1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Najib A Hodge, No. CV-24-00932-PHX-KML
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Najib A. Hodge worked for defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as an 16 associate banker before being terminated. (Doc. 7 at 4–5.) Defendant Isabel Islas was an 17 assistant manager at the branch where Hodge worked. (Doc. 7 at 4.) Hodge filed this suit 18 against JPMorgan and Islas1 alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 19 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Doc. 7 at 3.) 20 Because Hodge obtained leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court reviewed his 21 complaint and determined that Hodge had stated claims for race discrimination and 22 retaliation under Title VII. (Doc. 7 at 8.) The court also determined Hodge had not stated 23 an ADEA claim and dismissed it without prejudice. (Doc. 7 at 8.) 24 JPMorgan and Islas (“defendants”) move to dismiss all claims against Islas and the 25 ADEA claim against JPMorgan. (Doc. 23.) Their motion argues the court lacks subject 26 matter jurisdiction because Hodge “improperly identifie[d]” the court’s “basis for 27 1 Hodge also named Francisco Giutierrez (a JPMorgan branch manager) and “All 28 Employees Under Chase Bank Branch” as defendants. (Doc. 5 at 2.) These defendants were terminated for lack of service. (Doc. 19.) 1 jurisdiction.” (Doc. 23 at 4.) The motion also argues Hodge cannot state a Title VII claim 2 against Islas because individuals are not liable under Title VII. (Doc. 23 at 5.) And finally, 3 the motion argues Hodge’s ADEA claim should be dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 23 at 4 5–7) after previously having been dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 7 at 8.) 5 Hodge filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and his own motion seeking to 6 dismiss Islas. (Docs. 39, 40.) He separately filed a motion for partial summary judgment 7 and a “motion to preserve evidence.” (Docs. 41, 42.) The court will address the motions to 8 dismiss. 9 I. Dismissal of Islas 10 Defendants argue all claims against Islas should be dismissed because she cannot 11 be held personally liable under Title VII. (Doc. 23 at 5.) Hodge has stated he no longer 12 wishes to pursue claims against Islas. (Doc. 40.) Islas is therefore dismissed and 13 JPMorgan’s argument that Hodge’s claims against Islas must be dismissed under Fed. R. 14 Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is now moot. 15 II. Dismissal of Claims Based on Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 16 Defendants seek dismissal of some of Hodge’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) alleging 17 the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. (Doc. 23 at 1.) Hodge 18 identified multiple bases for federal jurisdiction in his complaint: Title VII, ADEA, “Title 19 14 of the Civil Rights Code,” “42 USC SEC 1983,” and “Sec 503(a) of the ADA.” (Doc. 5 20 at 3.) Defendants do not contest federal jurisdiction over Hodge’s Title VII claims. (See 21 Docs. 22 at 3, 44 at 2.) But they argue the other statutes give the court “no basis for 22 jurisdiction,” subjecting those claims to dismissal. (Doc. 44 at 2.) The court has already 23 established only Hodge’s Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims may proceed, 24 so this argument is moot. (Doc. 7 at 7.) To the extent Hodge attempted to assert claims 25 under other statutes, those claims are dismissed. 26 III. ADEA Claim 27 Defendants concede the court previously dismissed Hodge’s ADEA claim but argue 28 the court should now dismiss the claim “with prejudice.” (Doc. 44 at 3.) According to 1 defendants, Hodge did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the ADEA claim 2 and even if he had, he could not allege a viable claim because the operative complaint 3 indicates “the basis of Plaintiff’s dispute is alleged discrimination unrelated to his age” 4 rather than his race. (Doc. 44 at 4.) Defendants do not identify authority supporting the 5 request to revisit the terms on which the ADEA claim was dismissed. Moreover, 6 defendants’ apparent belief that a complaint cannot allege alternative theories of recovery 7 is incorrect. See Anderson v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 990 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 8 2021) (“[A] plaintiff can pursue multiple, even if inconsistent, theories of recovery in the 9 same suit[.]”). 10 The ADEA claim was dismissed without prejudice because Hodge’s complaint did 11 not contain sufficient factual allegations supporting it. (Doc. 7 at 8.) Hodge has not 12 indicated that he is interested in renewing an ADEA claim. Defendants’ motion to change 13 the dismissal to one with prejudice is a request for reconsideration, but defendants have not 14 established a need for reconsideration. Defendants’ request for reconsideration is therefore 15 denied. 16 IV. Conclusion 17 Hodge’s Title VII claims against JPMorgan for racial discrimination and retaliation 18 remain. (Doc. 7 at 6–7.) JPMorgan has filed its answer regarding those claims (Doc. 22), 19 so the court will call for a case management report and set a case management conference. 20 Accordingly, 21 IT IS ORDERED plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Islas (Doc. 40) is GRANTED. 22 Defendant Islas is DISMISSED. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 23) is 24 DENIED AS MOOT. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a scheduling conference is set for November 7, 26 2024, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 503, Sandra Day O’Connor United States Courthouse, 27 401 W. Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003. 28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as follows: 1 The parties are directed to meet, confer, and develop a Rule 26(f) Joint Case 2 Management Report, which must be filed within 4 weeks of the date of this order. It is 3 the responsibility of plaintiff(s) to initiate the Rule 26(f) meeting and prepare the Joint Case 4 Management Report. Defendant(s) shall promptly and cooperatively participate in the Rule 5 26(f) meeting and assist in preparation of the Joint Case Management Report. 6 The Joint Case Management Report shall contain the following information in 7 separately-numbered paragraphs. 8 1. The parties who attended the Rule 26(f) meeting and assisted in developing 9 the Joint Case Management Report; 10 2. A list of all parties in the case, including any parent corporations or entities 11 (for recusal purposes); 12 3. Any parties that have not been served and an explanation of why they have 13 not been served, and any parties that have been served but have not answered 14 or otherwise appeared; 15 4. A statement of whether any party expects to add additional parties to the case 16 or otherwise amend pleadings; 17 5. The names of any parties not subject to the Court’s personal (or in rem) 18 jurisdiction; 19 6. A description of the basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, citing 20 specific jurisdictional statutes. If jurisdiction is based on diversity of 21 citizenship, the report shall include a statement of the citizenship of every 22 party and a description of the amount in dispute. See 28 U.S.C. §1332; 23 7. A short statement of the nature of the case (no more than three pages), 24 including a description of each claim, defense, and affirmative defense; 25 8. A listing of contemplated motions and a statement of the issues to be decided 26 by those motions; 27 9. Whether the case is suitable for reassignment to a United States Magistrate 28 Judge for all purposes or suitable for referral to a United States Magistrate 1 Judge for a settlement conference; 2 10. The status of any related cases pending before this or other courts; 3 11.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Najib A Hodge, No. CV-24-00932-PHX-KML
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Najib A. Hodge worked for defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as an 16 associate banker before being terminated. (Doc. 7 at 4–5.) Defendant Isabel Islas was an 17 assistant manager at the branch where Hodge worked. (Doc. 7 at 4.) Hodge filed this suit 18 against JPMorgan and Islas1 alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 19 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Doc. 7 at 3.) 20 Because Hodge obtained leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court reviewed his 21 complaint and determined that Hodge had stated claims for race discrimination and 22 retaliation under Title VII. (Doc. 7 at 8.) The court also determined Hodge had not stated 23 an ADEA claim and dismissed it without prejudice. (Doc. 7 at 8.) 24 JPMorgan and Islas (“defendants”) move to dismiss all claims against Islas and the 25 ADEA claim against JPMorgan. (Doc. 23.) Their motion argues the court lacks subject 26 matter jurisdiction because Hodge “improperly identifie[d]” the court’s “basis for 27 1 Hodge also named Francisco Giutierrez (a JPMorgan branch manager) and “All 28 Employees Under Chase Bank Branch” as defendants. (Doc. 5 at 2.) These defendants were terminated for lack of service. (Doc. 19.) 1 jurisdiction.” (Doc. 23 at 4.) The motion also argues Hodge cannot state a Title VII claim 2 against Islas because individuals are not liable under Title VII. (Doc. 23 at 5.) And finally, 3 the motion argues Hodge’s ADEA claim should be dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 23 at 4 5–7) after previously having been dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 7 at 8.) 5 Hodge filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and his own motion seeking to 6 dismiss Islas. (Docs. 39, 40.) He separately filed a motion for partial summary judgment 7 and a “motion to preserve evidence.” (Docs. 41, 42.) The court will address the motions to 8 dismiss. 