Hodge v. Allenbaugh

2025 V.I. 21

Opinions

Opinion

For Publication

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

SHANE I.M. HODGE ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2023-0012 Appellant/Plaintiff, ) Re: Super. Ct. SX-2014-CS-00035 (STX)

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¥ )

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CRISTA R. ALLENBAUGH )

Appellee/Defendant )

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On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Croix Superior Court Judge: Hon. Jessica Gallivan

Considered: October 10, 2023 Filed: September 12, 2025

Cite as: 2025 VI 21

BEFORE RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES

Martial A. Webster, Sr., Esq St. Croix, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellant,

Crista R. Allenbaugh Charleston, S.C Pro se

OPINION OF THE COURT

SWAN, Associate Justice

qi Appellant Shane I.M. Hodge (“Hodge”) appeals from the Superior Court’s February 12,

2023 order granting in part Appellee Crista R. Allenbaugh’s (“Allenbaugh”) motion to approve

Opinion of the Court

Page 2 of 10 attorney’s fees and costs. For the reasons elucidated below, we vacate the Superior Court’s

February 12, 2023 order awarding Allenbaugh partial attorney’s fees and costs and remand the

case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

I FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

q2 In Allenbaugh v. Hodge, 70 V.I. 881, 886 (V.I. 2019), Allenbaugh requested that this

Court vacate all the Superior Court orders pertaining to her child custody case. This Court’s

exhaustive review of the record revealed that the parties’ minor child was approximately nine

months old when the custody proceeding began, and he and his mother had resided outside of the

Territory for the six months preceding the onset of this action. See id. Accordingly, we vacated

the Superior Court’s 2014 custody order and all other orders emanating from it. /d. Consistent

with this Court’s holding, the Superior Court entered an order dismissing the case on March 5,

2019

3 On or about July 18, 2019, Allenbaugh filed a motion in the Superior Court seeking

attorney’s fees and costs. In her motion, Allenbaugh requested approximately $32,000 in

reimbursement for attorney’s fees and expenses allegedly incurred from 2014 to 2019, seemingly

in conjunction with the Superior Court proceeding and the appellate proceeding in this Court

After Hodge failed to respond to the motion, the Superior Court entered an order on April 2,

2020, that directed him to file a response. Hodge subsequently filed a response asserting that he

was not served with the motion for attorney’s fees. Acting upon this information, the Superior

Court entered an order on April 21, 2020, directing Allenbaugh to serve the motion for attorney’s

fees on Hodge. Ultimately, on July 24, 2020, Hodge opposed the motion, requesting that the

Superior Court deny Allenbaugh’s motion for attorney’s fees on the grounds that the motion was

untimely filed, that Allenbaugh was not the prevailing party, and that Allenbaugh failed to

Page 3 of 10 submit sufficient proof that the attorney’s fees and expenses she allegedly incurred were

reasonable and related to the case

14 Nearly three years after Hodge filed his opposition, the Superior Court issued its ruling

on Allenbaugh’s motion. In its February 12, 2023 order, the Superior Court acknowledged that

the motion was filed several months after the due date, but accepted the motion after making a

finding of excusable neglect based on Allenbaugh’s pro se status. With respect to the merits, the

Superior court determined that Allenbaugh had been the prevailing party and determined that she

submitted documentation to substantiate $29,621.93 of the $32,000.00 award she had requested

However, the Superior Court found that Allenbaugh only adequately justified $7,420.00 of those

expenses, and therefore directed Hodge to pay her that amount within 90 days. Hodge filed a

timely notice of appeal with this Court on March 2, 2023, and this appeal ensued. See V.I.R

App. P. 5(a)(1)

II JURISDICTION

qs Title 4, section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code vests the Supreme Court of the Virgin

Islands with jurisdiction over “all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees, [and] final

orders of the Superior Court.” The Superior Court’s February 12, 2023 order constitutes a final

judgment within the meaning of section 32(a), thereby conferring jurisdiction on this Court

Joseph v. Daily News Publishing Co., Inc., 57 V1. 566, 578 (V.I. 2012)

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW

6 “This Court reviews the Superior Court’s ruling on a motion to approve attorney’s fees

and costs for abuse of discretion.” Hansen v. Bryan, 68 V.1. 603, 608 (2018) (quoting /n re

Guardianship of Smith, 58 V.1. 446, 449 (V.I.2013)). Additionally, where our review of the case

implicates the Superior Court’s application of the law, we exercise plenary review. Allen v.

