Hirshon Associates, LLC v. Suffolk Donut Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hirshon Associates, LLC v. Suffolk Donut Corp.

32 A.D.3d 457, 819 N.Y.S.2d 476

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 15, 2006

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 32 A.D.3d 457 (Hirshon Associates, LLC v. Suffolk Donut Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hirshon Associates, LLC v. Suffolk Donut Corp., 32 A.D.3d 457, 819 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

In an action to recover a real estate brokerage commission, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Underwood, J.), dated October 28, 2004, as denied that branch of their motion which was to vacate a judgment of the same court entered March 12, 2004, upon their default in answering or appearing, which was in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sum of $60,000.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to vacate the judgment entered March 12, 2004, is granted, and the judgment is vacated.

The defendant Craig Winkler was entitled to vacatur of the default judgment as against him because he was not properly served with process in this action (see CFLR 308). Further, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to vacate the March 12, 2004, judgment as against the defendant Suffolk Donut Corp. (hereinafter SDC), because SDC demonstrated a reasonable excuse for its brief delay in answering and demonstrated the existence of an arguably meritorious defense based on the prospective purchaser’s inability to purchase the property on SDC’s terms (see CFLR 5015 [a] [1]; cf. Rusciano Realty Servs. v Griffler, 62 NY2d 696, 697 [1984]; O’Connor Realty Servs. v Higgins, 149 AD2d 492 [1989]). Moreover, we note that, well before the order appealed from was issued, the [458]*458plaintiff’s counsel expressly consented to the defendants’ request to open their default, and accepted service of their answer. Adams, J.P., Goldstein, Fisher and Lifson, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover a real estate brokerage commission, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Underwood, J.), dated October 28, 2004, as denied that branch of their motion which was to vacate a judgment of the same court entered March 12, 2004, upon their default in answering or appearing, which was in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sum of $60,000.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to vacate the judgment entered March 12, 2004, is granted, and the judgment is vacated.

The defendant Craig Winkler was entitled to vacatur of the default judgment as against him because he was not properly served with process in this action (see CFLR 308). Further, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to vacate the March 12, 2004, judgment as against the defendant Suffolk Donut Corp. (hereinafter SDC), because SDC demonstrated a reasonable excuse for its brief delay in answering and demonstrated the existence of an arguably meritorious defense based on the prospective purchaser’s inability to purchase the property on SDC’s terms (see CFLR 5015 [a] [1]; cf. Rusciano Realty Servs. v Griffler, 62 NY2d 696, 697 [1984]; O’Connor Realty Servs. v Higgins, 149 AD2d 492 [1989]). Moreover, we note that, well before the order appealed from was issued, the [458]*458plaintiff’s counsel expressly consented to the defendants’ request to open their default, and accepted service of their answer. Adams, J.P., Goldstein, Fisher and Lifson, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

32 A.D.3d 457, 819 N.Y.S.2d 476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hirshon-associates-llc-v-suffolk-donut-corp-nyappdiv-2006.

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