FINAL COPY 309 Ga. 590
S20A0709. HODGES v. THE STATE.
MELTON, Chief Justice.
Following an August 22 to 29, 2016 jury trial, Victor Hodges
was found guilty of malice murder, robbery, and other offenses in
connection with the death of Julie Mae Simpson.1 On appeal, Hodges
contends only that the trial court employed an incorrect legal
standard when it denied his motion for new trial on the general
grounds. See OCGA §§ 5-5-202 and 5-5-21.3 We affirm.
1 On November 20, 2013, Hodges was indicted for malice murder, felony
murder predicated on robbery, robbery, and aggravated assault. At his August 2016 trial, Hodges was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive twenty-year term for robbery. Hodges was also sentenced to twenty years for aggravated assault, with that sentence to run concurrently with the sentence for robbery. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). On September 21, 2016, Hodges timely filed a motion for new trial. He amended the motion with new counsel on October 27, 2017. The trial court denied the motion on January 12, 2018. Hodges filed a timely notice of appeal on January 18, 2018, and his appeal was docketed to the April 2020 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 OCGA § 5-5-20 provides: “In any case when the verdict of a jury is found
contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity, the judge presiding may grant a new trial before another jury.” 3 OCGA § 5-5-21 provides: “The presiding judge may exercise a sound 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial reveals that, at around 9:00 p.m. on June
6, 2013, a male friend of Simpson’s named Deandra Walker visited
Simpson’s mobile home. About thirty minutes later, Hodges arrived.
Walker left after Hodges started acting aggressively and asking
Simpson if Walker was her “old man.” Concerned about Hodges’s
aggressive behavior, Walker called Simpson several times after he
left her mobile home. On one of these occasions, Hodges answered
the phone and told Walker not to call anymore.
Later that night, Hodges went to smoke crack cocaine with
Alton Smith in an abandoned trailer about half-a-mile from
Simpson’s mobile home. At that time, Hodges had two rings in his
possession that belonged to Simpson, and, sometime between 2:00
a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on June 7, he gave one of the rings to a man
named Ronnie Harris in exchange for more cocaine.4
discretion in granting or refusing new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding.” 4 That same month, Hodges gave the second ring to a woman named
Monica Trammell as collateral for a $40 loan. On the morning of June 7, Simpson’s sister, Rose, called
Simpson’s home phone and cell phone and did not get an answer.
Rose went to Simpson’s mobile home around 8:30 a.m. and knocked
on the door. When she received no response, she went inside. Rose
found Simpson partially naked in her bedroom, lying on the bed with
blood coming from the side of her head. Rose called 911, and the
police and paramedics responded to the scene.
Paramedics pronounced Simpson dead at her mobile home and
found that rigor mortis had already set into her body. Police
discovered blood on the bedroom floor, walls, and ceiling, and a cloth
on the bedroom floor that was covered with blood. They also noticed
blood in the bathroom sink indicating that someone may have tried
to clean up at the scene. Police also found a stereo speaker with a
broken edge that had a significant amount of blood and some hair
on it, and they found a broken piece from the speaker in Simpson’s
bed. Police collected two of Simpson’s broken fingernails from her
bed and later discovered that DNA under Simpson’s fingernails
matched Hodges’s DNA. Police also discovered a pair of men’s underwear in a hallway in the mobile home; the DNA recovered from
the underwear later matched Hodges’s DNA. Both Hodges’s and
Simpson’s DNA profiles were present in the blood recovered from
the bathroom sink. The medical examiner concluded that Simpson
suffered multiple blunt-force injuries to her head that might have
caused her to lose consciousness, but the ultimate cause of her death
was strangulation.
Hodges initially denied to police that the underwear at
Simpson’s trailer belonged to him and denied being at Simpson’s
mobile home on the night that she was killed. However, at trial
Hodges testified that he was at Simpson’s home on the night of her
death, that they were about to have sex but ultimately did not, and
that he left his underwear in Simpson’s trailer and took her two
rings before he left.
