering judgment, this Court presumes on
appeal that the pending motion was implicitly denied.’” Bencin v. Bencin, 2016-Ohio-54, ¶ 17
(9th Dist.), quoting Rothschild v. Eckstein, 2010-Ohio-4285, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). “In reviewing the
denial of a Civ.R. 56(G) motion, we apply an abuse of discretion standard.” DeepRock Disposal 14
Solutions, LLC v. Forté Prods., LLC, 2021-Ohio-1436, ¶ 42 (4th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is
more than an error in judgment and implies that the court’s judgment was unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶35} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(G),
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Generally, “‘[b]ad faith’ means ‘a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing,
breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud.
It also embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive another.’” DeepRock Disposal Solutions, LLC
at ¶ 51, quoting Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 151 (1962), overruled on other
grounds by Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552 (1994).
{¶36} Hoffman does not point to any evidence that Gunawan filed her affidavit in bad
faith. Standing alone, Gunawan’s recognition of Hoffman as a school employee, bound by the
rules of the school district, does not show Gunawan had any personal knowledge that Hoffman
had a contract with the Wooster City School District. Hoffman’s assertion to the contrary would
require this Court to make an illogical inference that because Gunawan identified Hoffman as an
employee, she also knew he had a contract with the school district. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by failing to find Gunawan’s affidavit in support of her motion for summary
judgment was filed in bad faith.
{¶37} In addition to Hoffman’s stated assignment of error, Hoffman asserts for the first
time on appeal that Gunawan’s legal counsel violated Civ.R. 11 by notarizing Gunawan’s affidavit.
“‘It is well-settled that this Court will not address arguments for the first time on appeal.’” 15
Frankowski v. Mahl, 2024-Ohio-1202, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Williamson, 2022-Ohio-
185, ¶ 31 (9th Dist.).
{¶38} Hoffman’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS[.]
{¶39} In his fourth assignment of error, Hoffman states that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for summary judgment on his claims against Gunawan because “no reasonable mind
could conclude that she was not at the very least reckless in sending emails to school and law
enforcement authorities alleging that an ‘inappropriate’ and ‘personal’ relationship existed
between [Hoffman] and her son.” However, Hoffman does not develop this argument. When an
appellant fails to develop an argument in support of his assignment of error, this Court will not
create one for him. See App.R. 16(A)(7); Cardone, 1998 WL 224934, at *8 (9th Dist. May 6,
1998). “If an argument exists that can support [an] assignment of error, it is not this [C]ourt’s duty
to root it out.” Cardone at *8.
{¶40} Hoffman’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶41} Hoffman’s first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error are overruled. The
judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 16
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT
CARR, J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
BRIAN J. HOFFMAN, Attorney at Law, pro se, Appellant.
UPIKIN GUNAWAN, pro se, Appellee.