Hillard v. Remington Typewriter Co.

163 F. 281, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5227
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York
DecidedJuly 24, 1908
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 163 F. 281 (Hillard v. Remington Typewriter Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hillard v. Remington Typewriter Co., 163 F. 281, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5227 (circtsdny 1908).

Opinion

HOUGH, District Judge.

Both patents in suit relate to a small but essential part of typewriter mechanism, viz.: the escapement, and the connection between them is so close that, in so far as either patent is related to defendant’s alleged infringement, each reveals the other. The patent already adjudicated (580,281) may be conveniently called the “repulser” patent, and the other similarly denominated the “camming back” patent. This intimate connection between the two inventions is avowed and has been considered by the courts, and, although the repulser idea was fully disclosed in the earlier camming back application, it has been held by the Circuit Court of Appeals proper to “carve out of” the earlier application the repulser thought, and to reserve it as the subject of a subsequent patent.

The opinion of the trial court on the repulser patent sets forth with sufficient fullness the claims and specifications thereof. Although some ■claims alleged to he here infringed were not specifically adverted to in the P'isher Case, it seems unnecessary to again set forth the language of the patent, inasmuch as it is admitted that the substance of the repulser invention as construed in the reported case is found in defendant’s alleged infringing machine, which is the well known and widely used Remington typewriter No. 6. The gist of 'Hillard’s invention was found by the Circuit Court of Appeals to be “the employment of the mainspring which had previously been used to move the paper carriage only, to move the escapement rocker and key levers back to their [282]*282normal positions after the finger key iá depressed by the stroke of the operator,” and what the court believed to be new with Hillard, and therefore entitled to protection, was “the utilization of the mainspring for the purpose described.” It is by this interpretation of the repulser patent that the Remington No. 6 must be judged.

The application for the camming back patent was filed May 13, 1892, renewed November 21, 1894, and thereafter very extensively changed and amplified. Of the claims alleged to be infringed by the Remington No. 6, the following may serve as examples:

“9. In a typewriter escapement, two engaging and disengaging members, one of which can be spaced forward step by step with respect to and under control of the other, and means for spacing the first-mentioned member backward by the impact of the said other member, substantially as described.
“10. In a typewriter escapement, the combination of a rack which can be spaced forward step by step with respect to and under control of a dog, and means for spacing the rack backward by the impact of the dog, substantially as described.”

Both claims were added after November, 1894.

This patent was not directly involved in the Fisher Case, but was considered by the court, which declared that the essence of the invention covered by it was the patentee’s “buckle joint and the cam for camming the carriage back.” The buckle joint 'was made just as prominent in the repulser patent as it was in the camming back patent, yet it was held by the lower court, and no exception taken to the finding by the appellate tribunal, that the joint was not of the essence of that invention, and defendant could not escape infringement by avoiding its use. The train of reasoning which in the Fisher Case eliminated the buckle joint from consideration is applicable here.

But with respect to the camming back patent, it is further urged by defendant that the original application for that patent disclosed no means of camming back the paper carriage, but only of camming back the spacing dog. So far as I am able to comprehend the vague and elusive language of the original application for the camming back patent, I believe this to be true; but it is also true that, when Hillard filed that application in 1892, he was at pains to say that he did not limit himself to combining his “carriage retracting mechanism” with any particular let-off mechanism,.etc., and, since the whole of the voluminous evidence submitted shows clearly that these inventions are really one, it does not seém to me proper to give to the camming back patent any less broad and generous interpretation than has been accorded to the repulser patent by the Circuit Court of Appeals.

It having been held therefore that the repulser patent is to be understood in a broad sense and without reference to the particular construction shown and described in the application therefor, so that the patent covers and includes any typewriter construction wherein carriage propelling power acts to return the members of the escapement and the parts connected therewith including the finger keys and type bars to their normal positions, it must be held by a parity of reasoning that the camming back patent covers and includes any typewriter construction whereby the rack and attached paper carriage can be spaced forward step by step with respect to and under control of a [283]*283clog, and spaced backward by the impact of said dog. It is, of course, obvious that varying the construction by attaching the dogs' to the paper carriage while separating the rack therefrom is a mechanical equivalent not preventing infringement.

The scope of Hillard’s patents having been thus fixed cither by controlling decision or analogy thereto, the relation of defendant’s escapement to that invention requires statement. This litigation is singular, in that there does not exist, and never has existed, any commercial machine made or sold by or for complainant and presenting his own embodiment of his own ideas. So far as the business world is concerned, these are paper patents, and counsel and witnesses alike have reasoned backward from the defendant’s ’ alleged infringing machine and pointed out therein, not imitations of anything that complainant ever made, but reproductions of ideas said to be discoverable in defendant’s claims and specifications.

Following this method, it is found that the Remington machine No. 6 has what is known as a “star wheel” escapement. The teeth of this wheel successively engage with the dogs, and the motion permitted to the teeth by such successive engagements is by well-known methods passed on to the paper carriage, which is always subject to the tension of the mainspring. The star wheel is admittedly an immaterial variation from the older method of permitting the dog faces to engage directly with the rack teeth. In the position of resí a tooth of the star wheel rests on the face of the dog, which is indifferently called “stepping,” “spacing,” “loose,” or “limber” by. the witnesses. In the commercial machine the working face of the stepping clog is beveled, but mainly for purposes of clearance, and such bevel is not related to the questions discussed further than that the presence, absence, or degree thereof affects the “drop.” Upon the depression of the letter key, the stepping dog is retracted or rocked toward the operator. The spoke of the star wheel in detent cannot move until the stepping dog is clear. When this occurs the wheel tooth is brought in contact with the other dog, indifferently called the “rigid” or “holding” dog. This release of the stepping dog and engagement of the wheel tooth with the rigid dog occurs before the letter key is fully depressed, and it is obvious that the length of stroke necessary for disengagement from the stepping dog and engagement with the rigid one is a matter capable of adjustment by varying the width of one dog or the other or the relation of the key lever to ihe rocker connected with the dogs.

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Related

Schnell v. United States
166 F.2d 479 (Second Circuit, 1948)
In re Hillard
48 App. D.C. 493 (D.C. Circuit, 1919)
Union Pac. R. v. United States
219 F. 427 (Eighth Circuit, 1915)
Hillard v. Fisher Book Typewriter Co.
195 F. 932 (Second Circuit, 1912)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
163 F. 281, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5227, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hillard-v-remington-typewriter-co-circtsdny-1908.