Hillman v. New York State Steel Co.

W.D. New York

Hillman v. New York State Steel Co.

209 F. 715, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1148

DecidedOctober 27, 1913

StatusPublished

This text of 209 F. 715 (Hillman v. New York State Steel Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hillman v. New York State Steel Co., 209 F. 715, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1148 (W.D.N.Y. 1913).

Pincite

Opinion

HAZEL, District Judge.

The question of the legal liability of the Standard Accident Insurance Company for the full amount of $5,000, at which, according to the petition, the judgment recovered against the defendant can be compromised, is involved in such doubt as to the right of the receivers to recover the full amount paid by them that I am constrained to advise that such offer of compromise or settlement be not accepted. Payment of the judgment on the basis of the proposed settlement would no doubt involve the receivers in a protracted and expensive litigation with the insurance company, and as I believe the policy to be distinctly one of indemnity—one that does not in terms compel the insurance company to pay the judgment when the liability is established, but only to reimburse the assured for the loss sustained—I am disinclined to authorize a settlement, especially in view of the construction which the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of this state has given to insurance policies of this description. See Saratoga Trap Rock Co. v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 143 App. Div. 852, 128 N. Y. Supp. 822, Beyer v. International Aluminum Co., 115 App. Div. 853, 101 N. Y. Supp. 83, Burke v. London Guarantee Accident Co., 47 Misc. Rep. 171, 93 N. Y. Supp. 652, and Munro v. Maryland Casualty Co., 48 Misc. Rep. 184, 96 N. Y. Supp. 705; which cases in principle disagree with the case of Sanders v. Insurance Co., 72 N. H. 485, 57 Atl. 655, 101 Am. St. Rep. 688, and in addition the case of Travelers’ Insurance Co. v. Moses, 63 N. J. Eq. 260, 49 Atl. 720, 92 Am. St. Rep. 663, which substantially warrants holding that the claim of fhe receivers against the insurance [716]*716company can only be for the proportionate share that will be paid out of the assets of the defendant corporation to the judgment creditor on final distribution. I recognize that in that case the judgment debtor was in bankruptcy and the judgment creditor had filed proof of claim in bankruptcy, yet as here the affairs of the corporation are sought to be wound up in equity, the action having been brought for the protection of the creditors of the coi'poration, there is such analogy between the two cases that the principle of the Moses Case is thought applicable.

An appropriate order may be entered.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

HAZEL, District Judge.

The question of the legal liability of the Standard Accident Insurance Company for the full amount of $5,000, at which, according to the petition, the judgment recovered against the defendant can be compromised, is involved in such doubt as to the right of the receivers to recover the full amount paid by them that I am constrained to advise that such offer of compromise or settlement be not accepted. Payment of the judgment on the basis of the proposed settlement would no doubt involve the receivers in a protracted and expensive litigation with the insurance company, and as I believe the policy to be distinctly one of indemnity—one that does not in terms compel the insurance company to pay the judgment when the liability is established, but only to reimburse the assured for the loss sustained—I am disinclined to authorize a settlement, especially in view of the construction which the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of this state has given to insurance policies of this description. See Saratoga Trap Rock Co. v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 143 App. Div. 852, 128 N. Y. Supp. 822, Beyer v. International Aluminum Co., 115 App. Div. 853, 101 N. Y. Supp. 83, Burke v. London Guarantee Accident Co., 47 Misc. Rep. 171, 93 N. Y. Supp. 652, and Munro v. Maryland Casualty Co., 48 Misc. Rep. 184, 96 N. Y. Supp. 705; which cases in principle disagree with the case of Sanders v. Insurance Co., 72 N. H. 485, 57 Atl. 655, 101 Am. St. Rep. 688, and in addition the case of Travelers’ Insurance Co. v. Moses, 63 N. J. Eq. 260, 49 Atl. 720, 92 Am. St. Rep. 663, which substantially warrants holding that the claim of fhe receivers against the insurance [716]*716company can only be for the proportionate share that will be paid out of the assets of the defendant corporation to the judgment creditor on final distribution. I recognize that in that case the judgment debtor was in bankruptcy and the judgment creditor had filed proof of claim in bankruptcy, yet as here the affairs of the corporation are sought to be wound up in equity, the action having been brought for the protection of the creditors of the coi'poration, there is such analogy between the two cases that the principle of the Moses Case is thought applicable.

An appropriate order may be entered.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

209 F. 715, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hillman-v-new-york-state-steel-co-nywd-1913.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack