Hilton v. Roylance

58 L.R.A. 723, 69 P. 660, 25 Utah 129, 1902 Utah LEXIS 46
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 21, 1902
DocketNo. 1368
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 58 L.R.A. 723 (Hilton v. Roylance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hilton v. Roylance, 58 L.R.A. 723, 69 P. 660, 25 Utah 129, 1902 Utah LEXIS 46 (Utah 1902).

Opinion

BARTCH, J.,

having stated the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The principal question to be determined is, were John R. Park and Annie E. Armitage lawfully married on December 5, 1872 ? The appellant insists that- the ceremony was performed according to the rites of the Mormon Church, by a person authorized to perform it, that it was a legal marriage, and valid at common law; and that the court erred in finding that the parties never intermarried and were never husband and wife. The respondent contends that there never was a marriage in this case, because, as is insisted, there never was any consent to a marriage contract, and that the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove a marriage contract, which it is claimed she failed to do. It is insisted by the respondent that the “sealing ceremony” which was performed and is relied upon as constituting a marriage ceremony simply made the parties thereto husband and wife for eternity (that is, after death, but not for time or this world, nor for time and [137]*137eternity), and that Dr. Park consented to be sealed to the plaintiff for eternity only. So far as appears from the record the sealing ceremony performed in this instance was, in substance, such as it was the custom to perform where members of the Mormon Church entered into matrimony. It is a ceremony peculiar to that church and its people, who constitute a large majority of the inhabitants of this commonwealth, and the importance of the main question herein presented, as affecting the marriage status and property rights in this State, must not be overlooked; for if, under the facts and circumstances disclosed in this record, there was no marriage, then it would seem impossible to conjecture how many of such sealing ceremonies, although performed by ordinance of the church, were, after all, mere nullities, creating no valid marital relations.

Marriage, strictly speaking, is not a mere civil contract, but a status created by contract. 1 Bish. Mar. & Div., sec. 34. It is true, it is founded in consent of the parties, but the consent is the contract because of which the status 1 is created. Marriage differs from ordinary contracts, in that it can only exist where one man and one woman are legally united for life, whereas ordinary civil contracts may exist between two or more of either or both sexes for any stipulated time. So the marriage relation differs from other contractual relations in that, when the status is once created, the State becomes an interested party, and thereafter the marriage, with the rights and duties assigned by the law of matrimony, is not subject, as to its continuance, dissolution, or effects, to the mere intention and pleasure of the contracting parties. The marriage, with its privileges, obligations, rights, and duties which are or may be assigned by the law of matrimony for the establishment of families and the multiplication and education of human kind, continues during the life of the parties, and no dissolution of the status can be effected simply by the mutual consent or agreement of the [138]*138parties. It is regulated and controlled, and can be dissolved only through the sovereign power of the State, whenever justice to either or both parties or the welfare of the public demands it. 1 Bish. Mar. & Div., secs. 11, 30. The doctrine of ethics and of social science is universally recognized as the foundation of the marriage law, and from time immemorial marriage has been, in every civilized country, recognized as the foundation of civilization and of the social system. Neither one of the parties to the marriage can thereafter commit a breach of any of the obligations or duties assumed without a violation of conscience as well as of 1'aw. In view of these things, how can it be said, as insisted for the respondent, that the “marriage contract is on a level with other contracts?” It is apparent that many of the rules of law applicable to the marriage status differ widely in material respects from those applicable to mere civil contracts. Id., secs. 35, 36. That, under the law, consent is the essence of marriage, the same as of every other contract, is true, and it is also true that the law does not compel parties to assume 2 the matrimonial' state without their mutual consent; but such consent, which, as we have seen, constitutes the contract to marry, may be given in writing or verbally, or may be inferred from the acts of the parties or the ceremony performed. With reference to consent, in case of marriage, no particular form of words is necessary. If, in language mutually understood, or by acts declaratory of intention, the parties accept each other as husband and wife, the marriage is consummated. Nor, in the absence of a statutory requirement, is a ceremony indispensable to its validity. Bissell v. 3 Bissell, 55 Barb. 325. At common law, where the parties cohabit together for a considerable length of time, and hold each other out as husband and wife, a marriage may be implied, though no ceremony was ever performed. Mr. Bishop, in his work on Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, in volume 1, section 77, says: “Because of the high favdr [139]*139in wbicb marriage is beld by the law, we have transmitted to ns the special maxim, 'Semper pmesundtur pro matrimonio" ('always presume marriage’). When a man and woman are living together as husband and wife, the law will hold them to be such, even against strong probabilities that they are not, or, when a ceremony of marriage is shown, there will be the like presumption that it is valid, unless some distinct and special fact clearly appears in the particular case to the contrary.” So, where a marriage ceremony is performed according to the forms of a church or of a religious sect, consent of the parties and capacity to contract will be presumed. Nor is cohabitation necessary to constitute a valid marriage. 4 “Consensus, non concuMtuSj facit nuitrimonium,’’ is a maxim of the common law, of the civil law, and equally of the ecclesiastical law. In Fleming v. People, 27 N. Y. 329, Mr. Chief Justice DeNio said: “Prima facie the fact of a marriage celebrated according to the forms of a religious denomination embraces the requisite assent of the married parties to take each other as husband and wife; and if the party whose interest it is to dispute the marriage is satisfied with a general statement of the ceremony, and will not inquire more particularly as to what took place, he can not be permitted to deny the apparent effect of the evidence.” 1 Bl. Comm., 433-435; 2 Kent, Comm., 87-89; Abb. Tr. Ev., 102-103; Bradner, Ev., 397; 1 Bish. Mar. & Div., sec. 383; 19 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 1180-1182; People v. Calder, 30 Mich. 85; Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357; Wilkie v. Collins, 48 Miss. 496; Caujolle v. Ferrie, 26 Barb. 177; Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47, 22 Am. Dec. 563; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31, 34 L. R. A. 384, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419. While, however, present intention and mutual consent of the parties is necessary to constitute a valid marriage, still, where the marriage has been celebrated by a properly authorized ceremony, apparently 5 with the assent of both parties, no secret reservation of [140]*140on© of the parties, entertained at the time of the ceremony, unknown to tbe other party, can serve the party entertaining it to avoid- the marriage, for this would be a fraud upon the innocent party, and the guilty one would be estopped to deny the marriage, or to take advantage of his or her own wrong.

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Bluebook (online)
58 L.R.A. 723, 69 P. 660, 25 Utah 129, 1902 Utah LEXIS 46, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hilton-v-roylance-utah-1902.