Hodges v. Pine Product Co.

68 S.E. 1107, 135 Ga. 134, 1910 Ga. LEXIS 446
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 23, 1910
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 68 S.E. 1107 (Hodges v. Pine Product Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hodges v. Pine Product Co., 68 S.E. 1107, 135 Ga. 134, 1910 Ga. LEXIS 446 (Ga. 1910).

Opinion

Holden, J.

The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for damages, making, among others, substantially the following allegations; Defendant is engaged in the business of extracting from wood, at its plant, “rosin, turpentine, creosote, etc., including all the poisonous gases and chemicals contained in pine wood.” From an artesian well the defendant pumps every day thousands of gallons of-water, which is discharged into a ditch used to convey the water into Cedar creek. “The said poisonous gases and chemicals extracted from the said wood contaminates the said artesian water as used and discharged from further service in said plant and let flow by said defendant into a ditch and over lands and on into Cedar creek.” Cedar creek runs through a described tract of land of 1,000 acres, more or less, owned by the plaintiff, and is “especially adapted for fishing and water for the stock of petitioner.” Prior to the eonduct of the defendant complained of, the plaintiff had fenced this tract of land. ' “Your petitioner is a sheep owner and stock raiser, and had this pasture especially prepared for his stock, consisting of sheep, cattle, hogs, goats, etc.; that their dependence for water was in said creek. Petitioner alleges and shows to the court that the said poisonous waters from defendant’s plant has already destroyed all the fish in said stream. That your petitioner has no way to water his said stock in said pasture, because the said waters in the said creek have been poisoned by the said defendant. . . Your petitioner shows to the court that the said contaminated poisonous waters kills vegetation and some trees.” “That the said tract of land has been further damaged by the said poisonous waters, in the opinion of this plaintiff, by the said waters killing some of the small growth and timber and grasses growing’ thereon,” and an offensive odor comes from the stream. Other allegations of the petition will be [136]*136hereinafter stated. To the order of the court sustaining the general and special demurrers of the defendant, and dismissing the petition, the plaintiff excepted.

1. While the petition was subject to some of the grounds of special demurrer, as will be hereinafter pointed out, we do not think it was subject-to general demurrer. The Civil Code, § 3879, provides: “The owner of land is entitled to the free and exclusive enjoyment of all watercourses, not navigable, flowing over his land ; and the diverting of the stream, . . or the adulterating thereof so as to interfere with, its value to him, is a trespass upon his property.” § 3057 provides; “Running water, while on land, belongs to the owner of it, but he has no power to divert it from the usual channel, nor can he so use or adulterate it as to interfere with the enjoyment of it by the next owner.” And § 3061 is as follows: “The owner of a stream not navigable is entitled to the same exclusive possession thereof as he has to any -other part of his land ; and the legislature has no power to compel or interfere with him in its lawful use, for the benefit of those above or below him on the stream, except to restrain nuisances.” A private nuisance gives a right of action to the person injured thereby, and the fact that the act may be otherwise lawful does not keep it from being a nuisance. See Civil Code, §§ 3858-3861. Any unlawful interference by one with the enjoyment by another of his private property gives a cause of action. Civil Code, § 3874. In 2 Farnham on Water and Water Rights, § 462, pp. 1565, 1566, it is said: “The right to have a natural watercourse continue its physical existence upon one’s property is as much property as is the right to have the hills or forests remain in place. . . Such flow and use belong to the land through which it passes, as an incident, convenience, or easement which inseparabfy connects itself therewith as a part thereof, and frequently gives or adds value thereto; and is a private property right in the proprietor thereof within the protection of the constitutional provision that private property shall be forever held inviolate, subject to the public welfare, and shall not be taken for public use without compensation being first made. .The propert}'', therefore, consists, not in the water itself, but in the added value which the stream gives to the land through which it flows. This is made up of the power which may be obtained from the flow of the stream, from the increased fertility of [137]*137the adjoining fields because of the presence of the water, and of the value of the water for, the uses to which it may be put. The right to the continued existence of these conditions is property, to protect which the owner may resort to' any or all of the instrumentalities which may be employed for the protection of private property rights.” According to the allegations of the petition, the defendant, in the operation of its plant, was continuously adulterating the waters of the stream passing through the land of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover whatever damages he sustained by reason thereof. Horton v. Fulton, 130 Ga. 466 (60 S. E. 1059); Satterfield v. Rowan, 83 Ga. 187 (9 S. E. 677); Price v. High Shoals Mfg. Co., 132 Ga. 246 (64 S. E. 87, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 684) ; Parker V. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591 (81 N. E. 468, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 584; Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner, 117 Tenn. 180 (100 S. W. 116, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 923, 10 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 581). There was an illegal invasion of the property .rights of the plaintiff, and he was entitled to recover nominal damages, if he sustained no special damages. Price v. High Shoals Mfg. Co., supra.

2. The pollution of a stream by one riparian owner so as to pollute the water as it passes through the land of a lower riparian owner gives a right of action to the latter. If no measure of .damages is furnished beyond the mere commission of the tort, nominal damages may be recovered. In the present case there is no allegation of diminution of market value of the land, or of its rental value. The only suggestion in that direction is an allegation that the plaintiff has been damaged in being deprived of the use of his pasture at least $100 a year. This is not a sufficient allegation as to rental value. The plaintiff relies upon items of special damages sought to 'be set up by him. One of these is comprised in allegations to the effect that the fish in the creek which passes through the plaintiff’s land down to its mouth at the river had been totally destroyed, and that the fish in the river had been practically destroyed; also that the plaintiff had been deprived of his fishing privileges in the creek passing through his land, which he had enjoyed all his life and which had been valuable to him, and that thereby he had been damaged the sum of $300. This allegation also states that the privilege was valuable to him, his family, and his settlement. Of course, the statements of value to his family 'and [138]*138Ins settlement are wholly irrelevant and furnish no ground for recovery. The allegation is also imperfect in not distinctly alleging the value of the fishing privilege owned by the plaintiff; but the demurrer does not rest on either of these last two points.- While, therefore, the allegation is imperfect, it amounts to a statement that the plaintiff owned a fishing privilege in the creek passing through his land, which had a pecuniary value; that this had been destroyed by the conduct of the defendant; and that the plaintiff had been damaged in the sum of $300.

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Bluebook (online)
68 S.E. 1107, 135 Ga. 134, 1910 Ga. LEXIS 446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hodges-v-pine-product-co-ga-1910.