Hoang Nguyen v. Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as United States Attorney General, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 19, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02617
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 HOANG NGUYEN, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02617-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR 13 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as United States Attorney General, et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Hoang Nguyen’s motion for a temporary 18 restraining order. Dkt. No. 3. On December 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint for mandamus, 19 injunctive, and declaratory relief. Dkt. No. 1. In his complaint, Plaintiff requests, among other 20 things, that the Court “compel the administrative act of reopening and terminating his removal 21 proceedings, thus completing the restoration of his LPR [lawful permanent resident] status . . . .” 22 Id. at 1. Petitioner also moves for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) preventing: (1) his 23 removal from the United States to Vietnam or to any other country; and (2) his detention during 24 the pendency of these proceedings. See Dkt. No. 3 at 7. 1 The Court herein provides an abbreviated factual background as pleaded in Plaintiff’s 2 complaint. It is not a complete recitation of either the facts or the underlying administrative 3 history of this case.1 4 Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Vietnam, resides in Seattle, Washington. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 5.

5 Plaintiff entered the United States as a refugee on September 25, 1992, and his status was 6 adjusted to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) on June 17, 1994. Id. On February 5, 1997, 7 Plaintiff was convicted of shoplifting, an offense considered a “crime involving moral turpitude” 8 under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Dkt. No. 1 9 ¶¶ 5, 11. On August 11, 1998, Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree theft, another crime 10 involving moral turpitude under the INA. Id. ¶ 12. Consequently, in October 2004, upon 11 Plaintiff’s return to the United States “from travel abroad,” he was charged as an arriving alien 12 seeking admission. Id. ¶ 15. During removal proceedings, Plaintiff admitted to the immigration 13 judge (“IJ”) that he had been convicted of shoplifting in 1997 and first-degree theft in 1998. Id. 14 ¶ 16. For its part, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) introduced evidence of

15 Plaintiff’s convictions. Id. Consequently, the IJ found Plaintiff removable as charged. Id. The IJ 16 designated Vietnam as Plaintiff’s country of removal. Id. Plaintiff was ordered removed from the 17 United States on June 15, 2005. Id. 18 Plaintiff asserts that “the IJ’s finding of removability was in error.” Id. ¶ 17. As to the 19 shoplifting conviction, on March 31, 2022, the Tacoma Municipal Court granted Plaintiff’s 20

21 1 Plaintiff’s complaint discloses several convictions that are not wholly relevant to the limited question of whether the latter disposition of Plaintiff’s convictions for crimes of moral turpitude—i.e., a 1997 shoplifting conviction and 22 1998 first-degree theft conviction—render him removable as a matter of law. These other convictions include a 2003 conviction for attempted violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (which has now been held to be 23 unconstitutional pursuant to State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 174, 481 P.3d 521 (2021)), as well as convictions dating back to the 1990s for: driving with a suspended/revoked license, taking a motor vehicle without permission, second- degree malicious mischief, hit-and-run of an attended vehicle. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 13–14. Plaintiff asserts that none of 24 these convictions make Plaintiff inadmissible or removable. Id. ¶ 14. 1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, further, vacated Plaintiff’s 1997 conviction for 2 shoplifting. Id. ¶ 27. Based on the text of the statute of conviction, Plaintiff’s conviction was 3 amended to one for “disorderly conduct.” Id. ¶ 30. As to the first-degree theft conviction, “theft 4 convictions with sentences of less than one year in Washington State are not removable under [8

5 U.S.C. § 1227], nor are they crimes involving moral turpitude under [8 U.S.C. 6 § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)] . . . .” Id. ¶ 18 (citing Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847, 849 7 (BIA 2016)). Plaintiff asserts that, consequently, his removal order was void ab initio. Id. ¶ 33. 8 On January 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen and terminate (“MTRT”) his proceedings 9 with the Board of Immigration Appeals, on the basis that his post-conviction relief invalidated 10 the removal proceedings. Id. ¶ 29 His motion remains pending. Id. 11 Since August 2018, Plaintiff has been reporting to ICE annually. Id. ¶ 26. In August 12 2025, these appointments were changed to a monthly basis. Id. At his check-in on September 22, 13 2025, “he was given forms in Vietnamese that appeared to be for the purpose of assisting ICE in 14 obtaining travel documents for his removal to Vietnam.” Id. ¶ 32.

15 In his mandamus action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated the 16 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by arbitrarily and capriciously declining to provide a 17 decision regarding the reopening and termination of Plaintiff’s removal proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 18 ¶ 37. Plaintiff alleges further that he has been waiting some 1,078 days for a decision, and that 19 such delay is unreasonable. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. Plaintiff also alleges that he has been denied due 20 process and equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 21 Constitution. Id. ¶ 46. “Defendants,” Plaintiff asserts, “have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and 22 abused their discretion, or otherwise not observed procedures required by law, and not proceeded 23 to conclude this matter within a reasonable time.” Id. ¶ 48 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(a); 706(1);

24 706(2)(A), (D)). As a result, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “ha[ve] caused great harm to 1 Plaintiff, as he cannot access the rights and privileges afforded to him by his permanent resident 2 status, and he is vulnerable to unlawful removal by ICE because his removal order has not yet 3 been vacated.” Id. ¶ 37. 4 Because Petitioner “will suffer great harm if he is detained or removed,” Petitioner seeks

5 to enjoin his removal and detention on an emergency basis. See Dkt. No. 3 at 7. Petitioner’s 6 counsel has provided written certification that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 65(b)(1). See Dkt. No. 6 (Howard Aff.) ¶¶ 1–4. 8 The Court may grant a TRO to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction and to maintain the status 9 quo. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 97 (2025) (Federal courts have “the power to issue 10 injunctive relief to prevent irreparable harm to the applicants and to preserve [] jurisdiction over 11 the matter.”); United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947) (“[T]he 12 District Court ha[s] the power to preserve existing conditions while it . . . determine[s] its own 13 authority to grant injunctive relief,” unless the assertion of jurisdiction is frivolous.). This is 14 particularly so when the order is necessary to prevent action that would otherwise destroy the

15 court’s jurisdiction or moot the case. See United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906). 16 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows: 17 1. Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order (Dkt. No. 3) is PROVISIONALLY 18 GRANTED, pending Respondents’ response to the motion. This grant is solely for 19 the purpose of maintaining the status quo so that the Court may review the merits 20 of the motion after full briefing. 21 2. Respondents ARE PROHIBITED from removing Plaintiff from either the United 22 States or this jurisdiction or detaining him during the pendency of these 23

24 ] proceedings, without further order of the Court. 2 3. Plaintiff's counsel SHALL immediately contact Respondents’ counsel to provide a 3 copy of this Order and to meet and confer on: (1) a briefing schedule for the 4 motion for TRO; and (2) whether Respondents will agree to a stipulated order to 5 not remove or detain Plaintiff during the pendency of this action. 6 4. If the Parties can agree on a briefing schedule, they SHALL file a stipulated 7 proposed briefing schedule with the Court within five days of this Order, along 8 with any other stipulations the Parties may agree on for the pendency of this case. 9 If the Parties cannot reach agreement on a briefing schedule, then Respondents 10 SHALL respond to the motion for TRO pursuant to the schedule set by Local Civil 11 Rule 65, once notice is accomplished. 12 13 Dated this 19th day of December 2025.

15 ana Lin United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER — 5