Hinkle v. Bisignano

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedJune 5, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-03002
StatusUnknown

This text of Hinkle v. Bisignano (Hinkle v. Bisignano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hinkle v. Bisignano, (E.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Jun 05, 2025

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

5 JOHN H.,1 No. 1:25-cv-3002-EFS 6 Plaintiff, 7 ORDER REVERSING THE v. ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS, 8 AND REMANDING FOR FRANK BISIGNANO, MORE PROCEEDINGS 9 Commissioner of Social Security,2

10 Defendant.

11 Plaintiff John H. asks the Court to reverse the Administrative 12 Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Title 2 and Title 16 benefits. As is 13 14

15 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 16 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 17 2 Frank Bisignano was confirmed as the Commissioner of Social 18 Security on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), he is substituted as the Defendant. 20 1 explained below, by not calling a medical expert, the ALJ erred when

2 evaluating Plaintiff’s symptom reports and the medical opinions. This 3 matter is remanded for further proceedings. 4 I. Background

5 Plaintiff applied for benefits, claiming disability beginning 6 August 1, 2019, because of diabetes, heart issues, bilateral arm 7 impairments, lower back impairment, memory loss, dizziness, fainting,

8 and neuropathy in his hands, knees, and feet.3 On the disability onset 9 date, Plaintiff was 55 years old, which is categorized as advance age.4 10 The agency denied benefits; and thereafter, ALJ Malcom Ross held a

11 telephone hearing in August 2023, at which Plaintiff and a vocational 12 expert testified.5 13

14 15 16

17 3 AR 234–39, 248–51. 18 4 AR 85; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(e), 416.963(e). 19 5 AR 145–66, 48–82. 20 1 The ALJ issued a decision denying benefits.6 The ALJ found

2 Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the 3 medical evidence and other evidence.”7 As to the medical opinions, the 4 ALJ found:

5 • the reviewing opinions of Howard Platter, MD, and Colleen 6 Ryan, MD, persuasive. 7 • the examining opinions of Rachel Worley, NP-C, and treating

8 opinions of Braiden Heath, PA-C, not persuasive.8 9 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found: 10 • Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through

11 December 31, 2021. 12 13

14 6 AR 14–31. Per 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)–(g), 416.920(a)–(g), a five-step 15 evaluation determines whether a claimant is disabled. 16 7 AR 22. As recommended by the Ninth Circuit in Smartt v. Kijakazi, 17 the ALJ should consider replacing the phrase “not entirely consistent” 18 with “inconsistent.” 53 F.4th 489, 499, n.2 (9th Cir. 2022). 19 8 AR 24–25. 20 1 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

2 activity since August 1, 2019, the alleged onset date. 3 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable 4 severe impairments: diabetes and peripheral neuropathy.

5 • Step three: Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 6 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the 7 severity of one of the listed impairments.

8 • RFC: Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work except: 9 he can stand and/or walk for a total four hours in an 8- hour day. He can frequently climb ramps and stairs, but 10 cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can have occasional exposure to hazards, such as dangerous 11 machinery. He can have no exposure to unprotected heights. 12 • Step four: Plaintiff could perform past relevant work as a 13 telephone solicitor and therefore was not disabled.9 14 Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the 15 Appeals Council and now this Court.10 16 17

18 9 AR 17–26. 19 10 AR 1–6; ECF No. 1. 20 1 II. Standard of Review

2 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by 3 substantial evidence or is based on legal error” and such error 4 impacted the nondisability determination.11 Substantial evidence is

5 “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 6 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 7 support a conclusion.”12

9 11 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. § 10 405(g); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) ), 11 superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that 12 the court may not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error— 13 one that “is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 14 determination”). 15 12 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 16 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 17 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a 18 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 19 detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion,” not simply the evidence 20 1 III. Analysis

2 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred both by rejecting Plaintiff’s 3 symptom testimony and by finding the State agency medical 4 consultants’ administrative findings “persuasive” when he instead

5 crafted an RFC that varied from those findings. In contrast, the 6 Commissioner maintains that the ALJ’s findings were supported by 7 substantial evidence and that any possible error is harmless. As is

8 explained below, by not calling a medical expert to offer testimony as to 9 the etiology of Plaintiff’s symptoms, the ALJ erred when evaluating 10 Plaintiff’s reported symptoms.

11 A. Symptom Reports: Plaintiff establishes consequential 12 error. 13 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity,

14 persistence, and limiting effect of his symptoms were not entirely 15 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 16

17 cited by the ALJ or the parties.) (cleaned up); Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 18 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 19 not indicate that such evidence was not considered[.]”). 20 1 record.13 As is discussed below, this finding is not supported by

2 substantial evidence given the ALJ’s failure to call a medical examiner 3 to offer an opinion based on the complete record, which included about 4 a year of treatment records that were not reviewed by the State agency

5 medical consultants—records which revealed that providers continued 6 to order testing to explain the cause of Plaintiff’s symptoms. 7 1. Standard

8 The ALJ must identify what symptom claims are being 9 discounted and clearly and convincingly explain the rationale for 10 discounting the symptoms with supporting citation to evidence.14 This

11 requires the ALJ to “show his work” and provide a “rationale . . . clear 12 enough that it has the power to convince” the reviewing court.15 13 Factors the ALJ may consider when evaluating the intensity,

14 persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms include: 1) 15 objective medical evidence, 2) daily activities; 3) the location, duration, 16

17 13 AR . 18 14 Smartt v.

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United States v. Friedman
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Debbra Hill v. Michael Astrue
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Lingenfelter v. Astrue
504 F.3d 1028 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
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759 F.3d 995 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
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Bluebook (online)
Hinkle v. Bisignano, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hinkle-v-bisignano-waed-2025.