Page 4 of 10

HOVENSA, L.L.C., 59 V.1. 430, 436 (V.I. 2013) (citing St. Thomas—St. John Bd. of Elections \

Daniel, 49 V.}. 322, 329 (V.I. 2007)); Brathwaite v. People, 60 V.I. 419, 426 (V.I. 2014)

IV DISCUSSION

q7 Hodge argues on appeal that the Superior Court erred when it granted a partial award of

Allenbaugh’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Specifically, Hodge argues that the motion

was untimely, that the Superior Court’s attempt to justify granting the partial award based on

excusable neglect is flawed, pursuant to Fuller v. Browne, 59, V.I. 948, 954 (V.I. 2013), that

Allenbaugh was not the prevailing party in the case, and accordingly that Hodge is prejudiced by

the Superior Court’s ruling

18 On the other hand, Allenbaugh contends that the Superior Court did not err in awarding

her a part of her request for attorney’s fees and costs and offers several reasons the court’s award

should be upheld. Among the reasons Allenbaugh presents for affirming the February 12, 2023

Superior Court order are her assertions that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in

making the award and did not lack jurisdiction to hear her case. Accordingly, Allenbaugh

requests that this Court uphold the Superior Court’s order partially granting her award of

attorney’s fees and costs.!

19 A thorough review of the record reveals that Allenbaugh failed to meet her burden of

showing good cause or excusable neglect for filing her motion for attorney’s fees and costs more

than 126 days late. In her motion for attorney’s fees and costs, Allenbaugh merely described the

events that led the parties to court. She also asserted that she was not properly served, and that

' Allenbaugh also argued that she was not served with Appellant’s petition for custody and that she experienced financial hardship because the Superior Court required her and the minor child to be present at the hearings in St. Croix, which doubled her travel and hotel accommodation expenses. (Appellee’s Br. 4-10.)

Page 5 of 10 she had to retain counsel because she was off island and therefore incurred tremendous travel

and accommodation expenses, while she had to take time away from work. Importantly,

Allenbaugh did not request an extension of time or request leave to file her motion for attorney’s

fees and costs within thirty (30) days of the order closing the case

qiO In its determination to accept Allenbaugh’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, the

Superior Court noted that the rule governing the award of attorney’s fees and costs is V.I. Rule

of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A), and the court further cited V.I. Rule of Civil Procedure 6-1(f)(1)

for the rule governing the time to respond to a motion for attorney’s fees and costs. However, in

this case, Allenbaugh filed her motion for attorney’s fees and costs 126 days after the court

issued the final judgment in this matter. The Superior Court also noted that “missing a deadline

to file a motion does not automatically mean [that the] motion must be denied” (J.A. 31) and

commented that this Court has recognized the doctrine of excusable neglect, looking specifically

at factors such as “all relevant circumstances surrounding the omission including the danger of

prejudice [to the opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial

proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of

the movant and whether the movant, acted in good faith.” Fuller, 59 V.1. at 954 (citing Brown \

People, 49 V.1. 378, 383 (V.I. 2008) (quoting Pioneer v. Inv. Ser. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc., 507

U.S. 380, 395 (1993)) (some alterations omitted). (J.-A. 31.) Concomitantly, the Superior Court

acknowledged that Hodge filed an untimely response to Allenbaugh’s motion for attorney’s fees

and costs more than a year later. After finding no issue with Allenbaugh’s service of the motion

upon Hodge, the Superior Court accepted Allenbaugh's motion for attorney’s fees and costs

qil Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A) requires that a motion for attorney’s

fees and costs must be filed

Page 6 of 10

[w]ithin 30 days after the entry of a final judgment or a judgment allowing costs, the prevailing party shall serve on the adverse party and file with the court a bill of costs, together with a notice of motion when application will be made to the court to tax the same

Rule 6-1(f)(1) further requires that a party shall file a response within 14 days after service upon

the party of any motion—except a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12 or Rule 56. After the time to

file a motion has expired, the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) states that

when an act is required or allowed to be done by or within a specified period, the court may upon a showing of good cause or excusable neglect, extend the date for doing that act. The court may consider whether the request to extend time is made before or after the required date; the reason for the movant’s delay; whether the reason for delay was within reasonable control of the movant; the danger of prejudice to the parties; the length of the delay; the potential impact of the delay on judicial proceedings; whether the party seeking the extension has acted in good faith, and all other relevant circumstances surrounding the parties’ failure to meet the originally prescribed deadline

An award of attorney’s fees and costs is within the discretion of the Superior Court judge

Mahabir v. Heirs of George, 75 V.1. 369, 374 (V.I. 2021). The moving party has the burden of

demonstrating good cause and excusable neglect. See, V.I. R. Civ. P. Rule 6

q!2 Therefore, Allenbaugh was required to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect, and

the Superior Court needed to consider and determine whether Allenbaugh had met her burden of

showing good cause or excusable neglect before it could properly grant her untimely motion for

attorney’s fees and costs, which was filed 126 days after entry of the final judgment. To show

good cause, Allenbaugh had the burden of demonstrating a legally sufficient reason why the

Superior Court should accept a motion for attorney’s fees and costs that was filed 126 days after

the final judgment. Specifically, Allenbaugh had the burden of demonstrating to the Superior

Page 7 of 10

Court that she exercised due diligence in attempting to file the motion for attorney’s fees and

costs within the deadline set by Rule 54(d){I)(A). See V.E.R. Civ. P. Rule 6

413 This jurisdiction acknowledges the doctrine of excusable neglect, and a determination

thereof is equitable in nature. Fuller, 59 V.I. at 954 (quoting Brown, 49 V.I. at 383). The

