Hoff v. County of Siskiyou

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 PHILLIP HOFF, No. 2:23-cv-00535 WBS JDP 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER 15 COUNTY OF SISKIYOU, an administrative body; ANDREA FOX, 16 ex-HOA manager; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18

19 ----oo0oo---- 20 Plaintiff Phillip Hoff has filed a fourth amended 21 complaint (Fourth Am. Compl. (“Compl.”) (Docket No. 36)) after 22 the court dismissed without prejudice all but one of his third 23 amended complaint’s claims with leave to amend. (Order (Docket 24 No. 35).) The court now considers defendants Siskiyou County and 25 Andrea Fox’s latest motion to dismiss.1 (Mot. (Docket No. 36).) 26

27 1 Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, the court has determined that oral argument would not be of further 28 assistance to the court. Accordingly, the motion is decided on 1 Except where necessary, the court will not recite the relevant 2 factual background or legal standards because they are already 3 set forth in the court’s prior order. (See generally Order.) 4 I. Standing 5 Previously, plaintiff alleged that the County took his 6 Conex container and donated it to a Buddhist temple without his 7 approval. (See Docket No. 21 at 32.) Now, plaintiff clarifies 8 that the County’s alleged acts comprising this lawsuit forced him 9 to donate his life savings, including his parcel of land, to said 10 temple in the year 2022. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 37, 103.) 11 Defendant now challenges plaintiff’s standing to bring claims 12 related to property rights in the land parcel at issue. (See 13 Opp’n (Docket No. 40-1) at 4.) 14 Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the 15 judicial power extends to “Cases” and “Controversies.” Courts 16 cannot decide legal disputes “in the absence of such a case or 17 controversy.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90 18 (2013). No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's 19 proper role in the federal system. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 20 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). This limitation requires that 21 plaintiffs have standing, that is “an actual injury traceable to 22 the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 23 decision.” Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). 24 Article III necessitates that an actual controversy exist 25 “through all stages of the litigation.” Already, LLC, 568 U.S. 26 the papers without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), 27 the scheduled April 1, 2024 hearing on the motion is hereby VACATED, and plaintiff’s request to reschedule the hearing 28 (Docket No. 51) is moot. 1 at 91 (quotations omitted). “A case becomes moot -- and 2 therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of 3 Article III -- when the issues presented are no longer live or 4 the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” 5 Id. Put another way, a case is moot if the dispute “is no longer 6 embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ 7 particular legal rights.” Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93 8 (2009). 9 Every single one of plaintiff’s claims is predicated on 10 infringement of his property rights in the land parcel and 11 allegedly related rights to certain permits and variances. 12 Regardless of what genuinely did or did not happen before 13 plaintiff deeded his property to the temple in 2022, “it is not 14 enough that a dispute was very much alive when the suit was 15 filed; . . . [t]he parties must continue to have a personal stake 16 in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 17 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 18 Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff’s donation of his 19 property extinguished any live controversy in which he still 20 carries a personal stake.2 21 II. Due Process (Claim 1) 22 2 Plaintiff argues that he still has standing to sue on 23 behalf of the Nam Quang temple because he is a board member. (See Opp’n at 16-17.) He accordingly asserts standing as an 24 organizational plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff gets it backwards: an organization may, under certain conditions, sue on behalf of its 25 injured members pursuant to the doctrine of associational standing, not the other way around. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 26 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“It is clear that an organization whose 27 members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.”). 