Hoadena Ingram v. Habeas Corpus

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: April 14, 2021
• Docket: 5:20-cv-01527
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HOADENA INGRAM, Case No. 5:20-cv-01527-JVS-MAA 12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AND DISMISSING ACTION 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE 14 HABEAS CORPUS, 15 Respondent. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 19 On July 30, 2020, the Court received and filed Petitioner Hoadena Ingram’s 20 (“Petitioner”) pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State 21 Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner 22 challenges a 2013 sentencing enhancement that was based on prior convictions 23 obtained by guilty plea. (Id. at 2–3.)1 He relies on a 2019 state legislative 24 enactment, California Assembly Bill No. 1618, which renders void as against 25 public policy certain guilty plea agreements that include a waiver of the right to 26 raise claims based on future changes in the law. (Id. at 3–5.) 27 1 Pinpoint citations of filings in this Order refer to the page numbers appearing in the 28 ECF-generated headers. 1 On August 11, 2020, the Court issued an Order identifying several 2 procedural defects with the Petition and ordering Petitioner file a response no later 3 than October 13, 2020 (“August 11 Order”). (Aug. 11, 2020 Or., ECF No. 3.) 4 Specifically, the Court ordered Petitioner to do the following: (1) to show cause 5 why the Petition should not be summarily dismissed as an unauthorized second or 6 successive Section 2254 petition (id. at 1–4); (2) to name the warden of Petitioner’s 7 institution of confinement as a proper respondent, or otherwise show cause why the 8 Petition should not be summarily dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction (id. at 9 4–5); and (3) to pay the $5 filing fee or file a request to proceed in forma pauperis 10 with supporting documentation (id. at 5). The Court cautioned Petitioner that 11 failure to file a response regarding each of these issues by October 13, 2020 would 12 result in a recommendation that the Petition be dismissed for failure to prosecute 13 and to comply with a court order. (Id. at 4–5.) Petitioner did not file a response to 14 this Order. 15 On November 6, 2020, the Court issued an Order directing Petitioner to show 16 cause why the Petition should not be summarily dismissed for failure to prosecute 17 and failure to comply with a court order (“November 6 Order”). (Nov. 6, 2020 Or., 18 ECF No. 4.) The Court again warned Petitioner that the Petition would be 19 dismissed for failure to prosecute and to comply with court orders if Petitioner did 20 not respond by December 7, 2020. (Id. at 2.) 21 On November 30, 2020, the Court received a letter from Petitioner dated 22 November 16, 2020 and addressed to Magistrate Judge Audero. (ECF No. 5.) 23 However, pursuant to Central District of California Local Rule 83-2.5, “parties to 24 any action or proceeding shall refrain from writing letters to the judge . . . . All 25 matters must be called to a judge’s attention by appropriate application or motion 26 filed in compliance with these Local Rules.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-2.5. Accordingly, 27 Petitioner’s letter was stricken from the docket and returned to Petitioner. (ECF 28 No. 6.) 1 On February 8, 2021, in the absence of any further response from Petitioner, 2 the Court issued another Order directing Petitioner to show cause why the Petition 3 should not be summarily dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply 4 with a court order (“February 8 Order”). (Feb. 8, 2021 Or., ECF No. 7.) The Court 5 explicitly warned Petitioner that his failure to file a response by March 10, 2021, 6 would result in dismissal of the Petition for failure to prosecute and to comply with 7 court orders. (Id. at 2.) 8 To date, Petitioner has not filed a response to the Court’s February 8 Order. 9 10 II. ANALYSIS 11 A. Legal Standard 12 District courts may dismiss cases sua sponte for failure to prosecute or for 13 failure to comply with a court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 14 Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005); 15 see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962) (holding that federal 16 district courts have “inherent power” to dismiss cases sua sponte for lack of 17 prosecution). Dismissal, however, “is a harsh penalty and is to be imposed only in 18 extreme circumstances.” Allen v. Bayer Corp. (In re: Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) 19 Prods. Liab. Litig.), 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. 20 Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). “A Rule 41(b) dismissal must be 21 supported by a showing of unreasonable delay.” Omstead v. Dell, 594 F.3d 1081, 22 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 23 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 Before dismissing an action for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply 25 with a court order, a district court must weigh five factors: “(1) the public’s interest 26 in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; 27 (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic 28 alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” 1 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit will 2 “affirm a dismissal where at least four factors support dismissal, or where at least 3 three factors strongly support dismissal.” Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 4 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 5 1999)). 6 7 B. The Factors Support Dismissal. 8 1. The Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution and the Court’s 9 Need to Manage its Docket 10 The first and second factors—the public’s interest in expeditious resolution 11 of litigation and the Court’s need to manage its docket—generally are considered 12 together. See Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1227; Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re 13 Eisen), 31 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994) (The first two factors are usually 14 reviewed together “to determine if there is an unreasonable delay.”). 15 Here, these factors weigh in favor of dismissal. “Orderly and expeditious 16 resolution of disputes is of great importance to the rule of law.” Prods. Liab. Litig., 17 460 F.3d at 1227. Thus, “[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 18 litigation always favors dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (quoting Yourish, 19 191 F.3d at 990). In addition, district courts “have an inherent power to control their 20 dockets,” Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of 21 City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)), and “are best suited to 22 determine when delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and 23 the public interest.