Hoa Duc Nguyen v. Marcos Charles, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HOA DUC NGUYEN, No. 1:25-cv-1592 TLN CSK 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMEENDATIONS 14 MARCOS CHARLES, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding through counsel, with a petition for writ 19 of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 This matter is before the Court on respondents’ 20 motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, the Court recommends that respondents’ motion to 21 dismiss be denied without prejudice, and the parties be ordered to show cause why a permanent 22 injunction should not be entered on the same terms as the preliminary injunction, the habeas 23 petition be granted, and this action be closed. 24 /// 25 /// 26

27 1 Initially, petitioner filed this action pro se. (ECF No. 1.) Subsequently, this Court appointed the Federal Defender to represent petitioner. (ECF Nos. 9-11.) This Court has liberally construed 28 petitioner’s initial pro se petition as required. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 The district court set forth the following factual and procedural background, noting that 3 the parties largely agree on the following history. (ECF No. 14 at 2 n.1.) 4 Petitioner is a 59-year-old citizen and native of Vietnam. (ECF No. 12 at 1, 34.) In 1975, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Petitioner 5 was admitted to the United States as a refugee and became a lawful permanent resident. (Id. at 30.) In 1997, Petitioner left the United 6 States to elude criminal charges. (Id. at 30, 37.) Upon his return in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security deemed his permanent 7 residency status abandoned, and he was paroled into the country to face criminal charges. (Id.) Ultimately, Petitioner pleaded guilty to 8 various crimes committed between 1993 and 1996 and served his sentence. (Id. at 8–10.) 9 As a result of his criminal convictions, Petitioner was placed into 10 removal proceedings as an “inadmissible” non-citizen under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 11 212(a)(2)(B). (Id. at 31, 37–38.) On June 17, 2024, Petitioner received a final order of removal to Vietnam and was taken into 12 immigration custody. (Id. at 12; ECF No. 1 at 3.) Petitioner was detained for exactly six months before he was released back into the 13 United States on December 17, 2024, by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on an order of supervision. (ECF 14 No. 12 at 30.) 15 On June 16, 2025, ICE revoked Petitioner’s release and detained Petitioner that same day. (Id.) ICE’s Notice of Revocation of 16 Release (“Notice of Revocation”) appears to have been given to Petitioner at the time he was being detained. (Id. at 26 (addressed to 17 Petitioner at the ICE field office on the date of detention).) The Notice of Revocation states that ICE’s decision to revoke his release 18 was based on “a review of your file and/or your personal interview on account of changed circumstances in your case,” but does not 19 identify what the “changed circumstances” were or what information led ICE to that determination. (Id.) Four months into his detention, 20 Petitioner was given an informal interview on October 20, 2025. (Id. at 31.) Also in October, Respondents submitted a “travel packet” 21 within the United States government to an agency “who coordinates the request for a travel document from Vietnam” for Petitioner’s 22 removal. (Id.) To date, Vietnam has not issued travel documents for Petitioner and Petitioner contends Vietnam has not agreed to accept 23 him. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 13–14.) Petitioner has now been in continuous ICE detention awaiting removal for 5.5 months. (Id. at 3.) Since his 24 [June 17,] 2024 order of removal [ECF No. 21 at 22], Petitioner has been in ICE detention for a total of 11.5 months. 25 26 2 Petitioner filed a verified habeas petition. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) A court “may treat the 27 allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 28 1987)). 1 (ECF No. 14 at 2-3.) 2 On November 19, 2025, petitioner filed the pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. 3 (ECF No. 1.) On November 21, 2025, the district court ordered briefing on petitioner’s 4 emergency request, construed as a motion for temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 6.) 5 Following briefing on the motion for temporary restraining order, on December 4, 2025, the 6 district court treated the motion as one for preliminary injunction, granted petitioner’s motion, 7 and issued a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 14.) The district court ordered petitioner’s 8 immediate release, enjoined and restrained respondents from re-detaining petitioner unless they 9 obtain a travel document for his removal to Vietnam and until they follow all procedures set forth 10 in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i), and any other applicable statutory and regulatory procedures. 