HAWTHORNE, Justice.
J. A. Hodges as owner of the SWJ4 of NEJ4 of Section 9, Township 6 South, Range 9 West, Beauregard Parish, Louisiana, joined by his mineral lessees and certain royalty owners who derive their royalty interests under the lease, brought this suit for a declaratory judgment1 decreeing Hodges to be the owner of all the minerals in the land, subject to the leasehold right of his lessees and the mineral royalty interests of the other plaintiffs. Named as defendants are Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc., and its mineral lessee, Sun Oil Company. After trial on the merits there was judgment rejecting plaintiffs’ demands and dismissing their suit, and decreeing Long-Bell Petroleum Company to be the owner of all the oil, gas, and other minerals in, on, and under the property, subject to its lease to Sun Oil Company. From this judgment plaintiffs have appealed.
The facts pertinent to the decision of this case are not in dispute. On December 29, 1931, Long-Bell Lumber Sales Corporation as fee owner conveyed to Long-Bell Minerals Corporation all the oil, gas, and other minerals under a tract of land in Beauregard Parish containing more than 100,000 acres. In 1936 Long-Bell Minerals Corporation was merged with Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc., defendant in the instant suit. By the 1931 conveyance there came into existence a mineral servitude affecting the entire tract described, in which was included the 40-acre tract now owned by plaintiff Hodges. We shall hereafter refer to this servitude as the “1931 servitude”. On February 28, 1938, Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc., owner of the 1931 servitude, and Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation, which had acquired the land of Lumber Sales Corporation, sold to plaintiff J. A. Hodges by warranty deed the 40-acre tract described above, and [206]*206Hodges went into possession of the property. There was no drilling or production on the Hodges tract by defendants or their authors in title. In 1939 the California Company as mineral lessee of the Petroleum Company, the Farm Land Corporation, and the Lumber Company drilled two wells on lands embraced within the 1931 servitude and contiguous to the 40 acres acquired by Hodges. No production resulted, but these wells were drilled in good faith and to a depth at which there was a reasonable hope of discovering minerals in commercial quantities. In 1946 the Petroleum Company leased to Barnsdall Oil Company lands likewise embraced in the 1931 servitude, and under this lease Barnsdall drilled on lands contiguous to the Hodges tract two wells which were completed as producers in December, 1946, and February, 1947. The land of the plaintiff was not covered by either of these leases.
The deed to plaintiff J. A. Hodges dated February 28, 1938, in which Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc., and Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation are designated as vendors, reads as follows:
“Know All Men By These Presents, That the Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Missouri, and The Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc., organized under the laws of the State of Louisiana, hereinafter called the vendors, for the consideration hereinafter recited, and on the terms and conditions hereinafter expressed by these presents, do hereby Grant, Bargain, Sell, Convey, Assign, Set Over and Deliver to J. A. Hodges, (husband of Irene Sellers) of Ragley, Louisiana, hereinafter called the vendee, the following described property situated in the Parish of Beauregard, State of Louisiana, to-wit:
“The Southwest quarter of Norths east quarter (SWJ4 NE(4) of Section Nine (9), Township Six (6) South, Range Nine (9) West, containing 40 acres, more or less.
“This conveyance is made expressly subject to existing public roads over any part of the above described premises.
“There is hereby expressly reserved unto the Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation, its successors and assigns, all of the timber now standing upon the above described land with the right to remove same at any time within one (1) year from February 23, 1948, together with all rights of ingress and all other rights necessary or convenient for the removal of said timber.
“There is hereby expressly reserved unto The Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc., its successors and assigns, all of the oil, gas and minerals beneath the surface of the land above [208]*208described, with full and exclusive right and authority to exercise all reasonably necessary means for the prospecting, exploring and developing of such oil, gas and other minerals, including such right of access to the use of the surface of said lands as may be necessary or incidental to this reservation; provided, however, that the vendee, or his heirs or assigns shall not be required to remove any buildings or other improvements placed or made upon said lands, and provided further that in the exercise of said reservation reasonable compensation shall be made for damages caused to said lands and improvements and growing crops thereon, and reasonable rentals shall be paid for such of said lands, if any, as may be used exclusively for such purposes.