Superior Court must consider “all relevant circumstances” when making an excusable

neglect determination. /d. In doing so, the court must consider the factors specifically

enumerated in Rule 6 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, including “whether the

request to extend time is made before or after the required date; the reason for the movant’s

delay; whether the reason for delay was within the reasonable control of the movant; the danger

of prejudice to the parties; the length of the delay; the potential impact of the delay on judicial

proceedings; [and] whether the party seeking the extension has acted in good faith” V.I. R. Civ

P. 6(b)(t). A review of the complete record reveals that the Superior Court took none of these

relevant factors into consideration. Rather than determining whether Allenbaugh had met her

burden of showing good cause or excusable neglect, the Superior Court placed tremendous

weight on the fact that Allenbaugh was a pro se litigant and essentially shifted the burden to

Hodge, suggesting that because Hodge also failed to respond timely that there was no prejudice

to him. While pro se pleadings are “interpreted with considerable lenience because the [authors]

lack formal legal training,” and as a policy matter, the Court “give[s] pro se litigants greater

leeway in dealing with matters of procedure and pleading,” Clarke v. Lopez, 73 V.I. 512, 516

(2020) (quoting Marsh-Monsanto v. Clarenbach, 66 V.1. 366, 376 (V.1. 2017)), that lenience and

leeway are not unlimited. The policy of solicitude does not extend so far as to “allow a party to

ignore or defy the rules of procedural and substantive law.” Construction Technicians v. Zurich

American Ins. Co., 61 V.I. 153, 157 n.3 (V.E. 2014) (quoting Simpson v. Golden, 56 V.I. 272

Page 8 of 10

280 (V.I. 2012)).2 Additionally, “the reason for the delay” is “the most important factor” in an

excusable neglect analysis, Montgomery v. VI. Grand Villas St. John Owners’ Assoc., 7\ V.1

1119, 1128 ¢V.I. 2019), and the Superior Court made no findings on this factor, nor could it,

because Allenbaugh failed to provide any reason for filing her motion late. Allenbaugh’s failure

to provide an explanation for filing her motion late is fatal because clear or plain neglect is not

commensurate to excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 6(b)(1)(B) of the Virgin Islands Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Bowman v Korte, 962 F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 2020); Pittston Stevedoring

Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 43 (2d Cir. 1976) (declining to find excusable neglect when

no explanation is given for the late filing); Grant v. Revera Inc., 655 Fed. Appx. 914 917 (3d Cir

2016 (same); Martin v. Matthews, 480 Fed. Appx. 471, 474 (10th Cir. 2012). Moreover, the fact

that Allenbaugh appears pro se also means that the delay in filing her motion is entirely

attributable to her and the time to file a motion for attorney’s fees, as is clearly set forth in Rule

54 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, does not require any legal training to

comprehend or calculate

q!4 As the Supreme Court of the United States observed in McNeil v United States,

procedural rules “are based on the assumption that litigation is normally conducted by lawyers,”

and the Court “ha[s] never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be

? Importantly, this Court has declined to make a finding of excusable neglect for pro se parties even with respect to deadlines missed by a much shorter time than this case with respect to filings that may have a greater impact on the party’s substantial nghts. See e.g. Montgomery v. VI. Grand Villas St. John Owners’ Assoc., 71 V.1. 119, 1128 (V.1. 2019)(declining to find excusable neglect with respect to a notice of appeal filed one week late by a pro se party, even when the party mailed the notice of appeal at 2:39 p.m. on the due date, when the due date and place to file were obvious and would be revealed by “even the most cursory reading of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure,” the delay was entirely within [the pro se litigant’s]} control” and since “it was unreasonable for the [the to assume that the United States Postal Service would deliver it in such a short period”)

Page 9 of 10

interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993). Rather, in the ordinary civil litigation context, the Court emphasized in McNei/ that “in

the long run experience teaches that strict adherence to procedural requirements is the

best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Jd. (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver

447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)). We agree. Litigants representing themselves in the courts of the

U.S. Virgin Islands must be held to the same standard as practicing attorneys when a court must

determine if compliance with a rule-imposed deadline is achieved, as it would be unfair to hold a

represented party to a strict standard while granting leniency to a party who chooses to forgo

legal representation

HI. CONCLUSION

415 | Because Allenbaugh failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect, the Superior

Court abused its discretion when it accepted her motion, seeking an award of attorney’s fees and

costs under V.I. Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A), which was 126 days late. For the

foregoing reasons, we vacate the Superior Court’s February 12, 2023 order and remand the case

to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

DATED this 12th day of September, 2025

/ IVE tle Khe enn. Associate Justice

Page 10 of 10

ATTEST

DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ Acting Clerk of the-Court

hve. Why }

By: anti Yy Peputy lerk II l Datea: MDICMWIEY [2 2023