9 I. Dismissal of Islas 10 Defendants argue all claims against Islas should be dismissed because she cannot 11 be held personally liable under Title VII. (Doc. 23 at 5.) Hodge has stated he no longer 12 wishes to pursue claims against Islas. (Doc. 40.) Islas is therefore dismissed and 13 JPMorgan’s argument that Hodge’s claims against Islas must be dismissed under Fed. R. 14 Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is now moot. 15 II. Dismissal of Claims Based on Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 16 Defendants seek dismissal of some of Hodge’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) alleging 17 the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. (Doc. 23 at 1.) Hodge 18 identified multiple bases for federal jurisdiction in his complaint: Title VII, ADEA, “Title 19 14 of the Civil Rights Code,” “42 USC SEC 1983,” and “Sec 503(a) of the ADA.” (Doc. 5 20 at 3.) Defendants do not contest federal jurisdiction over Hodge’s Title VII claims. (See 21 Docs. 22 at 3, 44 at 2.) But they argue the other statutes give the court “no basis for 22 jurisdiction,” subjecting those claims to dismissal. (Doc. 44 at 2.) The court has already 23 established only Hodge’s Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims may proceed, 24 so this argument is moot. (Doc. 7 at 7.) To the extent Hodge attempted to assert claims 25 under other statutes, those claims are dismissed. 26 III. ADEA Claim 27 Defendants concede the court previously dismissed Hodge’s ADEA claim but argue 28 the court should now dismiss the claim “with prejudice.” (Doc. 44 at 3.) According to 1 defendants, Hodge did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the ADEA claim 2 and even if he had, he could not allege a viable claim because the operative complaint 3 indicates “the basis of Plaintiff’s dispute is alleged discrimination unrelated to his age” 4 rather than his race. (Doc. 44 at 4.) Defendants do not identify authority supporting the 5 request to revisit the terms on which the ADEA claim was dismissed. Moreover, 6 defendants’ apparent belief that a complaint cannot allege alternative theories of recovery 7 is incorrect. See Anderson v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 990 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 8 2021) (“[A] plaintiff can pursue multiple, even if inconsistent, theories of recovery in the 9 same suit[.]”). 10 The ADEA claim was dismissed without prejudice because Hodge’s complaint did 11 not contain sufficient factual allegations supporting it. (Doc. 7 at 8.) Hodge has not 12 indicated that he is interested in renewing an ADEA claim. Defendants’ motion to change 13 the dismissal to one with prejudice is a request for reconsideration, but defendants have not 14 established a need for reconsideration. Defendants’ request for reconsideration is therefore 15 denied. 16 IV. Conclusion 17 Hodge’s Title VII claims against JPMorgan for racial discrimination and retaliation 18 remain. (Doc. 7 at 6–7.) JPMorgan has filed its answer regarding those claims (Doc. 22), 19 so the court will call for a case management report and set a case management conference. 20 Accordingly, 21 IT IS ORDERED plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Islas (Doc. 40) is GRANTED. 22 Defendant Islas is DISMISSED. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 23) is 24 DENIED AS MOOT. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a scheduling conference is set for November 7, 26 2024, at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 503, Sandra Day O’Connor United States Courthouse, 27 401 W. Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003. 28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as follows: 1 The parties are directed to meet, confer, and develop a Rule 26(f) Joint Case 2 Management Report, which must be filed within 4 weeks of the date of this order. It is 3 the responsibility of plaintiff(s) to initiate the Rule 26(f) meeting and prepare the Joint Case 4 Management Report. Defendant(s) shall promptly and cooperatively participate in the Rule 5 26(f) meeting and assist in preparation of the Joint Case Management Report. 6 The Joint Case Management Report shall contain the following information in 7 separately-numbered paragraphs. 