Hi * * H? Hf *
“To Have And To Hold the said property and appurtenances subject to the reservations, exceptions and conditions aforesaid, unto the said vendee, his heirs and assigns, forever; and the said Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation hereby binds itself, its successors and assigns to Warrant and Forever Defend the property and appurtenances herein conveyed against all legal claims and demands whatsoever, except those herein expressly reserved and excepted, as to taxes not now due and unpayable.
“The said vendors moreover transfer unto the said vendee all the rights and actions of warranty to which they are or may be entitled against all former owners of the property herein conveyed, hereby subrogating the said vendee to the said rights and actions to be by him enjoyed and exercised in the same manner as they might have been by the vendors.
“This conveyance is made for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Twenty and No/100 Dollars ($120.00) cash paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.
“In Testimony Whereof, the Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation and The Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc., have caused this instrument to be executed by their proper officers and their corporate seals to be hereunto affixed, respectively, on this the 28th day of February A.D. 1938.
“Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation
“Attest: “By: R. T. Demsey,
“W. A. Barker Vice-President
“Assistant Secretary
“(seal)
“Witnesses: L. L. Swafford
“Geo. W. Winskip
“The Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc.
“Attest: “By: R. T. Demsey,
“W. A. Barker Vice-President
“Assistant Secretary
“Witnesses: L. L. Swafford
“Geo. Winskip’*
[210]*210More than 10 years after the date of the execution of this instrument the vendee, J. A. Hodges, plaintiff, wrote to the Petroleum Company requesting a release of the mineral rights affecting the land described in the deed. In reply the Petroleum Company informed plaintiff that it was still the owner of the mineral rights by virtue of the 1931 servitude, and that this servitude was still in full force and effect because of the good faith drilling of the wells in 1939 and the drilling and production of oil in 1946 on lands contiguous to that of Hodges.2 Hodges then filed this suit.
In his petition plaintiff specifically pleads estoppel, alleging that the defendant Petroleum Company as well as the Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation is estopped by the warranty and other provisions in the deed from claiming under the 1931 servitude any mineral rights in the land sold to him. In the alternative, in the event the court should overrule the plea of estoppel, plaintiff contends that by the execution of the 1938 deed by the landowner and the mineral owner there resulted a division or reduction of the 1931 servitude so that any subsequent drilling operations which were not conducted on the 40 acres described in the deed did not interrupt the liberative prescription accruing in favor of his tract. Still further in. the alternative plaintiff contends that by the execution of the leases to the California Company in 1939 by the landowner and the mineral owner as lessors, which did not include this tract, there likewise resulted a division or reduction of the 1931 servitude so that drilling operations of the lessee did not constitute an interruption of the liberative prescription as to the Hodges tract.
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Petroleum Company is the owner of the mineral rights under the land involved by virtue of the 1931 servitude which is still in existence because the drilling operations and production on contiguous lands were an exercise of this mineral servitude.
The reservation of the minerals contained in the deed to Hodges and the other provisions of the deed are similar if not identical to those in deeds considered by this court in several other cases involving Long-Bell Petroleum Company,3 but the legal issue of estoppel by deed raised in the instant case was not presented to or decided by this court in those other cases.
In the Hodges deed one of the vendors, Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation, expressly warranted title to the property and [212]*212bound itself under this warranty to defend the property against all claims or demands except those therein expressly reserved or 'excepted. Moreover, both the Farm Land Corporation and the Petroleum Company in this deed transferred to Hodges all rights and actions of warranty.