28 1 The court previously dismissed this claim because 2 plaintiff failed to demonstrate a constitutionally protected 3 property interest in a permit or a variance for his second Conex 4 container. (See Order at 3-5.) The court also concluded that 5 the September 21, 2022 administrative hearing regarding his 6 citation provided him sufficient due process. (See id. at 5-6.) 7 Plaintiff pleads no new facts changing this analysis. 8 As to the administrative hearing, plaintiff now alleges that he 9 was not given an opportunity to decide on a “neutral” to preside 10 over the hearing. (Compl. ¶¶ 71-74.) Plaintiff also alleges 11 that, during the hearing, the “purported neutral” “muted” 12 plaintiff’s counsel twice while she was cross-examining Fox with 13 questions prejudicial to the County.3 (Id. ¶ 36.) However, 14 plaintiff fails to provide any authority indicating that 15 plaintiff has a constitutionally protected interest in selecting 16 a “neutral” for such an administrative hearing, nor can the court 17 find any. Cf. Makdessian v. City of Mountain View, 152 F. App’x 18 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2005) (due process satisfied upon notice and 19 opportunity to be heard before deprivation of significant 20 property interest). Neither does plaintiff further allege that 21 he was materially deprived of an opportunity to be heard at the 22 hearing, notwithstanding the two times that the presiding 23 official allegedly muted plaintiff’s counsel. 24 Accordingly, the court will dismiss this claim. 25 III. Unreasonable Seizure (Claim 2) 26 A. County 27 3 The court presumes that the hearing was conducted 28 remotely. 1 While plaintiff’s previous allegations that the County 2 cut his gate and locks to his property, seized his solar panels 3 and umbrellas, and bulldozed trash onto his land asserted a 4 Fourth Amendment injury plausible on its face, plaintiff failed 5 to further plead facts that would attach liability to the County 6 pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 7 The court accordingly dismissed this claim. (See Order at 6-8.) 8 That defect persists. Plaintiff now alleges that 9 defendant Andrea Fox “executed Defendant County’s official policy 10 in cutting the gate locks to Plaintiff’s property.” (Compl. ¶¶ 11 26, 104.) Plaintiff also alleges that the County “seized” his 12 land parcel in the sense that it “allow[ed] neighbors to grow 13 meth on it, bulldoze trash and cut locks.” (Id. ¶ 99.) However, 14 plaintiff still fails to allege any actual facts suggesting a 15 policy or custom of cutting residents’ locks and permitting 16 general lawlessness that negatively affected his property 17 rights.4 18 B. Fox 19 4 Plaintiff’s bare assertion of “Defendant County’s 20 official policy in cutting the gate locks to Plaintiff’s property” (Compl. ¶ 104) does not suffice. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 21 the Supreme Court held that “bare assertions” that “amount to 22 nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a [ ] claim” are not entitled to “presumption of truth,” and that the 23 district court, after disregarding “bare assertions” and conclusions, must “consider the factual allegations in [a] 24 complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief” as opposed to a claim that is merely “conceivable.” 25 556 U.S. 662 679–80 (2009). The Ninth Circuit explicitly confirmed that this standard applies to pleading policy or custom 26 for claims against municipal entities. See AE ex rel. Hernandez 27 v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (”This standard applies to Monell claims and should govern future 28 pleadings. . . .”). Plaintiff fails to meet that standard here. 1 Previously, the court noted that plaintiff did not 2 plead his unreasonable seizure claim against any individual 3 defendants. (See Order at 7 n.5.) Now, for the first time, 4 plaintiff makes the following allegations specifically against 5 Fox: she cut the locks and gates to plaintiff’s land parcel 6 (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 173); and she “yelled and screamed” at plaintiff 7 about trash in November 2021 when she “confronted [him] at Swan 8 Way,” causing him extreme emotional distress and anxiety, which 9 “meets the requirement of a search-and-seizure of an on-duty 10 compliance manager of County constituting a threat, intimidation 11 or coercion to Plaintiff because Fox lacked any probable cause” 12 (id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 102). 13 Because plaintiff requests no relief that requires Fox 14 to act in her official capacity as a Compliance Officer of 15 Siskiyou County (see Compl. at 29-30), Fox is sued in her 16 individual capacity. Accordingly, plaintiff must show that Fox 17 acted under color of state law in order to establish a 18 constitutional injury. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 19 (1985) (individual-capacity suits “seek to impose personal 20 liability upon a government official for actions he takes under 21 color of state law.”). 