8 1. The parties who attended the Rule 26(f) meeting and assisted in developing 9 the Joint Case Management Report; 10 2. A list of all parties in the case, including any parent corporations or entities 11 (for recusal purposes); 12 3. Any parties that have not been served and an explanation of why they have 13 not been served, and any parties that have been served but have not answered 14 or otherwise appeared; 15 4. A statement of whether any party expects to add additional parties to the case 16 or otherwise amend pleadings; 17 5. The names of any parties not subject to the Court’s personal (or in rem) 18 jurisdiction; 19 6. A description of the basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, citing 20 specific jurisdictional statutes. If jurisdiction is based on diversity of 21 citizenship, the report shall include a statement of the citizenship of every 22 party and a description of the amount in dispute. See 28 U.S.C. §1332; 23 7. A short statement of the nature of the case (no more than three pages), 24 including a description of each claim, defense, and affirmative defense; 25 8. A listing of contemplated motions and a statement of the issues to be decided 26 by those motions; 27 9. Whether the case is suitable for reassignment to a United States Magistrate 28 Judge for all purposes or suitable for referral to a United States Magistrate 1 Judge for a settlement conference; 2 10. The status of any related cases pending before this or other courts; 3 11. A discussion of any issues relating to preservation, disclosure, or discovery 4 of electronically stored information (“ESI”), including the parties’ 5 preservation of ESI and the form or forms in which it will be produced; 6 12. A discussion of any issues relating to claims of privilege or work product; 7 13. A discussion of necessary discovery, which should take into account the 8 December 1, 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) and should include: 9 a. The extent, nature, and location of discovery anticipated by the parties 10 and why it is proportional to the needs of the case; 11 b. Suggested changes, if any, to the discovery limitations imposed by the 12 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 13 c. The number of hours permitted for each deposition. The parties also 14 should consider whether a total number of deposition hours should be 15 set in the case, such as twenty total hours for plaintiffs and twenty 16 total hours for defendants. Such overall time limits have the advantage 17 of providing an incentive for each side to be as efficient as possible in 18 each deposition, while also allowing parties to allocate time among 19 witnesses depending on the importance and complexity of subjects to 20 be covered with the witnesses; 21 14. Proposed deadlines for each of the following events. In proposing deadlines, 22 the parties should keep in mind the Case Management Order will contain 23 deadlines to govern this case and once the dates have been set the Court will 24 vary them only upon a showing of good cause. A request by counsel for 25 extension of discovery deadlines in any case that has been pending more than 26 two years must be accompanied by a certification stating the client is aware 27 of and approves of the requested extension. The Court does not consider 28 settlement talks or the scheduling of mediations to constitute good cause for 1 an extension. The parties must propose the following: 2 a. A deadline for the completion of fact discovery, which will also be 3 the deadline for pretrial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3). This 4 deadline is the date by which all fact discovery must be completed. 5 Discovery requests must be served and depositions noticed 6 sufficiently in advance of this date to ensure reasonable completion 7 by the deadline, including time to resolve discovery disputes. Absent 8 extraordinary circumstances, the Court will not entertain discovery 9 disputes after this deadline; 10 b. Dates for full and complete expert disclosures and rebuttal expert 11 disclosures, if any; 12 c. A deadline for completion of all expert depositions; 13 d. A date by which any Rule 35 physical or mental examination will be 14 noticed if such an examination is required by any issues in the case; 15 e. A deadline for filing dispositive motions; 16 f. Case-specific deadlines and dates, such as the deadline to file a motion 17 for class certification or a date on which the parties are available for a 18 Markman (patent claim construction) hearing; 19 g. A date by which the parties shall have engaged in face-to-face good 20 faith settlement talks; 21 h. Whether a jury trial has been requested and whether the request for a 22 jury trial is contested, setting for the reasons if the request is contested; 23 i. Any other matters that will aid the Court and parties in resolving this 24 case in a just, speedy, and inexpensive manner as required by Federal 25 Rule of Civil Procedure 1; 26 15. A statement indicating whether the parties would prefer that the Court hold 27 a case management conference before issuing a scheduling order—and, if so, 28 an explanation of why the conference would be helpful. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the parties shall file a proposed Case Management 2|| Order containing all the proposed dates at the same time they file the Rule 26(f) Case || Management Report. The proposed Case Management Order must also be emailed in Word 4|| format to Lanham_chambers @azd.uscourts.gov. 5 Dated this 2nd day of October, 2024. 6 7 ‘ y/ @L f g LY ALG TV WAAL Honorable Krissa M. Lanham 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
-7-