Hitachi Construction Machinery Americas Inc. v. Amarillo Machinery Company, et al.

District Court, N.D. Texas·Decided May 18, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-00155·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION HITACHI CONSTRUCTION MACHINERY AMERICAS INC., Plaintiff, v. 2:25-CV-155-Z AMARILLO MACHINERY COMPANY, et al., Defendant. MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION Before the Court is Plaintiff Hitachi Construction Machinery Americas Inc.’s (“Hitachi”) Application for a Writ of Sequestration (“Application”), filed on July 8, 2025 in the same document as the Complaint. ECF No. 1. Because Hitachi combined its pleading with the Application, the Court did not initially expedite its review. Now, having considered the Application and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the Application. “Sequestration ...is the modern counterpart of an ancient civil law device to resolve conflicting claims to property.” Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605 (1974) (holding Louisiana’s sequestration procedure did not violate due process requirements). It “is an extraordinary pre-judgment writ whereby property in dispute... may be seized and held” by designated law enforcement officers “until it is sold, replevied|[,] or turned over as ordered by the court.” Baragas v. Coupland State Bank, No. 03-01-00098-CV, 2001 WL 1509972, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 29, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication). A writ of sequestration typically seeks to prevent concealment, destruction, waste, or disposal of property in which another party has a secured interest while litigation proceeds. See id. As such, it is “a conservatory writ” that “does not effect a transfer of title to property,” but merely

preserves the property in lieu of a resolution. Atl. Mar. Servs., LLC v. Ecopetrol Am., LLC, 2025 WL 3520344, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2025). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 provides for “sequestration” when that “remedy is available ... under the law of the state where the court is located.” See J. C. Trahan Drilling Contractor, Inc. v. Sterling, 335 F.2d 65, 66-67 (5th Cir. 1964) (dismissing appeal from a district court’s grant of sequestration because state law deemed the order “an exercise of a sound judicial discretion”). Thus, this Court applies Texas law on sequestration. Texas law provides for writs of sequestration in a few circumstances. Relevant here, a court may issue a writ of sequestration if: the suit is for title or possession of personal property or fixtures or for foreclosure or enforcement of a mortgage, lien, or security interest on personal property or fixtures and a reasonable conclusion may be drawn that there is immediate danger that the defendant or the party in possession of the property will conceal, dispose of, ill-treat, waste, or destroy the property or remove it from the county during the suit. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 62.001. Texas law also describes the permissible timing for a writ of sequestration. In a qualifying case, “[a] writ of sequestration may be issued at the initiation of a suit or at any time before final judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 62.002 (emphasis added). In order to obtain such a writ, the plaintiff must simply file an “application” that is “made under oath” which sets forth “(1) the specific facts stating the nature of the plaintiffs claim; (2) the amount in controversy, if any; and (3) the facts justifying issuance of the writ.” TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. § 62.022. A plaintiff sufficiently describes the claim when the affidavit “states that it is suing for title and possession of the described property and for foreclosure of security interest therein.” Marrs v. S. Tex. Nat. Bank, 686 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). A plaintiff may then justify the writ by “describing the property, the value of the property, that the property is in the possession of the defendant, and that the plaintiff

fears there is an immediate danger” of disposal, ill-treatment, waste, or destruction of the property. Id. Here, Hitachi has met its preliminary burden under Texas law. Hitachi filed its Application and attached the sworn affidavit of Eric Winkler, Hitachi's “Director of Regional Business for the North American and Latin American Regions.” ECF No. 1-1 at 1. That affidavit refers to numerous attached exhibits. These include a document purporting to be an “Authorized Retail Dealer Agreement”; a schedule for “Sales & Service Area”; a schedule for “Minimum Sales Responsibility”; a document listing “Standard Sales Order Terms”; a purported “Purchase-Money Security Agreement’; financing statements; an invoice; emails between the parties discussing an unpaid amount on that invoice; Hitachi's letters purporting to terminate the Dealer Agreement and enforce an acceleration clause under the Security Agreement; and Defendant's website advertising Hitachi products identical to those comprising the collateral. See id. at 1-62. Collectively, these documents allege the following: Hitachi is suing to recover an outstanding debt of $3,011,581.87, secured by collateral in AMC’s possession. Because of AMC’s default on the Security Agreement, which went uncured after notice, that debt is now due in full. The Dealer Agreement incorporated the Security Agreement. Hitachi attempted to terminate the Dealer Agreement partly on account of AMC’s default on the Security Agreement, but AMC has resisted such termination. Specifically, the agreement called for AMC to either fully purchase the collateral or return it to Hitachi upon termination. But AMC has neither paid for nor returned the property. The property is currently in AMC’s possession and some is even advertised for sale on AMC’s website. If AMC successfully sells the collateral, it may become unreachable. In the interim, the property may depreciate. Eric Winkler has alleged personal knowledge of facts supporting the Application and the Application provides supporting evidence in its various exhibits. The attached

agreements show a substantial likelihood that a dealer agreement and a security agreement existed between the parties. The standard sales terms, invoices, and emails support the allegation that AMC breached the Dealer Agreement and defaulted on the Security Agreement. The letters corroborate Hitachi's claim that it successfully terminated the Dealer Agreement and caused the secured debt to become due. The Security Agreement and the attached property descriptions show the collateral (see ECF No. 1-1 at 45-46) secures that debt. The photographs of AMC’s website support the conclusion that AMC’s continued possession of the collateral may result in removal, waste, or disposal of the collateral to the detriment of Hitachi’s interest in that property. Finally, the Court notes that writs of sequestration are often issued in ex parte proceedings. See Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 605. But here Defendants have received notice and an opportunity to respond through the pleadings. See ECF No. 7 at 5—6 (responding to Plaintiff's Application for a Writ of Sequestration). The Court considered Defendants’ response before granting the writ. The Court also considered the amount of time that has elapsed since the Application’s filing. But sequestration may occur at “any time before final judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 62.002. Ultimately, the parties’ disagreement persists. See ECF No. 28 (reporting the parties’ inability to reach settlement through alternative dispute resolution). So too, then, does the need for sequestration. For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS the Application. ECF No. 1.

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Hitachi Construction Machinery Americas Inc. v. Amarillo Machinery Company, et al., (N.D. Tex. 2026).

Hitachi Construction Machinery Americas Inc. v. Amarillo Machinery Company, et al. (Hitachi Construction Machinery Americas Inc. v. Amarillo Machinery Company, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.
416 U.S. 600 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Marrs v. South Texas National Bank
686 S.W.2d 675 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1985)