22 A defendant has acted under color of state law where he 23 or she has “exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and 24 made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the 25 authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) 26 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 27 The Ninth Circuit has recognized, for example, that off-duty 28 police officers do not act under color of state law if “‘[a]t no 1 point [do they] purport to be acting as a policeman,’ and even if 2 the victims recognize[ them] as an officer, that recognition 3 ‘does not alone transform private acts into acts under color of 4 state law.’” Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2015) 5 (citing Van Ort v. Est. of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 6 1996)). 7 Here, plaintiff’s allegations lead to the inescapable 8 inference that it was personal animus between himself and Fox 9 predating Fox’s current position as Compliance Officer for 10 Siskiyou County (see Compl. ¶ 4) that was the motivating force 11 for injuries which he attributes to Fox currently. For instance, 12 plaintiff’s complaint labels Fox as “an ex-HOA manager” and 13 further alleges that Fox was the manager for the homeowner’s 14 association Klamath River County Estates Owners’ Association 15 Inc., of which plaintiff’s parcel is a part. (See id. ¶ 10.) 16 Plaintiff also specifically mentions “animus from Defendant 17 Andrea Fox as the then-KRCE-homeowner manager.” (Id.) 18 Finally, and most directly, plaintiff alleges that 19 “Defendant Fox had a previous history of invidious discrimination 20 against Plaintiff Phillip Hoff, stemming from Defendant Fox’s 21 time as Manager of the KRCE Homeowners Association since the year 22 2012 up until 2021 -- per information and belief. During that 23 time, Plaintiff Phillip Hoff and Defendant Fox have repeatedly 24 clashed over various issues, and Defendant Fox plainly exhibited 25 her own personal animus against Plaintiff Phillip Hoff.” (Id. ¶¶ 26 20-21.) 27 Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that Fox cut his 28 locks and gate pursuant to any kind of authority stemming from 1 her position as Compliance Officer for Siskiyou County, or that 2 such actions were even made possible by the position that Fox 3 occupies -- in fact, plaintiff fails to even allege whether Fox’s 4 alleged cutting of the locks occurred at the same time as when 5 she was a County employee.5 He fails to do the same regarding 6 the alleged altercation at Swan Way; bolstering this conclusion 7 is plaintiff’s allegation that he “believed Defendant Fox was on 8 meth” during the altercation based on her behavior. (Id. ¶ 15.) 9 See also Naffe, 789 F.3d at 1036 (“recognition [of official as 10 official] ‘does not alone transform private acts into acts under 11 color of state law.’” (citing Stanewich, 92 F.3d at 839)). 12 Accordingly, the court will dismiss this claim. 13 IV. Equal Protection (Claim 3) 14 Under either a class-of-one or age/disability 15 discrimination theory, an equal protection claim typically 16 concerns governmental classifications that affect some groups of 17 citizens differently than others. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep't 18 of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). 19 A. Class of One 20 In order to show no rational basis for different 21 treatment, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the level of 22 similarity between plaintiff and the persons with whom they 23 compare themselves is extremely high.” Hardesty v. Sacramento 24 5 Neither does plaintiff allege that Fox held any 25 supervisory authority pursuant to his supervisory liability argument, or that any of Fox’s subordinates caused Fourth 26 Amendment injuries due to Fox’s enablement pursuant to her 27 supervisory power. (See Opp’n at 35-37.) Rather, plaintiff alleges that Fox herself caused the alleged injuries directly. 28 1 Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 2d 968, 983 (E.D. 2 Cal. 2013) (Mueller, J.) (quotations and citations omitted) 3 (emphasis added); see Warkentine v. Soria, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 4 1294 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (Seng, J.) (same). Cf. Freeman v. City of 5 Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Selective 6 enforcement of valid laws, without more, does not make the 7 defendants' action irrational”) (emphasis added). 8 The court previously did not dismiss this claim because 9 plaintiff sufficiently alleged that his neighbors’ adjoining 10 properties with two or more containers on them were apt 11 comparators. (See Order at 8-9; Docket No. 21 ¶ 72 (“Several 12 homes in and around HOFF’s land parcel have two and more Conex 13 containers without any permitting requirements, and no variance 14 hardships.”).) 