Hoch v. Kingston Brass, Inc.

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 26, 2019
DocketYORcv-16-0239
StatusUnpublished

This text of Hoch v. Kingston Brass, Inc. (Hoch v. Kingston Brass, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hoch v. Kingston Brass, Inc., (Me. Super. Ct. 2019).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-2016-0239

MICHAEL HOCH ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER ON V. ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT KINGSTON BRASS, INC. d/b/a ) ELEMENTS OF DESIGN ) ) Defendant. )

Plaintiff Michael Hoch brings this action against defendant Kingston Brass, Inc.

("Kingston") to recover damages sustained as a result of a water leak that occurred in Roch's

vacation home. Kingston now moves for summary judgment on all counts of the Plaintiffs

complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56. 1

I. Summary Judgment Factual Record

On or about September 18, 2015, Mr. Hoch discovered a water leak occurred in his

vacation home in Newry, Maine. (Defendant's Statement of Material Fact ("DSMF") ,i 1.)

Hoch alleges the leak was caused by the failure of a plumbing component-a "hot water riser"­

manufactured and/or sold by Kingston in a defective condition. (Id. ,i,i 2-4.) He seeks recovery

under theories of negligence (Count I), products liability (Count II), and breach of the implied

warranty of merchantability (Count III). (Pl.'s Comp!. ,i,i 12-24.)

Plaintiff has no documentation to support his assertion that Kingston manufactured or

sold the allegedly defective hot water riser at issue. (DSMF ,i 7.) Numerous entities besides

1 In conjunction with the present motion, Defendant has moved to exclude certain testimony of Plaintiffs expert witness, Professional Engineer John P. Certuse. The Court has concluded it can rule on the present motion based on the summary judgment record without determining the admissibility ofMr. Certuse's opinions.

1 Kingston market, manufacture, and/or sell hot water risers identical in appearance to the

allegedly defective hot water riser recovered from Hoch' s home, including four entities that

market and sell identical components. (Id ,r,r 5-6.)

Plaintiff admits it has no documentary proof that Kingston manufactured the hot water

riser at issue, and that there are numerous other entities besides Kingston that manufacture,

market, and sell "identical" hot water risers. (See Pl.' s Opp. Statement of Material Fact, ,r,r 2-7.)

Plaintiff submitted an Additional Statement of Material Fact ("PASMF"), asserting a

number of facts which make it more likely that Kingston manufactured the hot water riser in a

defective condition. Kingston has objected to all but one ofHoch's statements of material fact,

and admitted that Kingston has sold the Model No. DS481 riser-which Hoch alleges to be the

same model as the allegedly defective riser-for over eighteen years. (See PASMF ,r 3; Def.' s

Rep. PASMF,passim.) Accordingly, the Court must first rule on Defendant's objections to

Plaintiffs Additional Statements of Material Fact to determine whether Plaintiff has met its

burden of demonstrating the existence of a triable factual dispute as to each of the elements of its

claims.

A. Plaintiff's Reference to Materials Outside the Record

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment "shall submit with its opposition a

separate, short, and concise opposing statement[,]" which "may contain ... any additional facts

which the party opposing summary judgment contends raises a disputed issue for trial ... and

supported by a record citation as required by (M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4)]." M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(3).

"The court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific record citation to

record material properly considered on summary judgment." M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4).

2 Paragraphs one and two of Plaintiff's Additional Statement of Material Facts cite to

pages 32, 33, and 40 of the deposition of Plaintiff's expert, Professional Engineer John P.

Certuse. (See PASMF ~~ 1-2.) Defendant objects to these statements because those pages of

Mr. Certuse's deposition are not part of the summary judgment record. Indeed, a copy of Mr.

Certuse's deposition transcript is not appended to either party's statement of material facts.

However, Plaintiff did append a copy of Mr. Ce1iuse's deposition transcript to his Opposition to

Defendant's Motion to Exclude Certain Testimony of John P. Certuse, P.E., which he filed

before his Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Additional Statement

of Material Fact.

While Plaintiff technically violated Rule 56(h) by failing to include the Certuse

deposition transcript in the Summary Judgment record, Plaintiff did file a copy of the transcript

prior to the filing of his Additional Statement of Material Fact. Accordingly, Defendant's

objections to P ASMF ~~ 1 and 2 is overruled.

Thus, in ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will consider

the facts that Mr. Certuse "personally observed the faucet and the hot water riser that were

present at the time of the loss" and that he "relied on Tom Zarek's identification of the riser as

being Model No. DS481 manufactured by [Kingston]" in formulating his expert opinions.

(PASMF ~~ 1-2.)

B. Plaintiff's Reliance on the Unsworn, Unsigned Affidavit of Thomas Zarek

The Court may consider statements of material fact suppmied by affidavits in ruling on

the present motion for summary judgment, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(c), but such affidavits:

shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided

3 in this rule, an adverse party ... must respond by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

M.R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Defendant objects to paragraphs five through twenty of Plaintiffs Additional Statement

of Material Fact on the grounds that they are only supported by the unsworn, unsigned affidavit

of Thomas Zarek. To be admissible in evidence at trial, a witness's testimony must be sworn.

See M.R. Evid. 603. Because the form of Zarek's affidavit does not comport with the

requirements ofM.R. Civ. P. 56(e), the affidavit is therefore "material not properly considered

on summary judgment[,]" and the Court will "disregard [the] statement[s] of fact" supported by

that affidavit. M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4). Defendant's objections to PASMF ,r,r 5-20 are sustained

on the basis that Zarek's affidavit is unsigned and unsworn.

Perhaps more problematic to Plaintiffs case is that many of Zarek' s statements of fact

express opinions on matters that require expert testimony, such as the cause and mechanism of

the hot water riser's failure, the identity of its manufacturer, and the existence of a manufacturing

defect in the riser. (See PASMF ,r,r 7-8, 10-13, 16-20.) Plaintiff did not designate Mr. Zarek as

an expert witness prior to the expiration of the deadline established in the Scheduling Order.

(See Pl.'s Am. Expert Witness Disclosure; Order on Pl.'s Mot. to Enlarge Scheduling Order

Deadlines, ,r 2 (Feb. 10, 2017)). The testimony oflate-designated experts is properly excluded at

trial due to the prejudice that redounds from the admission of such testimony. See Chrysler

Credit Corp. v. Ben Cote's LIA Auto Sales, Inc., 1998 ME 53, ,r,r 19-20, 707 A.2d 1311 ("When

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