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (quoting Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 24 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984)). 25 To date, Petitioner has not filed a response to the Court’s August 11, 26 November 6, or February 8 Orders that complies with this District’s Local Rules. 27 The Court concludes that Petitioner’s failure to comply with these Court orders and 28 failure to prosecute the lawsuit constitute unreasonable delay. See Thomas v. 1 Maricopa Cnty. Jail, 265 Fed. App’x 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2008) (Mem.) (holding that 2 district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing pro se prisoner lawsuit for 3 failure to respond to a court order for almost three months). Petitioner’s 4 noncompliance and inaction also interfere with the public’s interest in the 5 expeditious resolution of this litigation and hinder the Court’s ability to manage its 6 docket. See Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1227 (“[The Ninth Circuit] defer[s] to 7 the district court’s judgment about when a delay becomes unreasonable ‘because it is 8 in the best position to determine what period of delay can be endured before its 9 docket becomes unmanageable.’” (quoting Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re Eisen), 31 10 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994))). For these reasons, the first and second factors 11 favor dismissal. 12 13 2. Risk of Prejudice to Respondent 14 The third factor also supports dismissal without prejudice. The risk of 15 prejudice to a respondent is related to a petitioner’s reason for failure to prosecute an 16 action, even in cases such as this in which the respondent has not yet been ordered to 17 respond to a habeas corpus petition. See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. Petitioner 18 has offered no reason for failing to file a response to the Court’s August 11, 19 November 6, and February 8 Orders. The absence of any reason indicates sufficient 20 prejudice to Respondent. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991–92 (holding that a paltry 21 excuse for default indicates sufficient prejudice to the defendants); see also Laurino 22 v. Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “a 23 presumption of prejudice arises from a plaintiff’s unexplained failure to prosecute”). 24 25 3. Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives 26 The fourth factor also supports dismissal without prejudice. “Warning that 27 failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can itself meet the 28 ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1229 1 (citing, inter alia, Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1991) 2 (“Moreover, our decisions also suggest that a district court’s warning to a party 3 that his failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the 4 ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.”)). Here, rather than dismissing the 5 Petition when Petitioner failed to respond to the August 11 Order, the Court issued 6 the November 6 Order, warning Petitioner that the Petition would be dismissed if 7 he did not respond by December 7, 2020. (Nov. 6, 2020 Or. at 2.) Petitioner 8 failed to file a response that complied with this District’s Local Rules. 9 In an abundance of caution, the Court issued the February 8 Order, 10 providing Petitioner with an additional opportunity to respond to the Court’s 11 Orders, and warning Petitioner that this action would be dismissed for failure to 12 prosecute unless Petitioner filed a response by March 10, 2021. (Feb. 8, 2021 Or. 13 at 2.) Petitioner did not file any response to this February 8 Order. 14 15 4. Public Policy Favoring Disposition of Cases on Their Merits 16 The fifth factor weighs against dismissal. “We have often said that the 17 public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits strongly counsels 18 against dismissal.” Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1228 (citing Hernandez, 138 19 F.3d at 399). On the other hand, “this factor ‘lends little support’ to a party whose 20 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose 21 conduct impedes progress in that direction.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, this 22 factor alone does not preclude dismissal. 23 24 C. Dismissal of this Action is Appropriate. 25 As discussed above, Petitioner’s failure to comply with Court orders and 26 failure to prosecute this action constitute unreasonable delay. In addition, four of the 27 dismissal factors weigh in favor of dismissal, whereas only one factor weighs 28 against dismissal. “While the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 1 || merits weighs against [dismissal], that single factor is not enough to preclude 2 || imposition of this sanction when the other four factors weigh in its favor.” Rio 3 || Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002). 4 The Court concludes that dismissal of this action for failure to comply with 5 |} Court orders and failure to prosecute is warranted. However, consistent with Rule 6 || 41(b) and this Court’s exercise of its discretion, the dismissal should be without 7 || prejudice. 8 9 | I. CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) the Petition is 11 || DISMISSED for failure to comply with court orders and failure to prosecute, and 12 || (2) the Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing this action without prejudice. 13 14] IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 15 Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 16 || United States District Courts, the Court “must issue or deny a certificate of 17 || appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The Court has 18 || considered whether a certificate of appealability is warranted. See 28 U.S.C. 19 |} § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). The Court 20 || concludes that a certificate of appealability is not warranted; thus, a certificate of 21 || appealability is DENIED. 22 23 || DATED: April 14, 2021 [ Af 24 U/ Ne 25 MES V. SELNA %6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 | /// ag || //

1 || Presented by: 2 | __ [yo 4 | MARIA K. AUDERO — 5 || UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28