Hodges v. Madison County Medical Center
This text of 929 So. 2d 381 (Hodges v. Madison County Medical Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Annie HODGES, Appellant
v.
MADISON COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
James C. Patton, Kosciusko, attorney for appellant.
James A. Becker, Robert H. Pedersen, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
Before KING, C.J., IRVING, CHANDLER and ISHEE, JJ.
*382 IRVING, J., for the Court.
¶ 1. Annie Hodges sued Madison County Medical Center (MCMC), alleging that she was injured by a "dangerous and hazardous condition" on the premises of MCMC. After discovery, the Madison County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to MCMC. Aggrieved, Hodges appeals and argues that the circuit court erred in finding that MCMC was immune from liability by virtue of Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-9(1)(v) (Rev.2002).
¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 3. On August 20, 2002, Hodges was visiting her niece at MCMC.[1] When Hodges entered her niece's room, the chair-bed in the room was fully extended into the bed position. Hodges sat on the end of the chair-bed, and it collapsed. Although Hodges's body did not hit the floor, she nevertheless went through the frame of the chair-bed, causing her to hit her back, shoulders, head, and elbow against the wall and causing her knees to fold up toward her chest. An examination of the chair-bed revealed that the mattress was supported by a shoestring instead of the metal spring that should have been in place to support the mattress.[2]
¶ 4. Joe Jenkins, MCMC's maintenance director, and Jasper Lott, his assistant, comprise the entire MCMC maintenance staff.[3] Jenkins testified that he and Lott perform necessary maintenance on the entire hospital, excluding the air conditioning system and medical equipment. According to both Jenkins and Lott, MCMC employs a maintenance system in which a nurse or other hospital employee completes a work order for any broken or damaged equipment that is discovered in the hospital. The maintenance department then repairs or replaces the equipment. If no work order is completed for a piece of equipment, then no repairs or preventive maintenance is performed. Essentially, MCMC's maintenance department's sole responsibility is to repair or replace broken or damaged equipment only after the department has been notified. The maintenance department does inspect equipment for possible defects or damage. Since no complaints or work orders had ever been received by MCMC's maintenance department in reference to the chair-beds, the chair-beds had never been inspected.
¶ 5. Jenkins admitted that no real annual inspections are done on the equipment that the hospital utilizes in its rooms. However, he testified that, since he had been maintenance director, MCMC had not had any kind of report about anyone being injured while sitting on the end of a chair-bed that was fully extended. Jenkins also testified that, since he had been maintenance director, he had not heard of any problems associated with the chair-bed. Jenkins further testified that MCMC does not stock shoestrings in its maintenance department, nor does MCMC's maintenance department use shoestrings to make repairs to chair-beds or any other equipment.
*383 STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6. "The Mississippi Legislature has determined that governmental entities and their employees shall be exempted from liability in certain situations as outlined in Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-9." Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 846 So.2d 1028, 1029(¶ 8) (Miss.2003). "This exemption, like that of qualified or absolute immunity, is an entitlement not to stand trial rather than a mere defense to liability and, therefore, should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation." Id. (citations omitted). "Therefore, immunity is a question of law and is a proper matter for summary judgment under [Rule 56] of Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we examine the trial court's decision de novo. Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., Inc., 891 So.2d 224, 228(¶ 11) (Miss.2005) (citations omitted). In conducting our review, we look at "all evidentiary matters in the record, including admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc." Id. We view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made." Id. "If any triable issues of fact exist, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed; otherwise, the decision is affirmed." Id.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
¶ 7. The sole issue of this appeal is whether the trial judge correctly granted summary judgment in favor of MCMC. In granting summary judgment, the trial judge held that MCMC was exempt from liability under the Mississippi Torts Claim Act, which states in pertinent part:
A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim . . . [a]rising out of an injury caused by a dangerous condition on property of the governmental entity that was not caused by the negligent or other wrongful conduct of an employee of the governmental entity or of which the governmental entity did not have notice, either actual or constructive, and adequate opportunity to protect or warn against; provided, however, that a governmental entity shall not be liable for the failure to warn of a dangerous condition which is obvious to one exercising due care[.]
Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(v) (Rev. 2002).
¶ 8. Hodges contends that she was an invitee, and, as such, MCMC owed her a duty of reasonable care. She maintains that this duty of reasonable care extends to reasonable inspection of the premises to discover any obvious or latent defects, as well as making repairs reasonably necessary to ensure her safety and protection. Hodges argues that she is not required to prove that MCMC was aware of the dangerous and hidden condition of the chair-bed, but "must only produce enough evidence to suggest that the latent defect in the chair-bed was a hidden, dangerous condition, in the nature of a trap, and that in the exercise of reasonable care, MCMC ought to have ascertained its existence and anticipated that someone might be injured by it." Hodges further argues that MCMC could have discovered or, at least, would have had constructive knowledge of the condition of the chair-bed had its maintenance employees conducted a reasonable inspection of the premises and the equipment utilized at the hospital. Therefore, Hodges maintains that MCMC should not have been granted immunity under section 11-46-9(1)(v).
¶ 9. MCMC argues that, under section 11-46-9(1)(v), it is liable for Hodges's injuries *384 only if she is able to show one of the following: (1) that an employee of MCMC caused the dangerous condition or (2) that MCMC had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and had an opportunity to protect or warn Hodges. MCMC contends that there is no evidence that an employee of MCMC placed the shoestring on the chair-bed. MCMC also contends that there is no evidence that MCMC had actual or constructive notice that a shoestring was used to connect the mesh to the frame of the chair-bed, or that if MCMC had such notice, it acquired that notice early enough to protect or warn Hodges.
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929 So. 2d 381, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 391, 2006 WL 1320579, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hodges-v-madison-county-medical-center-missctapp-2006.