11 (Id. at 12 ¶ 3.) Further, the district court enjoined and restrained respondents from removing 12 petitioner to any country other than Vietnam, unless they provide the following process: 13 (a) written notice to both petitioner and petitioner’s counsel in a language petitioner can 14 understand; (b) following the notice, petitioner must be provided a meaningful opportunity, and a 15 minimum of ten days, to raise a fear-based claim for protection under the Convention Against 16 Torture prior to removal; (c) if petitioner is found to have demonstrated “reasonable fear” of 17 removal to the designated country, respondents must move to reopen petitioner’s immigration 18 proceedings; (d) if petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a “reasonable fear” of removal to 19 the country, respondents must afford petitioner a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of 20 fifteen days, to seek to reopen his immigration proceedings. (Id. at 12-13 ¶ 4.) Bond 21 requirements were waived, and the district court referred the matter to the undersigned for further 22 proceedings. (Id. at 13 ¶¶ 5-6.) 23 Pursuant to the district court’s order, petitioner was released from custody on December 5, 24 2025. (ECF No. 17.) 25 On December 8, 2025, this Court issued a briefing schedule on the petition. (ECF No. 26 15.) That same day, respondents confirmed that petitioner was released from custody on 27 December 5, 2025. (ECF No. 17.) 28 On December 29, 2025, respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 21.) 1 Deportation Officer Patrick J. Cruz, Sr., declares that “[u]pon receiving the travel document and 2 coordinating removal plans, petitioner will be scheduled for imminent removal from the United 3 States to Vietnam.” (ECF No. 21 at 30.) On January 9, 2026, petitioner filed an opposition. 4 (ECF No. 22.) On January 9, 2026, respondents filed a reply. (ECF No. 23.) On January 13, 5 2026, respondents filed a supplemental status report, informing the court and parties that the 6 government has now obtained travel documents from Vietnam for petitioner’s removal to 7 Vietnam. (ECF No. 24 at 2, 4.) It appears the travel documents expire on June 30, 2026. (Id. at 8 4.) On January 14, 2026, petitioner filed a response to the supplemental status report. (ECF No. 9 25.) Briefing is complete. 10 III. RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 11 A. The Parties’ Positions 12 On December 29, 2025, respondents filed a motion to dismiss this action as moot, arguing 13 that because petitioner is no longer in respondents’ custody, this habeas petition is moot. (ECF 14 No. 21 at 2-3.) On January 9, 2026, petitioner filed opposition, arguing that the grant of 15 injunctive relief did not moot the habeas petition because the relief is temporary, and because 16 respondents have not pledged that they will not re-detain petitioner or try to remove him to a third 17 country. (ECF No. 22.) Respondents’ reply rested on their motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 23.) 18 In their supplemental status report, respondents further request that the Court “lift its 19 December 4, 2025, stay of detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).” (ECF No. 24 at 2 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) (An alien’s release under this section may be revoked “if, on account of 21 changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien 22 may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”)).) Petitioner opposes the request, noting 23 that the preliminary injunction does not prevent respondents from carrying out petitioner’s 24 removal to Vietnam, and allows them to re-detain petitioner if they obtain a travel document, 25 which they have. (ECF No. 25 at 1.) Further, petitioner points out that the preliminary injunction 26 only requires that if ICE does re-detain petitioner, ICE must follow the procedures required under 27 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i), which is already required by the regulations. 28 /// 1 B. Governing Standards 2 Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution requires a “case or controversy” for 3 justiciability, meaning that an injury-in-fact has occurred. “A habeas petition challenging” 4 incarceration or detention “is never moot simply because, subsequent to its filing, the petitioner 5 has been released from custody.” Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations 6 omitted). “For a habeas petition to continue to present a live controversy after the petitioner’s 7 release or deportation, . . . there must be some remaining ‘collateral consequence’ that may be 8 redressed by success on the petition.” Id. (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). The 9 collateral consequences must “be specifically identified,” and “only concrete disadvantages or 10 disabilities that [have] in fact occurred, that [are] imminently threatened, or that [are] imposed as 11 a matter of law” are sufficient. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8. 12 C. Discussion 13 Here, petitioner challenges the legality of his detention from which he was released, and 14 his future re-detention, and his potential removal to a third country. (ECF No. 1.) 15 Respondents primarily rely on Abdala, 488 F.3d at 1061, and Ogunbanke v. Nielsen, 2020 16 WL 730570, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2020), adopted in full, 2020 WL 1640028 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17 2, 2020). This Court finds both cases distinguishable because in Abdala and Ogunbanke, both 18 detainees challenged the length of their detention, and their deportations resolved their habeas 19 claims. Id. Here, petitioner challenged both the legality of his detention and his future re- 20 detention, as well as his potential removal to a third country. See Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 21 2025 WL 2996577, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (detainee was not deported during habeas 22 proceedings, and “where detainee challenges the legality of the detention from which he was 23 released and his future re-detention,” the petition is not moot). 