Hinds v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

518 F. Supp. 1350
CourtSpecial Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act
DecidedJuly 22, 1981
DocketCiv. A. No. 81-3
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 518 F. Supp. 1350 (Hinds v. Consolidated Rail Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Special Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hinds v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 518 F. Supp. 1350 (reglrailreorgct 1981).

Opinion

518 F.Supp. 1350 (1981)

Leslie R. HINDS, Darlene Thomas, Crescencio S. Miranda, Daniel Gailliard and William S. Smith, Plaintiffs,
v.
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 81-3.

Special Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act.

July 22, 1981.

*1351 Robert A. Sedler, Detroit, Mich., and Harold M. Provizer, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiffs.

Harry A. Rissetto, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

Raymond M. Larizza, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for intervenor United States.

Before FRIENDLY, Presiding Judge, and WISDOM and THOMSEN, Judges.

WISDOM, Judge:

In this class action five plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of § 501 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, P.L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980) ("Staggers Act"). That section changes the method of calculating the employee income protection provided by § 505(b) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, P.L. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974), 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) ("RRR Act" or "the Act"). Each of the plaintiffs is a former employee of the Penn Central Railroad and each is now employed by Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). They allege that each is a "protected employee" within the meaning of *1352 § 501 of the RRR Act.[1] A protected employee who is "deprived of employment or adversely affected with respect to ... compensation" as a result of the restructuring of the bankrupt railroads under the Act is entitled to receive from Conrail certain benefits, including "monthly displacement allowances" (MDAs) under § 505(b) of the Act. The RRR Act originally used a single formula to compute the MDAs of all protected employees. The Staggers Act amends § 505(b) to divide protected employees into four categories and provides a different method for calculating the MDAs for the members of each category. The plaintiffs allege that the deliberate effect of those amendments is to deny or substantially reduce the MDA entitlement of nonoperating employees (clerical workers, for example) and maintenance-of-way employees who continue to be employed by Conrail, while operating employees (train and engine crews) and employees not covered by a collective bargaining agreement (management) still in Conrail's employ continue to receive substantially the same guaranteed payments as before. The only issue in this case is whether this aspect of the Staggers Act discriminates between operating employees, on the one hand, and maintenance-of-way and nonoperating employees, on the other, in a way so lacking in rational justification as to violate the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.[2]

This court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over constitutional attacks on the Act under § 209(e)(1)(B) of the Act. See Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Hinds, 512 F.Supp. 1331 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A.1981), enjoining the plaintiffs from prosecuting this claim in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

The complaint asks for injunctive and declaratory relief. After filing its answer, Conrail filed a motion for summary judgment. The United States, intervening as of right to defend the constitutionality of this federal statute, filed a similar motion. The plaintiffs then cross-filed a motion for summary judgment. The court certified this case as a class action on the plaintiffs' unopposed motion.

We hold, and the parties agree, that there is no dispute as to any material fact. We grant the defendant's and the intervenor's motions for summary judgment; we deny the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The Staggers Act establishes a rational classification system and is therefore not in violation of the fifth amendment.

I.

The threshold issue this case presents is the appropriate standard of judicial *1353 review. We conclude that when Congress enacts social welfare legislation such as the labor protection provisions of the Staggers Act, the statute in question can be held to violate the fifth amendment only if it is "patently arbitrary or irrational". United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176, 101 S.Ct. 453, 460, 66 L.Ed.2d 368, 377 (1980). "Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end." Id. 449 U.S. at 178, 101 S.Ct. at 461, 66 L.Ed.2d at 378.[3]

This minimal rationality standard imposes a heavy burden on the challengers to the Staggers Act. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), the Supreme Court observed:

In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 [31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369]. "The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations —illogical, it may be, and unscientific." Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 [33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730]. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 [81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393].

Dandridge involved a classification scheme for the award of social welfare benefits. The plaintiffs invoked the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The due process clause of the fifth amendment imposes no higher standard. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81, 92 S.Ct. 254, 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971). Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694, 30 L.Ed.2d 884 (1954).

The plaintiffs accept the minimum rationality standard as applicable to this case, but contend that "there is no rational basis for distinguishing between the three generic classes of agreement employees with respect to the basic formulae for determining their compensation guarantees or for effectively denying supplemental income for protected nonoperating and maintenance-of-way employees while retaining it for protected operating employees."[4] Before applying the minimal rationality standard to § 501 of the Staggers Act, we take a brief look at the RRR Act.

II.

In 1973 the bankruptcy of certain major railroads in the Northeast and Midwest regions of the country threatened the national welfare; seven of the railroads, including the huge Penn Central system, were principally *1354 in the Northeast.

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Related

Consol. Rail Corp. v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co.
638 F. Supp. 350 (Special Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 1986)
RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES'ASS'N v. United States
575 F. Supp. 1554 (Special Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 1983)

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Bluebook (online)
518 F. Supp. 1350, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hinds-v-consolidated-rail-corp-reglrailreorgct-1981.