Hinyup v. L. A. Frey & Sons, Inc.

146 So. 2d 511, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 2550
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 1, 1962
DocketNo. 285
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 146 So. 2d 511 (Hinyup v. L. A. Frey & Sons, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hinyup v. L. A. Frey & Sons, Inc., 146 So. 2d 511, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 2550 (La. Ct. App. 1962).

Opinion

JESSE C. McGEE, Judge ad hoc.

This is a workmen’s compensation suit by Clara Nola Hinyup, as claimant, against her employer, L. A. Frey & Sons, Inc., and its workmen’s compensation insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; she claims compensation for permanent total disability [512]*512resulting from an alleged injury sustained by her on August 6, 1958. The defendants deny that the claimant sustained any injury during the course of her employment, and further deny that she was at any time subsequent to August 6, 1958, disabled from working.

After trial the court found for the claimant and awarded her compensation at the rate of $35.00 per week for a period of 100 weeks commencing from August 6, 1958, together with the sum of $635.48 representing medical and doctor expenses.

It is from this judgment that the defendants have perfected their appeal and the plaintiff has answered the appeal and prays that the judgment be amended by increasing the amount of the award to 400 weeks at $35.00 per week with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from due date of each installment until paid together with statutory penalty of 12% per annum, plus reasonable attorneys fees.

In this court defendants have moved to dismiss or strike plaintiff’s answer to the appeal on the grounds that the answer was not timely filed in accordance with the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2133 which requires that an answer to an appeal must be filed not later than fifteen days after the return day or the lodging of the record, whichever is later. Defendants contend that since the record in this case was lodged on March 2, 1961 and plaintiff’s answer to the appeal was not filed until March 31, 1962 that the answer was not timely filed. In answer to this contention plaintiff argues that LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2133 is not applicable but that instead Code of Practice, Art. 890 is controlling here.

The record shows that the order for this suspensive appeal was signed by the trial judge July 1, 1960, fixing the return day on July 29, 1960. Plaintiff was served with a copy of this order. Subsequently each month the defendants obtained an extension of the return day for the reason that the court reporter had not completed the transcript of testimony until finally on February 27, 1961, the return day was extended to March 27, 1961. However, the plaintiff did not receive notice of these extensions of the return day. Furthermore, the record does not show that plaintiff received any notice when the record was lodged in the Court of Appeal on March 2, 1961.

Under these facts the plaintiff contends that insofar as she was aware, the record was lodged on July 29, 1960, the return date indicated in the only notice which she received. Plaintiff argues that if the record had been lodged on July 29, 1960, as she had a right to assume that it did, the delay for answering the appeal would have started to run at that time and under the provisions of Code of Practice, Art. 890 would have continued until three days before that fixed for argument, which date in this case was July 9, 1962.

Applicable here is Sec. 4 of Act 15 of 1960, the enabling act for the LSA-Code of Civil Procedure, found in LSA-C.C.P. page 748, reading in pertinent part as follows:

“Section 4. (A) This act is hereby declared to be remedial legislation.
“(B) The provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure enacted by Section 1 hereof, so far as applicable, shall govern and regulate the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings :
“(1) Instituted on or after the effective date of this act; and
“(2) Pending on the effective date of this act, except that none of the provisions thereof shall:
“(a) Decrease or shorten any procedural delay granted or allowed by any law in existence immediately prior to, and which had commenced to run but had not yet completely elapsed on, the effective date of this act; or”

In our opinion the exception set forth in Section 4(B) (2) (a) is applicable here be[513]*513cause an application of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2133 would shorten a delay which had commenced hut not yet elapsed. Insofar as the plaintiff was notified or is shown to have known, the record was lodged in the Court of Appeal on July 29, 1960, on which date Code of Practice, Art. 890 was in effect providing that the procedural delay for answering the appeal would extend until three days before the case was set for oral argument. It would he harsh indeed to hold that the plaintiff did not have a right to rely on the provisions of Code of Practice, Art. 890 when she received no notice of the extensions of the return dates nor any notice of the date the appeal was lodged.

The case of Great American Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, 140 So.2d 477 (1st Cir. La.App.1962), cited by defendants is clearly distinguishable. In these cases the orders for appeals were signed in the district court on May 1, 1961 and May 5, 1961, the records were lodged in the Court of Appeal on June 5, 1961, and the answers to the appeals were not filed until September 23, 1961. The appellee contended that since suit was filed before January 1, 1961, the provisions of Code of Practice, Art. 890 were controlling. The court held that since the orders for the appeals were signed and the records lodged after January 1, 1961, the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2133 were controlling and that the answers to the appeals were not filed within fifteen days is required. The factual distinction between that case and the instant case is that here the order for an appeal was signed before January 1,1961 and insofar as the appellee knew, the record was lodged before January 1, 1961. We agree with Great American Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, supra, but find it inapplicable here.

We are of the opinion that the answer to the appeal in this case was timely filed and that defendants’ motion to dismiss said answer must be overruled.

The plaintiff alleges that on or about August 6, 1958, while in the employment of L. A. Frey & Sons, Inc., and in the course and scope of her duties as a sausage machine operator, she slipped on ice on the floor, fell and suffered a serious injury to her back; that as a result of the fall or injury she suffered a strain to the' nerves and muscles of her back in the sacroiliac area and suffers pain in the sacral area with radiation down into her legs; she has received examination and treatment and bilateral traction for a period of 14 days, and thereafter underwent a lumbar myelogram in order to determine if there was evidence of detectable compression of the sacroiliac and sciatic nerve root, but no relief has been obtained from this condition; that she continues to wear a lumbo-sacral corset and elastic bandages to halt the swelling and pain in the lower extremities.

Plaintiff testified that after the accident, she left the plant, caught a bus and met her husband at a ferry boat in Gretna, after having called him; that she went to the office of Dr. Ernest A. Schiro for treatment; that on the following, morning she returned to the plant and furnished one of the officials, Lawrence Frey, with a note from Schiro, wherein the doctor suggested that she have a leave of absence from her job.

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Related

Hinyup v. L. a. Frey & Sons, Inc.
149 So. 2d 763 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1963)

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Bluebook (online)
146 So. 2d 511, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 2550, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hinyup-v-l-a-frey-sons-inc-lactapp-1962.