Hoefs v. Sig Sauer Inc

Opinion

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 11 CODY J. HOEFS, 12

Plaintiff, 13 Case No. 3:20-cv-05173-RAJ v.

SIG SAUER INC., 15 Defendant. 16 18 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for reconsideration or 19 clarification. Dkt. # 34. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s 20 motion for reconsideration. 22 In March 2022, Defendant Sig Sauer Inc. (“Sig Sauer”) filed a motion to dismiss 23 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the basis that the three-year statute 24 of limitations on the Washington Product Liability Act (“WPLA”), fraud, and fraudulent 25 concealment claims expired and Plaintiff Cody Hoefs alleged no set of facts that would 26 allow him to equitably toll the statute of limitations. See Dkt. # 26; Dkt. # 30. 27 This Court denied that motion. Dkt. # 31. Pursuant to LCR 7(h), Sig Sauer seeks 1 clarification as to whether the Court intended to make factual findings on the statute of 2 limitations issue. If so, Sig Sauer moves for reconsideration on the basis that factual 3 findings are improper at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Dkt. # 34. 5 Defendant’s motion indicates that it is unclear from the order whether this Court 6 intended to make factual findings that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled. Dkt. 7 # 34 at 2. As is appropriate at this stage, the Court only concludes that Plaintiff’s motion 8 survives the motion to dismiss. 9 The Ninth Circuit has stated that “it is rarely appropriate to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) 10 motion to dismiss (where review is limited to the complaint) if equitable tolling is at issue,” 11 since “the applicability of equitable tolling depends on matters outside the pleadings[.]” 12 Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2006); Hernandez v. 13 City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 1998) (same). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 14 has also stated that “[d]ismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant 15 to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required 16 liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” TwoRivers v. 17 Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 18 Plaintiff met the burden required to survive the motion to dismiss. Washington law 19 mandates equitable tolling when “justice requires.” See Millay v. Cam, 955 P.2d 791, 797 20 (1998) (en banc); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Carter, 263 P.3d 1241, 1248–49 (2011) 21 (en banc). The predicates for equitable tolling are bad faith, deception, or false assurances 22 by the defendant and the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff. Millay, 955 P.2d at 797. 23 Here, the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges facts that, if true, could prove 24 tolling of the statute of limitations. Notably, the Second Amended Complaint details 25 Plaintiff’s diligence in determining the cause of the harm as well as possible bad faith in 26 Defendant’s representations about the pistol’s defects. See Dkt. # 31 at 6. The Court’s order 27 is without prejudice to Defendant’s ability to raise a statute of limitations argument on a 1 motion for summary judgment. 3 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. Dkt. # 34. 4 5 DATED this 31st day of October, 2022. A 6

7 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 8 United States District Judge 9

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