Hinsdale Sanitary District v. Washburn

188 N.E. 346, 354 Ill. 240
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 21, 1933
DocketNo. 21921. Reversed and remanded.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 188 N.E. 346 (Hinsdale Sanitary District v. Washburn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hinsdale Sanitary District v. Washburn, 188 N.E. 346, 354 Ill. 240 (Ill. 1933).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Stone

delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant sanitary district appeals from the judgment of the county court of DuPage county sustaining a legal objection to the confirmation of a supplemental assessment to pay an estimated deficiency in the cost of construction of an intercepting sewer. Numerous objections were filed in the proceedings, all of which were overruled except the objection that no public hearing was had on the matter of a deficiency assessment after the confirmation of the original assessment and before the contract was awarded. Since the objectors did not appeal from the judgment of the county court overruling other objections, the cause is here on a record presenting the single question whether the hearing provided for by section 59 of the Local Improvement act should have been held.

Section 59 of the Local Improvement act, (Smith’s Stat. 1931, chap. 24, par. 761,) in so far as material to the question here, provides as follows: “At any time after bids have been received pursuant to the provisions of this act, 'if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the board of local improvements that the first assessment is insufficient to pay the contract price or the bonds or vouchers issued or to be issued in payment of such contract price, together with the amount required to pay the accruing interest thereon, said board shall make and file an estimate of the amount of such deficiency and thereupon a second or supplemental assessment for such estimated deficiency of the cost of the work and interest may be made in the same manner as nearly as may be as in the first assessment, and so on until sufficient money shall have been realized to pay for such improvement and such interest: * * * Provided, further, that if said estimated deficiency shall exceed ten percentum of the original estimate, then no contract shall be awarded until a public hearing shall be had on said supplemental proceeding in like manner as in the original proceedings: And, provided, further, that no more than one (1) supplemental assessment shall be levied to meet any deficiency where said deficiency is caused by the original estimate made by the engineer, being insufficient: And, provided, further, that if any local improvement has heretofore been constructed or is now in process of construction or contracts have been entered into for its construction, under the direction of the board of local improvements pursuant to an ordinance providing that such improvement should be constructed and paid for by special assessment, it shall be no objection to any supplemental assessment proceeding now pending or hereafter instituted with respect to any such improvement that a public hearing on said supplemental proceeding was not had before the execution of the contract for the construction of such improvement.”

The county court held that on the record made in the case such a public hearing should have been had before the letting of the original contract for the improvement, because it reasonably appeared that a deficiency in the assessment existed, amounting to more than ten per cent of the-original estimate. The court dismissed the proceeding on the ground that under the statute, when there is such a showing of deficiency, a public hearing is a condition precedent and goes to the jurisdiction of the court to confirm a supplemental assessment. This court so held in Village of Beverly v. Schaerr, 350 Ill. 178. Appellant argues that the record does not show any basis for the holding that, prior to the letting of the contract, a deficiency in excess of ten per cent of the original estimate could have been discovered. That constitutes the question here.

The original assessment as confirmed by the court was for $436,280.06. The original estimate was for a total cost of $445,076.70, of which the cost of construction was estimated to be $400,970, engineering and supervision $20,-048.50, expense and cost of making and collecting the assessment $24,058.20. The ordinance directed that bids be received upon unit prices, the number of units of each item being estimated. The low bid for the work was $413,463.30. It exceeded the original estimate of the cost of the work by three and one-tenth per cent. It was accepted, a contract entered into and the work done. It appears from the record, however, that due to unexpected underground conditions the units of work overran the estimate in certain places and underran it in others, resulting in a net overruns cost of $29,447.08. The underruns were due to better working conditions than estimated by the engineers, and the overruns were due to an unexpected and unknown subterranean peat-bed, which resulted in excessive caving, requiring much additional labor and materials and causing subsidence to an unexpected degree in pavements and sidewalks under which the sewer passed.

When the work was completed it was found that the deficiency necessary to be raised by supplemental assessment was, in additional to the $29,447.08, a deficiency in interest accruing on bonds not paid, estimated at $50,000, and the estimated expense and collection cost of the supplemental assessment $6000. These and other estimated costs brought the total estimated deficiency to $117,149.43. It is not contended by counsel for appellant that this is not in excess of ten per cent of the original estimate, but it is argued that there was no way in which it could have been known, before the contract was let, that the deficiency would be as large, but that the only deficiency which seemed apparent upon receipt of bids and before the contract was let amounted to no more than three and one-tenth per cent of the original estimate. They say, also, that there was no ground for suspecting that the deficiency in accrued interest would arise until it became known that numerous property owners had not paid their assessments. Counsel for appellees, on the other hand, argue that it was apparent on receipt of the bids that the deficiency in the actual cost, including the estimated cost for property taken, would amount to over six per cent, and that had there been a reasonable estimate amounting to at least five per cent for deficiency in interest, a total deficiency exceeding ten per cent would have appeared.

The first question, then, is whether it was the duty of the sanitary district to estimate a reasonable amount for deficiency in interest iri determining whether the total estimated deficiency exceeded ten per cent of the original estimate. Appellant’s counsel say that the statute does not require that the board calculate a deficiency in interest, and as no one had any reason to presume that the property owners would default in the prompt payment of the assessments, no reason existed, at the time the bids were received, for making such a reservation. They also say that no one could foretell the unusual underground conditions which brought the final cost of construction up to nearly ten per cent of the original estimate of the construction cost. We are of the opinion that the record in this case justifies appellant’s latter contention. Borings were made, but the evidence shows they did not disclose the nature of the underlying peat-bed.

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188 N.E. 346, 354 Ill. 240, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hinsdale-sanitary-district-v-washburn-ill-1933.