Hoang Minh Le v. Patricia McRae

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 12, 2023
• Docket: 22-55419
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 12 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HOANG MINH LE, an individual, No. 22-55419

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:22-cv-00209-JGB-KK v. Central District of California, Riverside PATRICIA A. MCRAE, an individual, MEMORANDUM* Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 9, 2022** Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, COLLINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Hoang Minh Le appeals the dismissal of his Americans with Disabilities Act

and California Unruh Act claims for failure to prosecute. Le argues that the district

court abused its discretion when it dismissed the lawsuit sua sponte after he failed to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). timely file a case statement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Le’s claims.

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute for abuse of

discretion, meaning that we will not reverse absent “a definite and firm conviction

that the [district court] committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it

reached.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640–41 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992)).

We consider five factors when assessing a district court’s dismissal for failure

to prosecute: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the

court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the

public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the availability of

less drastic sanctions.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th

Cir. 1986). We may affirm a district court’s dismissal where at least four of these

five factors weigh in favor of dismissal, or at least three factors strongly weigh in

favor of dismissal. Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2011).

Here, three factors strongly weigh in favor of dismissal. The public interest

in expeditious resolution of litigation always supports dismissal. Pagtalunan, 291

F.3d at 642. The district court’s need to manage its docket also favors dismissal, as

the district court “is in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular

case interferes with docket management and the public interest.” Id.; see In re

2 Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2006).

Finally, because Le did not present any non-frivolous excuse for his delay in filing

the case statement, we presume prejudice from his failure to prosecute this case. See

Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 400–01 (9th Cir. 1998).

While the district court’s failure to consider alternatives and the public policy

favoring resolution of cases on their merits may weigh against dismissal, we lack “a

definite and firm conviction” that the district court erred in dismissing Le’s claims

because the three remaining factors strongly support dismissal. See Pagtalunan, 291

F.3d at 640 (quoting Ferdik, 963 F.3d at 1260). The district court thus did not abuse

its discretion in dismissing Le’s claims.

AFFIRMED.