Although Hodges does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence in this case, consistent with our customary practice of
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in murder cases,5 we have
5 We remind litigants that the Court will end its practice of considering reviewed the record independently and have concluded that the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury
to find Hodges guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for
which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99
SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Hodges argues that, because the trial court’s order denying
his motion for new trial on the general grounds “fails to indicate
whether [the trial court] weighed the evidence presented at trial and
. . . fails to indicate whether the trial [court] exercised its discretion
to sit as a [‘]thirteenth juror[’] pursuant to OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-
21,” the trial court must have improperly reviewed the motion for
new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidence rather than under
the appropriate legal standard. See Holmes v. State, 306 Ga. 524,
528 (2) (832 SE2d 392) (2019) (holding that “when the record reflects
that the trial court reviewed the motion for new trial [on the general
sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the term of court that begins in December 2020. See Davenport v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (___ SE2d ___) (2020). The Court began assigning cases to the December Term on August 3, 2020. grounds] only for legal sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court has
failed to exercise [its] discretion” as the “thirteenth juror”). Hodges
is incorrect.
When a trial court exercises its discretion as the “thirteenth
juror,” it “need not explicitly speak of its discretion with respect to
the general grounds, and unless the record shows otherwise, we
must presume that the trial court understood the nature of its
discretion and exercised it.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Wilson v. State, 302 Ga.
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FINAL COPY 309 Ga. 590
S20A0709. HODGES v. THE STATE.
MELTON, Chief Justice.
Following an August 22 to 29, 2016 jury trial, Victor Hodges
was found guilty of malice murder, robbery, and other offenses in
connection with the death of Julie Mae Simpson.1 On appeal, Hodges
contends only that the trial court employed an incorrect legal
standard when it denied his motion for new trial on the general
grounds. See OCGA §§ 5-5-202 and 5-5-21.3 We affirm.
1 On November 20, 2013, Hodges was indicted for malice murder, felony
murder predicated on robbery, robbery, and aggravated assault. At his August 2016 trial, Hodges was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive twenty-year term for robbery. Hodges was also sentenced to twenty years for aggravated assault, with that sentence to run concurrently with the sentence for robbery. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). On September 21, 2016, Hodges timely filed a motion for new trial. He amended the motion with new counsel on October 27, 2017. The trial court denied the motion on January 12, 2018. Hodges filed a timely notice of appeal on January 18, 2018, and his appeal was docketed to the April 2020 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 OCGA § 5-5-20 provides: “In any case when the verdict of a jury is found
contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity, the judge presiding may grant a new trial before another jury.” 3 OCGA § 5-5-21 provides: “The presiding judge may exercise a sound 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial reveals that, at around 9:00 p.m. on June
6, 2013, a male friend of Simpson’s named Deandra Walker visited
Simpson’s mobile home. About thirty minutes later, Hodges arrived.
Walker left after Hodges started acting aggressively and asking
Simpson if Walker was her “old man.” Concerned about Hodges’s
aggressive behavior, Walker called Simpson several times after he
left her mobile home. On one of these occasions, Hodges answered
the phone and told Walker not to call anymore.
Later that night, Hodges went to smoke crack cocaine with
Alton Smith in an abandoned trailer about half-a-mile from
Simpson’s mobile home. At that time, Hodges had two rings in his
possession that belonged to Simpson, and, sometime between 2:00
a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on June 7, he gave one of the rings to a man
named Ronnie Harris in exchange for more cocaine.4
discretion in granting or refusing new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding.” 4 That same month, Hodges gave the second ring to a woman named
Monica Trammell as collateral for a $40 loan. On the morning of June 7, Simpson’s sister, Rose, called
Simpson’s home phone and cell phone and did not get an answer.