24 Further, this Court is persuaded by petitioner’s argument that the grant of preliminary 25 injunctive relief does not render the habeas petition moot because the relief is temporary. As one 26 district court found: 27 Absent preliminary injunctive relief, [a] [p]etitioner faces the prospect of re-detention without a pre-detention hearing during the 28 pendency of this federal case, which may take months or years to 1 resolve.” Cruz v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3443146, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2025). “A habeas petition is not moot where preliminary relief is 2 not made permanent.” Id.; see also Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 403 (2019) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the suggestion of mootness 3 where “release had been granted following a preliminary injunction” “[u]nless th[e] preliminary [relief] was made permanent and not 4 disturbed on appeal” because “these individuals faced the threat of re-arrest and mandatory detention”); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 5 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[Petitioner] raises an as-applied constitutional due process challenge to the government’s ability to 6 re-detain him without a hearing. Accordingly, I have jurisdiction over his claim.”); Rodriguez v. Kaiser, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7 199636, at *21 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining government from re-detaining petitioner 8 without a pre-detention hearing after previously granting temporary restraining order); Martinez v. Wamsley, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9 201309, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2025) (“[T]he temporary relief granted to the three Petitioners does not moot their underlying 10 application for a writ of habeas corpus.”). 11 N.Y.V.D. v. Santracruz, 2026 WL 45268, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026); Im v. Semaia, 2026 WL 12 183856, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2026). Here, only preliminary relief has been granted. Pursuant 13 to the terms of the preliminary injunction, respondents must follow governing procedures prior to 14 removing petitioner to Vietnam. 15 Further, contrary to respondents’ position, the district court’s order did not stay 16 petitioner’s detention. Indeed, nowhere in the district court’s order is a stay or 8 C.F.R. § 1252(g) 17 mentioned. (See ECF No. 14, passim.) Rather, the district court enjoined petitioner’s re- 18 detention unless the government obtained a travel document for petitioner’s removal to Vietnam 19 and until they followed all procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l) and 241.13(i), and any 20 other applicable statutory and regulatory procedures. (Id.) 21 Now that respondents have obtained a travel document for petitioner, which would appear 22 to constitute a changed circumstance, they are required to follow the procedures set forth in both 23 the district court’s preliminary injunction and in their own regulations.3 (ECF No. 14 (citing 24 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i)).) Once those procedures have been followed, and petitioner has 25 been removed to Vietnam, and not a third country, respondents may file a motion to modify or 26 3 Respondents provided no documents indicating that additional steps have been taken to remove 27 petitioner since the travel document was obtained. See, e.g., Xiong v. Wofford, 2026 WL 177739, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2026) (after Laotian Travel Document obtained for Xiong, DHS 28 issued a warrant for his removal and re-detained him after issuing a notice of imminent removal.) 1 | dissolve the preliminary injunction upon timely notice to petitioner. 2 Therefore, this Court recommends that respondents’ motion to dismiss be denied without 3 || prejudice. 4 | IV. CONCLUSION 5 Respondents are required to follow the procedures set forth in both the district court’s 6 || preliminary injunction and in their own regulations. (ECF No. 14 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ □□□□□□□□□ 7 || 241.13@)).) Once those procedures have been followed, and petitioner has been removed to 8 | Vietnam, and not a third country, respondents may file a motion to modify or dissolve the 9 || preliminary injunction upon timely notice to petitioner. 10 Based on the findings above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 11 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 21) be denied without prejudice. 12 2. Respondents’ request to lift the preliminary injunction (ECF No. 24) be denied 13 without prejudice. 14 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 15 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days after 16 || being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 17 || the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 18 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 19 | filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 20 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 21 || Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (th Cir. 1991). 22 23 || Dated: February 11, 2026 A aA 24 Ly {nn spe CHI SOO KIM 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 || Ameguy1592.mtd.dn.2241.imm 28