Hilton v. Forrestal

165 F.2d 251, 83 U.S. App. D.C. 44, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 2061
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedDecember 29, 1947
DocketNo. 9554
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 165 F.2d 251 (Hilton v. Forrestal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hilton v. Forrestal, 165 F.2d 251, 83 U.S. App. D.C. 44, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 2061 (D.C. Cir. 1947).

Opinion

PRETTYMAN, Justice.

Appellant brought a civil action in the District Court for a declaratory judgment.1 He alleged that he is a civil service employee of the United States Government at the Charleston, South Carolina, Navy Yard, with permanent status and with twelve years continuous and satisfactory service;, that on November 8, 1946, he was placed in furlough status for one year, pursuant to. regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission purportedly pursuant to. Section 12 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944,2 governing reductions in force among Federal Government personnel. He asserted that the regulations are void as contrary to the statute, and prayed that the court so declare and direct appellee-defendant Secretary to restore him to his office. The District Court gave summary judgment for defendants.

Section 12 of the Veterans’ Preference Act provides as follows:

“In any reduction in personnel in any civilian service of any Federal agency, competing employees shall be released in accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations which shall give due effect to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings: Provided, That the length of time spent in [253]*253active service in the armed forces of the United States of each such employee shall he credited in computing length of total service: Provided further, That preference employees whose efficiency ratings are ‘good’ or better shall be retained in preference to all other competing employees and that preference employees whose efficiency ratings are below ‘good’ shall be retained in preference to competing nonpreference employees who have equal or lower efficiency ratings: * *

The pertinent regulation issued by the Civil Service Commission is set forth below.3

Appellant says that the regulations are void because they give absolute preference to veterans with permanent tenure (Class A-l), whereas the statute requires that due effect must also, and equally, be given to length of service and efficiency ratings.

The question before us is whether the regulations are reasonable under the statute. It is true that the Commission has given “due effect” to the four statutory factors by a sort of seriatim application. First there is a classification by tenure; then a sub-classification by veterans’ preference; then a sub-classification by efficiency ratings; and within the sub-classifications length of service is applied.

We cannot say that this is an unreasonable method of applying the wholly general directives of the statute. We cannot, therefore, hold the regulations void.

At the same time, we do not think, as appellees argue, that the regulations as drawn represent the only possible method of applying the statute. The proviso in Section 12 is that preference employees shall be retained in preference to all other “competing” employees. We think that that refers to employees competing within the bounds of such classifications as the Commission may establish by regulations, giving “due effect” to the four factors named. The regulations as drawn refer to “competitive retention groups and subgroups”. The [254]*254Commission could establish classifications, os groups, by a composite consideration of the four factors, and only those employees falling within a particular classification or group would be “competing”.

From a practical point of view, we think that Congress meant to give the Commission a wide measure of discretion in the formulation of rules to deal with the difficult administrative problem arising from the reduction of federal employees and the complications of veterans’ rights. It did not, we think, mean to foreclose the Commission by unequivocally requiring that veterans, regardless of length of service, be retained over non-veterans, regardless of length of service; or that comparatively inexperienced veterans compose the reduced federal force in preference to experienced non-veteran personnel. But we think that Congress left that difficult solution largely to the Commission, and so long as the Commission stays within the reasonable limits of the “due effect” directive, the courts must leave it there.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
165 F.2d 251, 83 U.S. App. D.C. 44, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 2061, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hilton-v-forrestal-cadc-1947.