15 Now, however, plaintiff alleges more specifically that 16 he “has driven around the county to locate many land parcels with 17 two or more Conex container-container-boxes [sic] -- allegedly 18 with no second permit or citation from the county.” (Compl. ¶ 19 119 (emphasis added).) Two of these appear to be properties each 20 located at least ten miles from Klamath River Country Estates, 21 where plaintiff’s parcel is located. Others are “plumbing and 22 gas stations [that] have five (5) or more Conex container- 23 container-boxes [sic].” (Id.) 24 There are many rational reasons why a gas station might 25 be treated differently than plaintiff’s parcel with respect to 26 the regulation of Conex containers. The same goes for parcels of 27 land located many miles away and possibly used or zoned for very 28 different purposes. The only alleged commonalities between the 1 properties that plaintiff identifies now is that they host two or 2 more Conex containers, and they are all located in Siskiyou 3 County. This does not come close to demonstrating the “extremely 4 high” level of similarity required by law. See Hardesty, 935 F. 5 Supp. 2d at 983. 6 B. Elder/Disability Discrimination 7 Plaintiff now also alleges that he is part of a class 8 of disabled and elderly citizens subject to disparate treatment. 9 (Compl. ¶ 113.) However, plaintiff’s sole allegation in support 10 is as follows: “Per information and belief, Defendants have a 11 pattern and practice of refusing to issue hardship variances to 12 individuals with disabilities and those similar in age to 13 Plaintiff.” (Id.) This is patently a “formulaic recitation of 14 the elements of a [ ] claim,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679–80, which 15 fails to even facially establish the existence of a discrepancy 16 in the County’s treatment of its elderly or disabled populations 17 as to Conex container permits. 18 Accordingly, the court will dismiss this claim. 19 V. Disability Discrimination (Claim 4) 20 The court already dismissed this claim twice because 21 plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing that the County 22 denied him his permit or variance on the basis of his disability. 23 (See Order at 9; Docket No. 20 at 11.) 24 The court must now dismiss it again. Plaintiff’s 25 latest amended complaint still contains no allegations showing 26 that defendants “denied [plaintiff] the benefits of the services, 27 programs, or activities of a public entity” because of his 28 disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Plaintiff still only brings 1 wholly conclusory allegations such as: “Defendant Fox harbored a 2 discriminatory animus against Plaintiff Phillip Hoff due to his 3 disability” (Compl. ¶ 22); and “Defendants also assumed that they 4 could treat Plaintiff arbitrarily and capriciously and that 5 Plaintiff, due to his disability, would not be able to take 6 action to stop them or otherwise vindicate his rights” (Id. ¶ 7 133). 8 Accordingly, the court will dismiss this claim. 9 VI. Regulatory Taking (Claim 7) 10 The court previously dismissed this claim because 11 plaintiff’s allegations regarding permits and variances failed to 12 show that the County’s alleged actions constituted lawful 13 interference with his property rights, and any plausible “public 14 use” of his property motivated the County’s alleged actions. 15 (See Order at 9-10.) 16 Plaintiff now alleges that the County’s regulation of 17 Conex containers on his property eliminated “all of or partial of 18 the beneficial use of his land parcel.” (Compl. ¶ 161.) 19 A. Total Taking 20 “[A] regulation which ‘denies all economically 21 beneficial or productive use of land’ will require compensation 22 under the Takings Clause.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 384 23 (2017) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 24 (2001) and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 25 1003, 1015 (1992)). 26 Plaintiff fails to make the threshold showing that an 27 inability to have a second Conex container on his parcel thereby 28 deprived it of all economically beneficial or productive use of 1 land. Even if plaintiff’s parcel is such that its sole 2 beneficial use is for storage, the parcel already has one validly 3 permitted Conex container. What’s more, the government does not 4 take a property interest when it merely asserts a “pre-existing 5 limitation upon the land owner’s title.” Lucas, 533 U.S. at 6 1028–1029. 7 B. Partial Taking 8 Any regulation causing anything less than a complete 9 elimination of economic value requires the ad hoc review under 10 factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transp. 