Article 1764 of the Civil Code provides:
“All things that are not forbidden by law, may legally become the subject of, or the motive for contracts; but different agreements are governed by different rules, adapted to the nature of each contract, to distinguish which it is necessary in every contract to consider :
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“2. Things which, although not essential to the contract, yet are implied from the nature of such agreement, if no stipulation be made respecting them, but which the parties may expressly modify or renounce, without destroying the contract or changing its description; of this nature is warranty, which is implied in every sale, but which may he modified or renounced, without changing the character of the contract •or destroying its effect. * * * ” •(Italics ours.)
Article 2501 reads:
“Although at the time of the sale no ■stipulations have been made respecting the warranty, the seller is obliged, of course, to warrant the buyer against the eviction suffered by him from the totality or part of the thing sold, and against the charges claimed on such thing, which were not declared at the time of the sale.” (Italics ours.)
Thus even if we concede that there was no express warranty by the Petroleum Company, its obligation of warranty existed under the provisions of these two articles of the Code.
As correctly stated by counsel for appellants in brief, “ * * * although there were two vendors in the 1938 deed, the obligation of warranty is indivisible, and where more than one vendor joins in a deed each, and every vendor is bound as warrantor of the entire title. Schultz v. Ryan, 131 La. 78, 59 So. 21; Soule v. West, 185 La. 655, 170 So. 26, and Robinson v. Dunson [La.App.], 65 So.2d 643”.
At the time of the sale to Hodges in 1938, the 1931 servitude was'in existence, but no mention of this servitude was made in the deed. However, the landowner and the owner of the servitude, the Petrolum Company, were named as vendors in the deed, and under the express provisions of Article 2501 they, and each of them, warranted Hodges against any charges that might be claimed against the land sold which were not declared at the time of the sale. The next question for our decision is whether the 1931 servitude was a charge against the land sold to Hodges.
[214]*214As previously stated, the 1931 servitude came into existence by the sale of the mineral rights by Long-Bell Lumber Sales Company to Long-Bell Minerals Corporation in 1931. Under the law of this state oil and gas in place are not subject to absolute ownership as specific things apart from the soil of which they form a part; or, as has been stated, there can be no mineral estate in oil and gas as such. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing’s Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207; Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43 So.2d 782, and authorities there cited. A sale or reservation of minerals is a sale or reservation of & real right or a servitude, and carries with it the grant or retention of the right to go on the land for exploration for or exploitation of the minerals. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846; Deas v. Lane, 202 La. 933, 13 So.2d 270; Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, supra; Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So.2d 73. Moreover, a mineral servitude is a real right or charge imposed on the land. Patton v. Frost Lumber Industries, 176 La. 916, 147 So. 33. See La. Civ.Code Art. 647.
When Hodges acquired the property in 1938, the land was burdened with a charge, the 1931 mineral servitude. This mineral servitude was owned by one of the vendors named in the deed, the Petroleum Company, which in this suit is asserting rights under ' this servitude although no mention of it was made in the deed.
The only conclusion we can reach is that by the 1938 deed to Hodges, Hodges was warranted by the Petroleum Company against the 1931 servitude, a preexisting charge, and that consequently the Petroleum Company, named as a vendor in that deed, is estopped to assert as against Hodges any claim or rights under that servitude.
Counsel for the appellees argue that the plea of estoppel is not well founded in this case for several reasons. One of their contentions is that Hodges did not acquire the minerals by the 1938 deed, and that consequently there was no warranty of title to these minerals since under the provisions of Article 2501 of the Code the seller warrants title only with respect to eviction and charges against the thing sold, and that there can be no estoppel in the absence of warranty. Counsel are entirely correct when they state that the mineral rights were not conveyed to Hodges in the 1938 deed. However, the land was, and, as pointed out above, the vendors warranted him against any preexisting charge against the land, and the 1931 servitude was such a charge.