Rose went to Simpson’s mobile home around 8:30 a.m. and knocked
on the door. When she received no response, she went inside. Rose
found Simpson partially naked in her bedroom, lying on the bed with
blood coming from the side of her head. Rose called 911, and the
police and paramedics responded to the scene.
Paramedics pronounced Simpson dead at her mobile home and
found that rigor mortis had already set into her body. Police
discovered blood on the bedroom floor, walls, and ceiling, and a cloth
on the bedroom floor that was covered with blood. They also noticed
blood in the bathroom sink indicating that someone may have tried
to clean up at the scene. Police also found a stereo speaker with a
broken edge that had a significant amount of blood and some hair
on it, and they found a broken piece from the speaker in Simpson’s
bed. Police collected two of Simpson’s broken fingernails from her
bed and later discovered that DNA under Simpson’s fingernails
matched Hodges’s DNA. Police also discovered a pair of men’s underwear in a hallway in the mobile home; the DNA recovered from
the underwear later matched Hodges’s DNA. Both Hodges’s and
Simpson’s DNA profiles were present in the blood recovered from
the bathroom sink. The medical examiner concluded that Simpson
suffered multiple blunt-force injuries to her head that might have
caused her to lose consciousness, but the ultimate cause of her death
was strangulation.
Hodges initially denied to police that the underwear at
Simpson’s trailer belonged to him and denied being at Simpson’s
mobile home on the night that she was killed. However, at trial
Hodges testified that he was at Simpson’s home on the night of her
death, that they were about to have sex but ultimately did not, and
that he left his underwear in Simpson’s trailer and took her two
rings before he left.
Although Hodges does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence in this case, consistent with our customary practice of
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in murder cases,5 we have
5 We remind litigants that the Court will end its practice of considering reviewed the record independently and have concluded that the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury
to find Hodges guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for
which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99
SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Hodges argues that, because the trial court’s order denying
his motion for new trial on the general grounds “fails to indicate
whether [the trial court] weighed the evidence presented at trial and
. . . fails to indicate whether the trial [court] exercised its discretion
to sit as a [‘]thirteenth juror[’] pursuant to OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-
21,” the trial court must have improperly reviewed the motion for
new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidence rather than under
the appropriate legal standard. See Holmes v. State, 306 Ga. 524,
528 (2) (832 SE2d 392) (2019) (holding that “when the record reflects
that the trial court reviewed the motion for new trial [on the general
sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the term of court that begins in December 2020. See Davenport v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (___ SE2d ___) (2020). The Court began assigning cases to the December Term on August 3, 2020. grounds] only for legal sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court has
failed to exercise [its] discretion” as the “thirteenth juror”). Hodges
is incorrect.
When a trial court exercises its discretion as the “thirteenth
juror,” it “need not explicitly speak of its discretion with respect to
the general grounds, and unless the record shows otherwise, we
must presume that the trial court understood the nature of its
discretion and exercised it.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Wilson v. State, 302 Ga. 106, 108 (II) (a) (805 SE2d 98) (2017). See
also Holmes, supra, 306 Ga. at 528 (2) (“This Court presumes, in the
absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion [as the ‘thirteenth juror’] pursuant
to OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.”) (emphasis supplied). Here, the trial
court specifically stated in its order that it was denying Hodges’s
motion for new trial after “consideration of the pleadings, the
transcript of proceedings, and [the] applicable law.” “The court did
not state the incorrect standard in its order, and nothing in the
record indicates that the court was unaware of its responsibility.” (Citations omitted.) Allen v. State, 296 Ga. 738, 741 (2) (770 SE2d
625) (2015). Accordingly, Hodges’s contention is without merit. See
Price v. State, 305 Ga. 608, 613 (3) (825 SE2d 178) (2019).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED AUGUST 24, 2020.
Murder. Coffee Superior Court. Before Judge Brooks.
Conger & Smith, Gregory D. Smith, for appellant.
George E. Barnhill, District Attorney, John A. Rumker,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.