11 Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Palazzolo, 533 12 U.S. at 617 (2001). Under Penn Central, courts evaluate the 13 following three factors of “particular significance”: (1) “[t]he 14 economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;” (2) “the 15 extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 16 investment-backed expectations;” and (3) “the character of the 17 governmental action.” Penn Central, 533 U.S. at 124. 18 Plaintiff’s allegations fail to satisfy any prong of 19 the Penn Central test. As to the first two factors, plaintiff 20 alleges no economic injuries that stem from his expectation and 21 subsequent failure to secure a permit. As to the character of 22 the municipal regulation on Conex containers, plaintiff alleges 23 no imposition of the kind that courts typically recognize as 24 constitutionally intrusive, such as a physical government 25 invasion of the property. See id. at 124 (“A ‘taking’ may more 26 readily be found when the interference with property can be 27 characterized as a physical invasion by government than when 28 interference arises from some public program adjusting the 1 benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 2 good”) (cleaned up). 3 “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values 4 incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 5 every such change in the general law.” Id. (cleaned up). 6 Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that the County’s permitting 7 and variance policies are anything more than such an incidental 8 regulation. 9 Accordingly, the court will dismiss this claim. 10 VII. State Law Claims: Financial Elder Abuse and Negligence 11 (Claims 5 and 6) 12 Because the court dismisses plaintiff’s federal claims, 13 it no longer has federal question jurisdiction. Federal courts 14 have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 15 related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 16 that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 17 III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A 18 district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 19 . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which 20 it has original jurisdiction.” Id. at § 1367(c); see also Acri 21 v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) 22 (en banc) (district courts may decline sua sponte to exercise 23 supplemental jurisdiction). 24 “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims 25 are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be 26 considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial 27 economy, convenience, fairness and comity -- will point toward 28 declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 1 claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 2 (1988). 3 The balance of factors in this case weighs toward 4 declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Judicial 5 economy does not weigh strongly in either direction, as this 6 action is still in the initial pleading stages. Convenience tips 7 slightly in favor of the state forum, given the locations of 8 Siskiyou County and plaintiff relative to this court. Fairness 9 weighs equally toward both fora as there is no reason to doubt 10 that a state court would provide an equally fair adjudication of 11 the issues. Finally, comity weighs in favor of declining 12 jurisdiction because all the remaining claims in the latest 13 complaint are state law claims. These claims are of the kind of 14 common property disputes routinely dealt with by the state 15 courts, which are likely to have a better understanding than this 16 court of the relevant state laws. 17 Accordingly, the court will decline to exercise 18 supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. 19 VIII. No Leave to Amend 20 Plaintiff has now amended his complaint four times. 21 (See Docket Nos. 1, 6, 13, 21, 36.) The court is convinced that 22 yet another attempt to plead these claims would be truly futile, 23 and accordingly will not give plaintiff leave to amend further. 24 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 25 dismiss (Docket No. 40) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 26 Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 are dismissed with prejudice. Claims 5 27 and 6 are dismissed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 28 1367(c), without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to refile its ee ERIE I EEE EE eee

1 remaining state law claims in state court.® 2} Dated: March 29, 2024 . ak. 2 3 WILLIAM B. SHUBB 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 | TTT 6 Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (Docket No. 40- 28 | 2) is denied as moot. 15