Further in support of their argument that the plea of estoppel is not well founded, appellees rely on Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43 So.2d 782. In that
[216]*216case the court was considering deeds executed in November, 1941, similar to the deed here involved, which contained a mineral reservation in language identical to that of the reservation in the Hodges deed, and in which the Petroleum Company and the Farm Land Corporation were named as vendors. Appellees say that the court held in the Tritico case that there was no warranty of title to the mineral rights because they were not conveyed, and that the Petroleum Company did not appear in the deeds as vendor. Although there is language in that case that apparently supports appellees’ view, we cannot agree that the holding of the court was what they say it was.
In the Tritico case the Petroleum Company was claiming that the mineral reservation in the deeds of November, 1941, created a new servitude. The holding of this court in that case was that this mineral reservation to the Petroleum Company was legally ineffective and did not create a new servitude (1) because the landowner, Farm Land Corporation, was not the owner of the minerals when the deeds were executed —the mineral rights had been conveyed to the Petroleum Company in December, 1931, and this 1931 servitude was still in full force and effect since 10 years had not elapsed from the date of the 1931 deed—and (2) because the Petroleum Company did not clearly express its intention to renounce the 1931 servitude. What the court was called upon to decide in the Tritico case was whether the mineral reservation in the 1941 deeds created a new servitude, and that is the question it did decide.
It is true that in that case the court stated that the title to the mineral rights was never conveyed by the 1941 deeds to the vendees, and this statement is correct. In the instant case likewise we concede, as stated above, that the mineral rights were not conveyed to the vendee; but this is immaterial to our decision of the instant case because the warranty which is the basis of estoppel is the warranty of title to the land, and not of title to the mineral rights.
It is interesting to note that in the case of Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger, 222 La. 670, 63 So.2d 420, the court again had occasion to consider a mineral reservation identical to that in the deed involved in this case and also to that in the deeds in the Tritico case, the reservation there being in 1943 deeds in which the Farm Land Corporation and the Petroleum Company joined in the execution of warranty deeds to the defendants’ authors in title. In the Granger case the mineral reservation in favor of the Petroleum Company was found to be legally effective because at that time (1943) the vendor, Farm Land Corporation, was the owner of the minerals, more than 10 years having expired since the creation of a 1931 servitude.4 In other words, in the [218]*218Tritico case the Petroleum Company’s contention that a new servitude was created in the 1941 deeds was rejected, whereas in the Granger case the same contention was upheld for the reason given above. There can be no doubt, however, that in all of these deeds it was the intention of the vendors to create a new servitude.
In the deed in the instant case both the Petroleum Company and the Farm Land Corporation are specifically named as vendors, and they executed the deed as such. They solemnly stated in the instrument that they were vendors and as such conveyed the land to Hodges. Certainly as between them and Plodges they can be considered in no other light than as vendors of the land. In Gaines v. Crichton, 187 La. 345, 174 So. 666, 667, this court said:
“Estoppel by warranty is an estoppel based on the principle of giving effect to the manifest intention of the grantor, and of preventing the grantor from derogating or destroying his own grant by any subsequent act. It is a species of estoppel by deed. The party to the deed and his privies are estopped from den Ing the truth of any material fact asserted in the deed. Lewis v. King, 157 La. 718, 103 So. 19.
“Where a party solemnly admits a fact by deed, he is estopped from not only disputing the deed itself, but also every fact which the deed recites. Karcher v. Karcher, 138 La. 288, 70 So. 228; Reliance Homestead Ass’n v. Brink, 173 La. 331, 137 So. 52.”
In the deed in the instant case both the Farm Land Corporation and the Petroleum Company stated as a fact that they were vendors of the land, and they are now es-topped from disputing this fact.
For the reasons assigned the judgment appealed from is annulled, reversed, and set aside. It is now ordered that plaintiffs’ plea of estoppel be sustained, and that the defendant Long-Bell Petroleum Company, Inc., and its mineral lessee, defendant Sun Oil Company, be estopped from claiming under the 1931 servitude any mineral rights in, on, and under the property described in plaintiffs’ petition. Defendants-appellees are to pay all costs.