Hofer v. Federal Cartridge Corporation

71 F. Supp. 243, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2709
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJanuary 24, 1947
Docket1650
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 71 F. Supp. 243 (Hofer v. Federal Cartridge Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hofer v. Federal Cartridge Corporation, 71 F. Supp. 243, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2709 (mnd 1947).

Opinion

NORDBYE, District Judge.

The issue presented is: Are these plaintiffs exempt as professional employees within the meaning of Section 13(a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 213(a) (1), which provides that the overtime provisions shall not apply to any employee who is employed in a “bona fide * * * professional * * * capacity?” The Administrator has defined a bona fide professional employee as one who is

“(A) Engaged in work—

“(1) Predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work, and

“(2) Requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance, and

“(3) Of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time, and

“(4) Whose hours of work of the same nature as that performed by nonexempt employees do not exceed 20 percent of the hours worked in the workweek by the nonexempt employees; provided that where such nonprofessional work is an essential part of and necessarily incident to work of *244 a professional nature, such essential and incidental work shall not be counted as nonexempt work, and

“(5) (a) Requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study as distinguished from a general academic education and from an apprenticeship, and from training in th© performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or (b) * * * and

“(B) Who is compensated for his services on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $200 per month (exclusive of board, lodging, or other facilities); provided that this subsection (B) shall not apply in the case of an employee who is the-holder of a valid license or certificate permitting the practice of law or medicine, or any of their branches, and who is actually engaged in the practice thereof.”

These plaintiffs were all employed as head nurses at the Twin Cities Ordnance-Plant, where small-arms ammunition was manufactured during the war. These operations were carried on by the defendant under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract with the United States Government. Plaintiff Edna L. Schrupp was designated as chief nurse. She was in charge of all of the first-aid stations around the plant and their operations. There was at one time during the period covered herein some sixteen stations with sixty-one nurses in attendance at the hospital and the stations. The other plaintiffs, who were head nurses at various stations, generally had one or more nurses, under them, and were responsible for the work to be done at the particular field station under their charge. They were also responsible for the reports which were required from time to time and for the maintenance of the supplies needed for the operation of the station. A full line of drugs,, ointments, and other medical supplies necessary for emergency and first aid treatment was required to be on hand. A bedroom was attached to each field station with two beds which were used for patients, who were ill and for emergency cases. When an employee came or was brought to the. station for treatment, the head nurse would, be in charge of the aid which should be administered. Most of the aid was administered to employees who had suffered industrial accidents, such as cut fingers, burns and bruises of various kinds, foreign substances in eyes, and the numerous other mishaps generally occurring from day to day in a plant which at one time employed over twenty thousand employees. The nurses would examine the injuries sustained, apply the appropriate medication, disinfectants, etc., bandage the injured part, and determine whether the injury or other mishap was of sufficient gravity so as to advise hospital treatment. If so, the nurse contacted the doctor and arranged for transmittal to the plant hospital. Frequently, employees came to the stations complaining of headaches, stomach distress, or other discomfort, and under such circumstances the nurse would survey the complaint and usually administer simple remedies which the alleviation of the ailment would suggest. At times, the employees were given inoculations at the field stations, and under such circumstance* the head nurse did the inoculating. All of these head nurses were registered nurses under the laws of the State of Minnesota and had a high school education or its equivalent, with a full three-year nurse’s training in a recognized hospital. Under the Minnesota law, before a nurse could become a registered nurse, she would be required to pass an examination held by a Board of Examiners appointed by the Governor of the State, and upon passing the examination shq receives a certificate permitting her to be styled and known as a registered nurse. While the medical treatment administered by the plaintiff nurses may generally have been limited to that which is commonly known as first' aid, more serious problems also arose, and one cannot discount the absolute necessity of having persons who were trained and skilled in that particular field. The first aid required was not always necessarily simple first aid Each of the head nurses was held responsible for the particular field station to which she was assigned. Industrial accidents and illness of employees are vital factors in impeding production of a wartime institution such as the Twin Cities Ordnance Plant. The decisions of the head *245 ■nurses made from day to day in determining the nature of the complaints and what preliminary treatment should be administered, the necessity for hospitalization of the employee, the emergency involved in any particular case, and similar questions, undoubtedly required the consistent exercise of judgment and discretion on their ■part. True, there was much standardization in the work with respect to remedies for particular injuries and complaints. Moreover, the supervision of the field aid stations was directly under the authority of the medical director in charge. But the medical men made only occasional visits to the stations and the entire work was carried on therein under the direct supervision of the head nurses. And the fact that a standard remedy is prescribed for a designated injury or complaint does not detract from the analysis and training and skill necessary to determine the extent and seriousness, and often the type of injury or complaint, as well as what particular remedy should be given or applied.

The work of these head nurses is fairly encompassed within the purview of the definition of a professional employee as promulgated by the Administrator. Although a registered graduate nurse when performing her duties is usually referred to, in common parlance, as one who is engaged in a professional field, the Administrator’s definition, not the popular meaning, is probably determinative. Aulen et al. v. Triumph Explosive, Inc., D.C., 58 F.Supp. 4. The work o<# these plaintiffs is predominantly intellectual and varied in character, requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment. Certainly, it would be difficult to standardize their work in relation to any given period of time.

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Bluebook (online)
71 F. Supp. 243, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2709, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hofer-v-federal-cartridge-corporation-mnd-1947.