Hobart v. Indus. Comm.

2018 Ohio 2853
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 19, 2018
Docket17AP-326
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2018 Ohio 2853 (Hobart v. Indus. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hobart v. Indus. Comm., 2018 Ohio 2853 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

[Cite as Hobart v. Indus. Comm., 2018-Ohio-2853.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[State of Ohio ex rel.] : Mary C. Hobart, : Relator, : No. 17AP-326 v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Industrial Commission of Ohio and Pure Foods, LLC, :

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on July 19, 2018

On brief: Anthony P. Christine, for relator.

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Crystal R. Richie, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION DORRIAN, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Mary C. Hobart, has filed this original action requesting this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its December 13, 2016 order that denied her application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation, and to enter a new order granting her application. {¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate recommends this court No. 17AP-326 2

grant the request for a writ of mandamus. Specifically, the magistrate found the reports of Dr. Steven A. Cremer do not provide some evidence on which the commission could rely in determining residual functional capacity. {¶ 3} The commission has filed the following objection to the magistrate's decision: The Magistrate Erred By Re-weighing The Medical Evidence.

{¶ 4} The magistrate stated the main issue is "whether the reports of Dr. Cremer provide some evidence on which the commission exclusively relied in determining residual functional capacity [pursuant to] Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(4)." (Appended Mag. Dec. at ¶ 31.) The commission generally argues the magistrate impermissibly reweighed the evidence and determined that the medical reports of Dr. Cremer were not some evidence upon which the commission could rely to determine residual functional capacity and, in doing so, the magistrate exceeded the appropriate level of review. The commission urges this court to reject the magistrate's decision to issue the writ of mandamus and to find that Dr. Cremer's reports is some evidence upon which the commission could rely to deny relator's application for PTD compensation. {¶ 5} The commission makes several specific arguments in support of its objection. First, the commission takes issue with the magistrate's analysis: Analysis begins with the observation that relator has no industrial injury or impairment to her non-dominant left upper extremity. In rendering an opinion on the "Physical Strength Rating" form regarding the Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3- 34(B)(2) classification of physical demands of work, the examining physician should consider to what extent, if any, the non-dominant left upper extremity might be useful in the performance of sedentary and/or light work. Here, Dr. Cremer does not directly address how the left upper extremity might assist the right upper extremity in the performance of the physical demands of work.

Based solely on the reports of Dr. Cremer, it is difficult to see how the severe right upper extremity impairment alone permits any light work.

(Appended Mag. Dec. at ¶ 36-37.) No. 17AP-326 3

{¶ 6} The commission construes this analysis as the magistrate creating a new standard that: (1) the examining physician "should consider" the usefulness of a non- allowed condition in the performance of the physical demands of work, and (2) the examining physician should make such a notation on the physical strength rating form in violation of the requirements to provide an opinion as to the claimant's ability to work "[b]ased solely on impairment due to the allowed condition(s) in the claim." (Comm. Obj. at 4.) Such a standard, according to the commission, violates the rule outlined in State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm., 67 Ohio St.3d 452 (1993), that non-allowed conditions cannot be used to advance or defeat a claim for PTD compensation. Waddle stated that " '[e]ntitlement to permanent total disability compensation requires a showing that the medical impairment due to the allowed conditions, either alone or together with nonmedical disability factors, prevents claimant from engaging in sustained remunerative employment.' " Id. at 455, quoting State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 22, 24 (1992). We disagree with the commission that Waddle prohibits, in this case, consideration of how the left upper extremity might assist the right upper extremity in the performance of the physical demands of light work. Such consideration is not the same as consideration of a non-allowed condition as the basis of an award for PTD. To the contrary, focusing solely on the impairment due to the allowed condition of the upper right extremity, Dr. Cremer opined there was a 43 percent upper extremity impairment which is equivalent to a 26 percent whole person impairment. The magistrate's analysis does not violate Waddle. Furthermore, we do not construe the magistrate's analysis as creating a new standard but, rather, as an observation regarding how the left upper extremity might assist the right upper extremity in this case given Dr. Cremer's restrictions on the right upper extremity. {¶ 7} Second, the commission argues that contrary to the magistrate's conclusion, "Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2) does not require Dr. Cremer to 'consider to what extent, if any, the non-dominant left upper extremity might be useful in the performance of sedentary and/or light work,' " but, rather, simply classifies the physical demands of particular types of work. (Comm. Obj. at 4, quoting Appended Mag. Dec. at ¶ 36.) However, while Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2) does not require consideration of how the left upper extremity might assist the right upper extremity in the performance of the physical No. 17AP-326 4

demands of work, in this case, such consideration would have served to explain how relator could or could not comply with the demands of light-duty work given Dr. Cremer's restrictions on the right upper extremity. {¶ 8} Third, the commission argues the magistrate improperly determined that Dr. Cremer's opinion failed to meet the criteria for light-duty work and to observe that Dr. Cremer's restrictions against repetitive gripping, pulling, or pushing is inconsistent with the definition of light work as defined in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B). The commission points to State ex rel. Rice v. J.P. Industries, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 97APD01-3 (Feb. 10, 1998) (memorandum decision) for the proposition that a physician may choose a category of work as set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B) and, at the same time, limit certain physical activities within that category. According to the commission, an injured worker need not be able to perform every job within a particular work category. However, we are mindful of our conclusion in State ex rel. O'Brien v. Cincinnati Inc., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-825, 2008- Ohio-2841, ¶ 10, that the commission cannot simply rely on a physician's "bottom line" identification of an exertional category without examining the specific restrictions imposed by the physician to make certain that any physical restrictions the physician lists correspond with an ability to actually perform at the exertional level indicated by the physician. Dr. Cremer imposed several restrictions: "[n]o repetitive gripping, pulling or pushing with [right] hand. No weight bearing on right hand." (Appended Mag. Dec. at ¶ 26.) Examination of the specific restrictions imposed by Dr. Cremer was not improper.

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2018 Ohio 2853, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hobart-v-indus-comm-ohioctapp-2018.