Hine v. New York & Bermudez Co.

73 F. 852, 20 C.C.A. 63, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 1850
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedApril 7, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 73 F. 852 (Hine v. New York & Bermudez Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hine v. New York & Bermudez Co., 73 F. 852, 20 C.C.A. 63, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 1850 (2d Cir. 1896).

Opinion

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge.

The libelants are owners of the steamship San Domingo. They engaged the firm of Bowring & Archibald, shipbrokers in New York City, to effect a time charter of their vessel. Negotiations ensued between this firm and W. n. Hurlbut & Co., representing the respondents, which resulted in a charter executed by Bowring & Archibald, agents for owners, and by the New York & Bermudez Company, through its president. The material parts of the charter party are as follows:

“The said agents agree to let, and the said charterers agree to hire, the said steamship for a trip of about two calendar months from the day of delivery * * * in New York. * * * she being then stanch, strong, and every way fitted for the service, * * * and to be so maintained during the continuation of this charter party; to be employed in such lawful trades, between safe port a0“d ports in British North America (not north of Eiver St. Lawrence) aad United States of America aad West Indies '™d South America (not south of Eiver Platte), including Guanaco, Venezuela, as charterers or their agents shall direct.”

All of this clause was a part of the printed form used, except the words italicized. The words, “South America (not south of River Platte),” were broad enough, by themselves, to include any port in Venezuela. The insertion, therefore, of the words, “including Cuanaco, Venezuela,” was a distinct, positive, and explicit: notice to the owners that their vessel was being chartered for use in trade with that port, and was to be stanch, strong, and in every way fitted for such service as employment in that trade would require of her.

Next follows a clause providing for payment by owners of wages, provisions, and stores. This is followed by a provision requiring charterers to pay for coals, port charges, etc., — both clauses being part of the printed form. Then comes the clause which, by reason of the careless and* inartificial way in which it was expressed, has caused the litigation now before this court for determination. It is in ink, containing provisions not contemplated by the printed form, and reads as follows:

“Steamer to be fitted with shifting boards and bulkheads suitable for carrying asphalt cargoes safely, to be done by owner’s agents, but at charterers’ expense.”

[854]*854It will be noticed first that this clause clearly and explicitly notified the owners that, at whatever of the stipulated ports the charterers found asphalt, it might be expected they would load the vessel with it. The clause also contemplates that something shall be done to the ship in order to fit her for carrying such cargoes. The owners contend that this fitting is to be done by the charterers, and, in support of this contention, call attention to the circumstance that the clause is written under the same subdivision in the charter party which contains the provisions as to charterers paying for coals, port charges, etc. Inspection of the original document, however, shows that this argument is wholly without force. The clerk who undertook to fill up the printed form evidently wrote the clause in the first blank space he found large enough to contain it. Alternatively, the owners contend that it was to be done by Bowring & Archibald individually; the words “owners’ agents” being, as they contend, mere descriptio personas, and used for the purpose of identifying that firm. This would be a most strained and unnatural construction. The charter party is a bipartite agreement. The construction contended for would introduce a third party, individually responsible for defaults in the performance of acts for the doing of which it received no consideration. Evidence was introduced by the libelants explanatory of the situation of the parties, and which discloses the negotiations that led up to the making of the charter party. When the charter was first talked of, Guanaco was not referred to. It was subsequently named as one of the ports. Asphalt was spoken of as probable cargo, and, when the parties had about got to terms as to rate of hire, charterers wished the owners to pay the expense of putting in the fittings necessary for that sort of cargo. Bowring & Archibald, acting as agents for the owners, declined to go to this expense, whereupon the charterers agreed to pay it, but still expressed a desire to have the fittings put up, or their putting up seen to, by Bowring & Archibald. There seems to have been some impression that Bowring & Archibald’s long experience as steamship owners and agents would tend to insure the work being done properly. But all this in no way operates to require an unnatural construction of the clause. A phrase which states that a certain piece of work is to be done by “owners’ agents” plainly imports that it will be done by agents of the owners, not by agents of the charterers. That the charterer is to pay the expense entailed does not change the provision for doing the work; and if the particular agents who represent the owners have superior knowledge and experience, and may be expected to use superior judgment in prescribing the details of the work, that knowledge and experience may presumably benefit the owners, but will’not relieve them of the obligation to ’do the work which they have stipulated shall be done by their agents. We concur, therefore, in the conclusion expressed by the district judge, as follows:

“The clause in question was a substantial and necessary part of the charter. The nature of the cargo — a peculiar one — is not elsewhere referred to. Special fittings for such a cargo were necessary to be made by some one; [855]*855and, as the clause in question is made a part of the charter itself, I feel bound to construe it in connection with the previous clause, providing that tlie ship ‘shall he in every way jit ted for the service,’ and as an amplification and further specification of what the service was expet-1 (id to be, and what was necessary to make the ship fit.’’

The charter party, therefore, when executed by owners' agents, bouud their principals, the owners, when notified that an asphalt cargo was to be loaded, to deliver the Ban Domingo "tight, stanch, strong,and iu every way fitted for'’ such service, "with shifting boards and bulkheads suitable for carrying asphalt cargoes safely.” Apparently, this stipulation was entered into by owners’ agents without any consultation with their principals. It was, however, within their authority, as shipbrokers and agents for the owners, io make such stipulation, it was, moreover, reasonably to be expected that having, as agents, thus increased their principal’s obligations beyond the measure expressed in the usual printed form of charter party, they would continue to act as agents for owners, in complying with such special stipulation. In other words, having pledged the ship to a warranty of the seaworthiness of additional fittings to be put in by them, it might fairly be supposed that they would personally superintend tin* doing of the work, thus giving their principals the benefit of Ute special knowledge and experience they were supposed to possess. The contrary seems to have been the case. Having negotiated the charter, executed the charter party on behalf of owners, and thus, presumably, earned their commissions, they turned the business of fitting up the Ban Domingo lo safely carry asphalt cargoes over to the captain, who liad never had any experience with such cargoes. The Ban Domingo being in Philadelphia, lío wring & Archibald sent for the captain to come to A'evv York, for consultation with the charterers.

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Bluebook (online)
73 F. 852, 20 C.C.A. 63, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 1850, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hine-v-new-york-bermudez-co-ca2-1896.