Hoagland v. Van Etten

22 Neb. 681
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 22 Neb. 681 (Hoagland v. Van Etten) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hoagland v. Van Etten, 22 Neb. 681 (Neb. 1888).

Opinion

Maxwell, Ch. J.

This is an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien upon certain real estate described in the petition, owned by Mrs. "Van Etten; Moyer claims for material furnished To1 one Hayden, a contractor in the erection of the defendant Van Etten’s dwelling, and French is a senior mortgagee. The amount claimed to be due the plaintiff for material furnished by him is the sum of $803.76, with interest. He also claims there is due him the sum of $17.07 upon the account of one Andrew L. Wiggins, and the sum of $18.87 on the account of Harvey S. Nutting.' He further claims to be due him the sum of $86 on the account of Rutón Gsanter & Co., and on the account of Nich. Spellman the sum of $72, and $24 on the account of one Wm. Klatt; $13.87 on the account of Hans Tams; $28.82 on the account of Jacob New; $30.05 on the account of Sullivan Bros.; $163.12 on the account of Sidney D. Crawford; $40.87 on the account of John Liibbe; $48 on the account of [683]*683Abner C. Smilley; $21.41 on the account of N. J. Sander; $58.83 on the account of Jam.es Morton & Son; $213 on the account of Henry A. Kosters. The plaintiff also alleges “that he owns the above claims against said last named defendant, and they are all past due, and demand has been made on the said defendant for payment, and payment thereof was refused and no part of any of said claims has been paid.”

The defendant in her answer denies that the plaintiff owns the claims above set forth, and alleges that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. On the trial the court instructed the jury: “ It will not be necessary for you to determine whether the assignment was valid or not; but you will allow the amount due, if anything, on each particular claim the same as if sued on by the original party, and subject to the same defenses, if any, regardless of the alleged assignment.”

It is conceded that the assignments were merely formal to enable the plaintiff to bring the action for all, and that he is not the real party in interest.. In justification of this course, the plaintiff’s attorney cites Pomeroy on Remedial Rights and Remedies, section ■ 132. In all the cases cited by Mr. Pomeroy in support of his proposition, except two, the plaintiff had an interest in the proceeds resulting from the suit. It was not a case of an entire want of interest, but merely a defect of parties plaintiff. In such case it is well known that if one of the proper parties brings an action and no objection is made for defect of parties, he may maintain the action although others should be brought in, as where a debt is assigned as collateral security for a less sum than the value of the debt, the assignee may maintain an action on the security although the assignor having an interest in the surplus would be a proper party.

Section 29 of the code provides that, “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided in section 32.”

[684]*684In Mills v. Murray, 1 Neb., 327, it was held that the assignee or actual owner of a chose in action is the proper and only party who can maintain a suit thereon. This doctrine was affirmed in Seymour v. Street, 5 Neb., 93, Hickland v. Nebraska City National Bank, 8 Neb., 463. The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, “ Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except,” étc. This case is not within any of the exceptions named, and therefore must be considered with reference solely to section 29. If a party having no interest in the subject-matter of the suit, who holds simply as assignee, and is to deliver to his assignor the proceeds of the action, may maintain an action on such an assignment, then section 29 has no meaning whatever. "We do not care to enter into a discussion of the propriety, or impropriety, of requiring acti ons to be brought in the name of the real party in interest. The statute contains a plain provision which this court has no authority to disregard. We hold, therefore, that an assignee having no interest in the result of the suit, and not entitled to any portion of the proceeds thereof, is not entitled under section 29 to maintain an action as the real party in interest. Where a number of persons hold mechanics’ liens against certain real estate, such persons may and should be brought before the court, as among such lienholders there is no priority, but each lien should stand upon its own separate facts, in order that issue may be taken thereon.

The first answer filed by the defendant was to a great extent stricken out on motion. An amended answer was thereupon filed, the sixth and seventh counts of which were stricken out, and the sustaining of such motion is now assigned for error. Said counts are as follows: “ Said defendant, for a further defense in said action, alleges the facts to be that on or about the 10th day of September, 1883, she contracted with one David I. Hayden, a contractor and carpenter and joiner,, in said city of Omaha, [685]*685by a duly written, signed, executed,- and delivered contract (a copy of which is hereto attached, marked Exhibit A/ and hereby made a part of this answer), and that by virtue of said contract, of which each and every one of said parties had knowledge, said Hayden agreed to and with said defendant, for certain and specified sums of money to be paid as in said contract specified, amounting in all to the sum of $975, of which no payment was required until forty-five days after the completion and acceptance of said work specified, and then not to exceed twenty dollars per month without interest until due, with forbearance of ninety days after any payment became due before action or foreclosure of lien could be instituted, and of nine months after decree and termination of action before said property could be advertised for sale thereunder, and other conditions of payment as in said contract specified, to construct and erect for said defendant, as in said contract specified, two certain and specified additions to her house on said lot, and to furnish all the labor, skill, mechanism, and materials for said work and building, and to do and perform other work on said lot and furnish the materials for the same as in said contract specified, and that Avhatever materials, services, and labor said plaintiff and either, any, or all of said named parties furnished and supplied for said work and building and appurtenances, if any, were furnished and supplied to the said Hayden, under and by virtue of the said contract of which they each and all had knoAvledge before furnishing or doing anything whatsoever upon the same, and they each and all so intended and furnished nothing whatsoever to said defendant, and did nothing whatsoever for her or at her instance and request, as they each and all well knew and so intended.

That in pursuance of said contract by and between said Hayden and said defendant, said Hayden commenced said work and employed one Nich. Spellman to do and perform the brick work specified in said contract, and he, [686]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Archer v. Musick
23 N.W.2d 323 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1946)
Bankers Trust Co. v. International Trust Co.
113 P.2d 656 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1941)
Stinchcomb v. Patteson
1917 OK 446 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1917)
Jackson v. McGilbray
1915 OK 218 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1915)
Follmer v. State
142 N.W. 908 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1913)
Strawn v. First National Bank of Humboldt
109 N.W. 384 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1906)
Stewart v. Price
64 L.R.A. 581 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1902)
Western Cornice & Manufacturing Works v. Meyer
76 N.W. 23 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1898)
Henley v. Evans
74 N.W. 578 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1898)
Grand Island & Wyoming Central Railroad v. Swinbank
71 N.W. 48 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1897)
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Metcalf & Wood
69 N.W. 961 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1897)
Kinsella v. Sharp
66 N.W. 634 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1896)
Gerner v. Church
62 N.W. 51 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1895)
Hoagland v. Van Etten
47 N.W. 920 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1891)
Gruber v. Baker
22 P. 256 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1890)
Grimes v. Cannell
23 Neb. 187 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1888)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
22 Neb. 681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hoagland-v-van-etten-neb-1888.